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Abstract 
This is a case study dissertation to research the socio-political conflict surrounding Gilles 
Eric Séralini’s et al (2012) research on the toxicity of Monsanto’s NK603 line of corn 
and the herbicide Roundup. The study analyzes this conflict as a system of interconnected 
and often conflicting interests, assumptions and ideologies about how knowledge is 
created and transformed from the research stage to the policy implementation stage. The 
goal of this study is to: 1.) analyze critical surface level and underlying factors that 
contribute to the conflict; 2.) analyze systemic processes between national and 
international researchers, private interests and government policymakers in developing 
and implementing research protocols, policies and regulations pertaining (but not limited) 
to Monsanto’s NK603 corn and Roundup; 3.) identify potential patterns of knowledge 
transformation from the research stage to policy implementation. The theoretical 
approach used in this study considers social construction, critical theory and Kuhn’s 
theory of scientific revolution. In utilizing case study methodology, this study 
incorporates internal analysis of Séralini’s case with a basic comparative analysis of DDT 
and lead policy processes and knowledge transformation, using mainly secondary data 
sources supplemented with primary interview material from two select researchers using 
purposive sampling. By conducting this research, it is hoped that this study reveals a 
better understanding of the complex interconnected systems that help create and 
transform food safety policies and the science that supports and/or transforms them.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Background 
The Basics 
It might be helpful to first get a basic understanding (a much more in-depth 
conversation follows throughout the text) of how crops are regulated within the U.S. For 
the last several decades, U.S. conventional crop regulation has been divided between the 
USDA, the FDA and the EPA. The USDA determines the hazardous potential of a crop 
to ensure that crops, when they are approved by the USDA (e.g. new crop varieties 
derived from hybridization), do not pose a threat to the agricultural system (e.g. 
beneficial plants and insects) and surrounding environment. The EPA ensures that the 
pesticides used in crop production are safe for human (and animal) consumption by 
analyzing toxicity studies and setting pesticide residue levels based on their assessment of 
those studies. Those pesticide residue levels are then tested, to some extent, by the USDA 
and the FDA. The main function of the FDA, in terms of food safety, is to ensure that 
after a crop (grown for human consumption) is harvested and/or manufactured for 
commercial sale the end product is free from hazardous substances that could threaten 
human health—including checking for pesticide residue level compliance. These 
agencies do not simply test what others give to them, but they also conduct their own 
research, expanding their understanding and capacity to address current and potential 
health hazards that might stem from the U.S. agricultural production and consumption 
system.  
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United States Department of Agriculture 
The safety of the U.S. agricultural system could be considered a source of pride 
for farmers, consumers, and policymakers alike. Part of American cultural heritage prides 
itself on “pulling oneself up by one’s own bootstraps” and it ties in well with the bold, 
courageous and innovative efforts it took to develop what was once considered by 
European settlers as a “wild and hostile” land. Agriculture has been central to U.S. 
settlement, development and prosperity as it provides a basis, literally, for growth. The 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has been supporting U.S. agricultural 
development for over 150 years (first established in 1862 when Abraham Lincoln signed 
into law what he dubbed “the people’s department”) providing public research and 
resources that promoted plant and soil sciences to improve and increase U.S. crop 
viability and production. A multitude of USDA public programs have helped grow and 
distribute our nation’s food supply to not only the general population, but also addressing 
the food and nutritional needs of the poor. Part of the efforts in increasing yield and 
decreasing production costs of the U.S. agricultural system was built on an increasing 
dependence on chemical inputs (e.g. pesticides and fertilizers), but although U.S. 
production rates were impressive, the negative consequences (public and environmental 
health) of many of the chemicals used in the past (e.g. lead arsenate and DDT) 
undoubtedly made for a more inviting discussion of an alternative, potentially safer 
method of farming. 
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Environmental Protection Agency 
Rachel Carson’s research on environmental contaminants contributed to a 
heightened public and political awareness of pesticide hazards 
(https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt/search?q1=Rachel%20Carson;id=mdp.3901502263598
4;view=1up;seq=11;start=1;sz=10;page=search;orient=0). Pollution control became a 
critical national issue, but it became glaringly obvious that federal environmental 
pollution regulation and oversight was inefficient and ineffective. Pollution control was 
fragmented between multiple departments and accountability gaps and overlaps in 
addressing environmental issues were common. In addition, most of the federal 
department’s goals focused on other priorities, leaving environmental issues as a bi-
product or secondary concern. The system, as it was, challenged the U.S. government’s 
capacity to effectively research, regulate and mitigate environmental hazards. In 
response, President Nixon’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization proposed a 
new Administration solely responsible for protecting the nation’s environmental integrity 
and the public health from environmental hazards. To do this, the Council on 
Environmental Quality was merged into the newly formed EPA in 1970. In addition, an 
integrative set of environmental responsibilities was reallocated from the following 
administrations and programs were combined into one administrative body—the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): 
 Federal Water Quality Administration of the Department of Interior (DOI),  
 Pesticides Research and Standard-Setting Programs of the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) 
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 Pesticide Registration Program of the Agricultural Research Service of the
Department of Agriculture (USDA),
 Environmental Control Administration, National Air Pollution Control of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW), and
 Radiation Protection Standards (certain functions) of the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC). (https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/ash-council-memo)
The goal of the EPA—to “establish and enforce environmental standards consistent with 
national environmental goals” — plays a significant role in protecting public health and 
the environment (https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/ash-council-memo). But from the start, 
it was known that the EPA would be operating “on the horns of a dilemma” as an 
advocate and enforcer for public and environmental health in the face of the economic 
progress that matches, and perhaps also drives, our accustomed or desired standard of 
living. As stated in the Ash Council Memo for President Nixon which initially laid out 
the rationale and structure for the EPA, a  
[s]ound environmental administration must reconcile divergent interests and serve
the total public constituency. It must appreciate and take fully into account 
competing social and economic claims…[in order to] sustain a well-articulated 
attack on the practices which debase the air we breathe, the water we drink and 
            the land that grows our food. (https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/ash-council-memo) 
Food and Drug Administration 
Regulating approximately 80% of the total gross national product, the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for ensuring that commercial food is safe to 
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consume (except meat, poultry and eggs which are the USDA’s responsibility). The FDA 
is mainly concerned with post-market safety, meaning that once a food is commercially 
available to the public, the FDA is responsible for carrying out regulatory standards that 
ensure it is safe for human consumption or protective measures if it is found to be toxic.  
Introducing Agricultural Biotechnology 
Genetically modified, GMO’s, bioengineered, transgenic and genetically 
engineered (GE) are all different ways to talk about the same thing—the seeds/plants 
which have been modified through r-DNA techniques, which is, according to the U.S. 
National Institute of Health, “foods [that] have had foreign genes (genes from other 
plants or animals) inserted into their genetic codes” 
(www.nlm.nig.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/002432.htm). This is a key distinction from 
traditional plant hybridization which develops new varieties and traits by crossing genes 
from the same plant family.  
Company Histories 
Since the 1990’s, the bio-agricultural industry, however, has experienced great 
economic gain. Between 1994 and 1997, the USDA granted non-regulated status for a 
variety of genetically engineered crops from a handful of industry manufacturers: 
Calgene (tomato, cotton and rapeseed); Upjohn (squash); Monsanto (soybean, potato, 
cotton; tomato; corn-glufosinate tolerant); Zeneca & Petoseed (tomato); Ciba Seeds 
(corn—insect resistant); AgroEvo (corn—glufosinate tolerant); Dekalb (corn-glufosinate 
tolerant); etc. There were approximately a dozen crops that the USDA had determined 
non-regulated status by the time Monsanto petitioned for non-regulated status for GA-21 
6 
 
(the glyphosate tolerant pre-cursor to NK603). In Monsanto’s (and DeKalb Genetics 
Corporation) petition to the USDA, Mutz, et al. (July 30, 1997) emphasized GA21’s 
“environmental and safety characteristics”, describing glyphosate as not only highly 
effective for weed control during the growing season, but it binds to the soil thus 
reducing leeching (and runoff contamination), biodegrades quickly and has “extremely 
low toxicity to mammals, birds and fish” (p. 2).  
But GA21 did not start with Monsanto. Bayer Crop Science, S.A. used to be 
Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. (formerly or currently also Aventis Crop Science, SA, 
(http://bayercropscience.com.au/cs/ourcompany/). Rhone-Poulenc Agro (R-PA) and 
Dekalb collaborated, for years—R-PA did initial genetic work on the seeds and Dekalb 
inserted the genes and grew the plants. R-PA developed glyphosate resistant corn and 
patented the genetically modified trait (RD-125). However, in 1994, R-PA “gave” (this 
later gets decided in court that the rights were obtained fraudulently) Dekalb rights of use 
as well as rights to grant sublicenses and in 1996, Monsanto became a significant (40%) 
equity interest owner (with 10% voting stock) in Dekalb and soon obtained a sublicense 
to grow glyphosate resistant corn using R-PA’s RD-125 technology. Part of the 
agreement between R-PA and Dekalb was that Dekalb would report the results of the 
field tests to R-PA. However, in 1994, Dekalb withheld the results (which confirmed 
greenhouse results of glyphosate resistance 4 times the goal expectations set by 
Monsanto) and instead wrote to R-PA asking permission to use RD-125 with soybeans 
(http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/ambriefs/Monsanto.pdf l).  
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Coincidentally, in 1996 Monsanto put their first glyphosate-tolerant crop on the 
market—Roundup Ready soybeans (http://www.monsanto.com/food-inc/pages/seeds-
patent-history.aspx). Withholding the field test results (of the RD-125 corn) from R-PA, 
DeKalb began using plant breeding techniques to make the genetically modified 
glyphosate-tolerant corn a more durable and consistent line. Between 1994 and 1996 
Dekalb had developed the first Roundup Ready corn line (GA21) using R-PA’s RD-125 
and Monsanto began selling it in 1998. Dekalb Genetics Corporation, since 1998, is a 
fully-owned subsidiary of Monsanto, and one of the leading corn seed suppliers in the 
U.S. (http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-federal-circuit/1136223.html). That year (1998), 
Monsanto’s Robert Fraley, Robert Horsch, Ernest Jaworski, and Stephen Rogers were 
awarded the National Medal for Technology and Innovation (NMTI) “[f]or their 
pioneering achievements in plant biology and agricultural biotechnology, and for global 
leadership in the development and commercialization of genetically modified crops to 
enhance agricultural productivity and sustainability” 
(http://www.uspto.gov/about/nmti/recipients/1998.jsp). This reward pairs well with 
Monsanto’s John F. Franz’ 1985 NMTI “[f]or his discovery of the herbicidal properties 
of glyphosates which have had significant consequences upon the production of 
agricultural food and fiber as well as upon agricultural practices throughout the world” 
(http://www.uspto.gov/about/nmti/recipients/1985.jsp).   
NK603 and Roundup 
The trade name for NK603 corn is “Roundup-Ready Corn” and has been sold 
alone as an herbicide (Roundup) tolerant seed or as a seed that is a combined (stacked) 
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with other GMO traits that offer herbicide tolerance and insect resistance. The patent for 
NK603 expired in 2015 and in response Monsanto has developed and is marketing a new 
version, Roundup Ready 2, which allows a broader timespan to spray and tolerates a 
higher rate of herbicide application (http://deltafarmpress.com/monsanto-new-roundup-
ready-corn-2-system).  There is some confusion, however, in defining Roundup Ready 2 
in regards to earlier reference that distinguished NK603 as Roundup Ready 2 from its 
predecessor, GA-21 (the original Roundup Ready corn). For the purpose of this study, 
NK603 is Roundup Ready and the study includes an investigation into Roundup Ready 2 
corn with the assumption that the knowledge creation, transformation and dissemination 
process for each is comparable because the product is marketed as a somewhat equal 
replacement for the patent-expired NK603. In other words, Roundup Ready 2 is virtually 
the same as NK603 but Monsanto was able to obtain a separate patent because it attached 
the glyphosate tolerant gene to a different “promotor” in the gene sequence (Lawson and 
Charnley, 2016). Both NK603 and Roundup are property of Monsanto and currently 
approved by over 20 countries around the world, including the U.S., Canada, European 
Union, China, Japan and the Russian Federation and they are promoted as safe for human 
consumption (assuming Roundup is not consumed directly but as a residue).  
Roundup is a brand name for the pesticide that Monsanto developed as part of the 
herbicide tolerant corn system. Its main ingredient is glyphosate and the Roundup 
formulation is glyphosate mixed with “other” ingredients—adjuvants and surfactants. 
One of these surfactants is polyethoxylated tallowamine (POEA), of which several 
Roundup formulas contain. POEA’s have become a central part of the conflict with rising 
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concern regarding its impact on human, aquatic and animal health. But without 
surfactants, such as POEA’s, glyphosate would not be as effective as an herbicide. What 
makes the glyphosate plus surfactants/adjuvants so effective (I will use POEA’s here as 
an example since it is part of the conflict) is that when glyphosate is applied to a plant, 
the salt and POEA enhance the chemical’s ability to drive into the cells of the plant , 
enabling the chemical to travel through the leaves, down the stem and to the roots and 
shoots and from there it can enter into the soil, biodegrading into its major metabolite, 
(i.e. the major component left after glyphosate breaks down)—aminomethylphosphonic 
acid (AMPA). Glyphosate binds very well to certain types of soil (less sandy), 
biodegrading (according to some) within a few weeks and, therefore, is marketed for 
being a low-risk pesticide for run-off contamination. The two products, Roundup and 
NK603 (and its stacked versions) are widely marketed as a safer, more environmentally 
sound alternative for weed control than other, more hazardous conventional solutions.  
Séralini 
This dissertation focuses on the agricultural biotechnology research and policies 
surrounding a recent study conducted by Gilles-Eric Séralini, et al (2012) (representing 
researchers independent of the bio-agriculture industry) and the subsequent conflict 
arising from industry-related scientists, government bodies and Monsanto regarding 
Séralini’s, et al (2012) work. Séralini’s, et al (2012) study examined the long-term 
toxicity of a specific variety of NK603 and the herbicide Roundup with which the corn is 
designed to work. Using Séralini’s et al (2012) study will provide a basis of 
understanding the broader issue of food safety testing, assessment, policy and regulation.  
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Séralini and his team argued that approval for these products was based on the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) internationally 
accepted 90-day standard for sub-chronic toxicity tests and does not, subsequently, 
demonstrate long-term safety. To compensate for this gap in the research, he and his team 
designed a 2-year chronic toxicity test that expanded on a previous industry-led 
(Monsanto’s) 13-week study on NK603 from which Séralini had interpreted changes 
between the control and test animals indicating potential toxicity. Séralini et al (2012) 
emphasized that theirs was the only study, to date, that examined long-term toxicity of 
NK603. In addition, Séralini et al (2012) noted that, prior to their research, studies on 
herbicides typically examined the main ingredient in Roundup, glyphosate, but not the 
product as a whole which would include the adjuvants that enhance the capacity for 
glyphosate to work. They submitted the results of their study, titled “Long term toxicity 
of a Roundup herbicide and a Roundup-tolerant genetically modified maize” along with 
photos of rats with large tumors, concluding that the results of their study indicated that 
NK603, Roundup and glyphosate were toxic and that additional long-term studies were 
necessary to confirm or reject their initial findings.  
Shortly after Séralini’s study was published in Food and Chemical Toxicology 
journal, letters of protest to Séralini’s article began to populate the journal’s editorial 
section, emphasizing “concerns about the validity of the findings it described; the proper 
use of animals; and even allegations of fraud” (http://www.elsevier.com/about/press-
releases/research-and-journals/elsevier-announces-article-retraction-from-journal-food-
and-chemical-toxicology). Séralini was asked by the journal’s Editor-in-Chief, A. 
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Wallace Hayes, to submit all of his team’s research data for review and Hayes 
commended him on “his willingness and openness in participating in this dialog”; 
however, after a thorough review, the journal’s Editor-in-Chief  “found no evidence of 
fraud or intentional misrepresentation of the data…but, ultimately, the results presented 
(while not incorrect) are inconclusive, and therefore do not reach the threshold of 
publication for Food and Chemical Toxicology” (ibid). The European Food Safety 
Authority also reviewed Séralini’s, et al (2012) study and concluded that the study design 
and the presentation of the data negated any conclusions of carcinogenicity (EFSA, 
2012). Prior to the article retraction, Richard Goodman, who was identified by several 
anti-GMO groups (gmoanswers.com; march-against-monsanto.com; gmwatch.org, etc.) 
and confirmed by the Editor-in-Chief, as a former Monsanto employee, was hired as part 
of the editorial board (https://www.elsevier.com/about/press-releases/research-and-
journals/food-and-chemical-toxicology-editor-in-chief,-a.-wallace-hayes,-publishes-
response-to-letters-to-the-editors). In a written response to a multitude of complaints 
about industry pressuring the journal to retract the article, Hayes announced that the 
journal’s editorial board consisted of “academic, government, and industrial scientists”, 
emphasizing that Hayes was hired for his scientific expertise and that his appointment as 
Associate Editor, as well as the article retraction, “was not influenced by Monsanto, or 
any other party” and the decision to retract Séralini’s article was his (Hayes’) alone (ibid, 
p. 1). In addition to perceptions of conflict of interest, Hayes’s response addressed 
complaints that questioned why an article describing a 90-day study that Monsanto had 
previously submitted was not also retracted, (this was the study that Séralini, et al were 
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replicating). He distinguished Séralini’s study from Monsanto’s study mainly in terms of 
the language used to describe the purpose and what each study claimed as their outcomes. 
Hayes stated that Séralini’s claim that their study potentially linked NK603 and Roundup 
to cancer was unsupported by the data as well as the design of the test, whereas 
Monsanto’s claim of safety was supported by the design and the data (ibid). Séralini had 
responded to this claim, noting that in the article, it is explicit that the study was chronic, 
not carcinogenic, and therefore met the design criteria, but did not preclude them from 
presenting evidence of potential carcinogenicity and suggesting further studies to 
determine the validity of those initial findings. Comparing Séralini’s research article to 
the journal’s “Guide for Authors”, “Publishing Ethics”, and “Article Withdrawal” 
policies, the article technically meets the journal ethical standards and publication 
requirements (https://www.elsevier.com/journals/food-and-chemical-toxicology/0278-
6915/guide-for-authors#8101; https://www.elsevier.com/editors/publishing-ethics; 
https://www.elsevier.com/about/company-information/policies/article-withdrawal). To 
access the letters to the editor and subsequent response pieces, see 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278691512005637.  
The heart of the issue appears not to be whether or not Séralini’s study is 
inconclusive, but rather how science is conducted, interpreted and used. With this as a 
foundation, the resulting knowledge becomes a potentially powerful tool for industry, 
government and public policy development. Following the retraction of Séralini’s study, 
the bio-agriculture industry representatives and U.S. government representatives have 
defended the integrity of the safety tests that support current public policy regarding 
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NK603 and Roundup, but the European Food Safety Authority (although not accepting 
the validity of Séralini’s study) and the European Commission have indicated the 
potential need for long-term feeding studies and, more recently, a re-evaluation of 
Roundup’s main ingredient--glyphosate.  
My initial investigation into this case reveals contexts within contexts that 
integrate science with political, environmental, economic and social issues. However, to 
limit and focus the scope, this study will mainly focus on political, economic and social 
issues. For example, it seems that, according to Domingo and Bordonaba (2011), Diels, et 
al (2011), and Fernandex-Cornejo (June 3, 2010), most legislative and regulatory 
decisions surrounding Monsanto’s NK603 corn and Roundup are made based on 
industry-backed research. Séralini’s case potentially challenges the safety of two of 
Monsanto’s key products, thus challenging the integrity of the science currently backing 
the safety of those products and the status quo of public policy regarding those products, 
which ultimately impacts society at the consumer level.  
Statement of the Problem 
The integration of multiple forms of genetically modified food into the global 
food system assumes a level of safety for human and animal consumption. Government 
policies and regulations regarding how these food products can be disseminated in the 
global market rely mainly on industry-based research (and interpretations) of their results. 
However, there are other scientists who argue that their own research suggests that 
certain genetically modified foods (and the pesticide/herbicide applications with which 
they are designed to work) are potentially unsafe for human and animal consumption. 
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Both sides claim the other’s research is inherently biased, insufficiently designed and 
tested, and inconclusive and/or invalid. The disagreement between researchers regarding 
the science (e.g. research design, methodology and interpretation of outcome) of 
genetically modified foods safety testing, impacts local to international government and 
civil society responses to whether and how genetically modified food should be tested 
and regulated.  
Purpose of the Research 
Reasons for conducting this study are threefold: 1) corn is a major crop that 
impacts U.S. and global economies, health and environment, 2) NK603 corn (whether it 
is grown as a single GE trait or stacked) makes up a significant percentage of corn crop 
acreage and Roundup is one of the most widely used agricultural herbicides, and 3) the 
on-going controversy between scientists, government and industry regarding the safety of 
these products suggests there is a potential red flag in the scientific-industry-government 
triangle of knowledge production, dissemination and implementation. 
The purpose of this research is to present the data and analysis within a systems-
oriented socio-political perspective. I am trained as a social scientist, not a lab scientist; 
therefore, I examined the scientific elements inherent in the topic (e.g. research design 
protocols and the basic research design features of Séralini’s case) as a layperson.  My 
purpose for conducting this research was not to validate or discredit scientific research, 
but rather identify social and/or political processes that impact scientific research and 
vice versa. I examined systemic processes between researchers, private interests and 
government policy makers in the development of research protocols, policies and 
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regulations for Monsanto’s NK603 corn and Roundup and related agricultural 
biotechnology. Although the main focus of the research is U.S. government policy, Yin 
(2004) reminds us that national policy is often set in international context. Thus, this 
research also examined case-related international policy processes, particularly those 
within the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World 
Trade Organization, the European Commission and European Food Safety Authority. Not 
only is the European Union (EU) the setting in which Séralini’s research takes place, but 
EU (a significant importer of genetically modified corn) internal policies regarding bio-
agricultural technology often clash with U.S. international commerce expectations.  
Propositions 
1. My first proposition is that there are certain critical factors that contribute 
to the conflict. On the surface, these factors include:  
 potentially inconsistent research protocols,  
 limited public access to raw data and flexible interpretations of 
subsequent statistics,  
 perceived divergence/alignment between research results and 
public policy/regulatory decisions,  
 transparency in how public policy and regulatory decisions are 
made, and  
 rigid positions from outlying anti- and pro-bio agriculture groups. 
Underlying these factors are issues of trust, values, interests, 
ethics, rights and power. From a conflict analysis perspective, this 
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case is significant because it examines current assumptions about 
the credibility and validity of Science as it pertains to public 
policy-making, public health and private interests.  
2. My second proposition is that there are potential patterns of knowledge 
transformation from the research stage to policy regulation. This is 
important as a potential learning tool for current and future conflicts that 
involve public safety and private and/or government interests. Finding 
patterns enables us to better compare this particular topic to the larger 
scope of food safety as well as the broader consequences and benefits of 
other policy issues involving public safety (Yin, 2004) 
3. My third proposition is Séralini’s study, through its contribution that 
challenges the politically determined standardization of agricultural 
biotechnology toxicology testing, represents a pivotal shift in how 
agricultural biotechnology is researched and perceived as valid by 
illuminating the “crisis” in critical, yet potentially unresolved, problems. 
Research Questions 
How do science and industry influence state-level policy and regulatory decision-making 
processes regarding the safety and/or promotion of a specific genetically modified corn 
(NK603) and the herbicide (Roundup) with which it is designed to work? How and what 
knowledge is generated and how is it transformed between scientists, industry and 
government to create policies and regulations for production and consumption of NK603 
corn? What are the possible benefits/consequences of current safety protocols and how 
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are those protocols met or challenged by Séralini’s research team’s study? How does 
Séralini’s study compare with other major public policy processes, specifically compared 
with DDT and lead?  
Theory and Ethics 
Underlying the language of policy, industry, and science is a common social 
denominator. Stake (1995) suggests that “[t]o the qualitative scholar, the understanding 
of human experience is a matter of chronologies more than of causes and effects” (p. 39). 
This seems to make sense if one considers the complex interconnected systems that help 
create social events. Within the context of scientific research, public/private interests and 
needs, and public policy, cause and effect is not easily determined because of multiple 
direct and indirect influential factors that impact outcomes within that chronology—so a 
comprehensive chronology is more multi-dimensional than linear. But with the 
realization of such complexity, how can chronology offer any more explanation or 
understanding if we do not create a subjective perspective from which to construct and 
understand those events?  Mayring (2000, p. 12) offers a bridge between ideologies of 
objectivity and subjectivity by suggesting that we bracket our prior understandings, 
attitudes and assumptions by “stay[ing] persistently curious about new phenomena”. 
Without bracketing one’s own bias, there is increased potential that the research gathered 
to create the foundation of analysis is also biased, and therefore less credible. In other 
words, I strived to limit my bias by consciously opening my mind to new possibilities and 
new perspectives. I willingly sought to broaden the boundaries of my personal realities in 
order to achieve a more holistic understanding of the phenomenon.  
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Social construction. 
This study is important to help understand how information is shaped and used 
from its creation within the research lab to its implementation in public policy. Why this 
information is so important is because in the U.S. and other major Western societies, 
science and scientific process is highly valued as a determinant of truth and fact. It helps 
these cultures determine the boundaries of reality. Integral to creating these boundaries 
are how our ideologies help shape our worldviews and what we value; when one group’s 
ideologies conflict with another group’s ideologies, there is, as Gergen (2009) suggests, a 
tension between insiders and outsiders, us v them, right v wrong which lends to a 
negative perception of the “other”. How one constructs perceptions of scientific validity 
could be perceived as stemming from socially constructed transitions from, for example, 
religious and political autocracy to Enlightenment and the “rise of science, objectivity 
and truth” (Gergen, 2009, p. 27). However, Gergen (2009) also emphasizes that science, 
objectivity and truth have not only the capacity to empower, but also to dominate as we 
construct “knowledge class” of haves and have nots in which access to the knowledge 
creation (and the knowledge itself) is restricted to privileged individuals and/or groups 
(ibid). The exchange of knowledge within and between scientists, industry, policy makers 
and the public occurs within a social context.   
Using social construction as one of my theoretical foundations in thinking about 
the conflict within this case, the tension between scientists, industry and government is 
maintained by conflicting ideologies, values, and interests that have been constructed 
through social (e.g. human) interactions. Alternatively, when differing socially 
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constructed realities meet, there is an opportunity to invite change and to allow one’s 
worldview, ideologies, values and interests…one’s boundaries of reality…to shift. 
Throughout this research there is a consistent thread of relationships and social 
interactions that influence how science is conducted, how it is assessed and how it is 
delivered and received in a broader social context.  
Scientific revolution. 
Researching from a social construction perspective is complemented by 
considering Kuhn’s (1996) theory on scientific revolution. “[D]uring revolutions, 
scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places 
they have looked before” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 111). According to Kuhn, the science that 
society accepts as “normal” is simply the current trend in how to conduct and interpret 
valid scientific research. Sowell (2007) describes these trends as “visions” that mold and 
establish our moral, political, economic, religious and social ideas. That is, until an 
anomaly challenges the current trend’s capacity to solve a significant problem, which 
leads to a scientific “crisis” in which new methodologies and theories are tested until 
something succeeds at solving a piece of the puzzle. This, in turn, leads to a “paradigm 
shift” in which the previously validated theory and methodology is replaced with 
something unexpected that requires a new theory and method to be developed to 
explain/solve that piece of the puzzle (http://bertie.ccsu.edu/naturesci/PhilSci/Kuhn.html; 
https://www.uky.edu/~eushe2/Pajares/Kuhn.html). What might cause this revolution is a 
juncture between conflicting paradigms that challenges current standards. But if there is 
discrepancy between what some policy makers, scientists and public consider valid in 
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terms of current standards as in the case of agricultural biotechnology, the transition 
remains in “crisis” until a solution is found that resolves the “problem” and is accepted 
and mainstreamed by the general population. Sowell (2007) suggests that visions form 
the basis upon which the theories and hypothesis surrounding perceived problems and 
solutions are framed. When a scientific “crisis” occurs, Sowell (ibid) suggests that, in 
theory, divergent conclusions can be checked and verified by scientific processes. 
However, Sowell, in suggesting why this verification process might be hindered, states 
that “[a] great deal of partial evidence may be accumulated on each side, but the evidence 
for and against one’s own vision can be weighed differently, and being convinced is 
ultimately a subjective process” (p. 232).  
Séralini and his team were not the first researchers to question scientific 
anomalies resulting from past toxicology studies and they were not the first to conduct 
toxicity studies that challenge the status quo of genetically engineered crop and pesticide 
safety, so how might Séralini’s case be different? Séralini and his team challenged the 
status quo of a significant research design protocol (90-day toxicity studies) not only by 
explicitly questioning the validity of current scientific standards but by producing a study 
that potentially challenges the status quo of current public policies and industry 
ideologies. According to Sowell (2007), a party responding negatively to evidence (e.g. 
through “denial, evasion, and obfuscation”) indicates a level of threat that the evidence 
represents. In the case of Séralini, it might be perceived that divergent visions of “sound 
science” are being challenged by the evidence presented in Monsanto’s study versus the 
evidence presented in Séralini’s study (p. 233). Sowell (ibid) goes on to state that “[a]t 
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one extreme in the relationship of evidence to visions is the total subordination of 
evidence to conclusions based on a vision or the theories deriving from it” (p. 233). 
Operating outside the social constructs of industry and government offered Séralini and 
his team a different perspective from which to accept and or question the science and 
policies of NK603 and Roundup, and their study, with the help of mainstream media, 
offered a sort of spotlight that highlighted the larger conflict in which other independent 
scientists could join regarding how, what, and why certain scientific assumptions are 
considered valid, or not. It is possible, however, that this case ends with circular 
arguments from conflicting parties about, as Kuhn (1996) puts it, “what is a problem and 
what [is] a solution” (p. 109). But, I feel optimistic that these conflicting systems and 
worldviews are somehow converging and that change is inevitable.  
Critical theory. 
Anticipating this change, critical theory is influential to my perspective and 
played a significant role in how I analyzed the system dynamics within the context of 
knowledge, power and social change within and between two major democratic bodies 
(U.S. and E.U.). I analyzed how power is defined and used to create and transform 
knowledge for agricultural biotechnology science and policy. Applying critical theory to 
this study suggests that the system, to some extent, currently supports social oppression 
(or knowledge repression) and that “[o]ur knowledge of material “facts,” for example, 
cannot be disconnected from the social understandings or interpretations of those 
facts…” (Payne and Samhat, 2004, p. 14). Using a more Habermasian interpretation of 
critical theory, in which not just mainstream media, but also interpersonal communication 
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develops public thought and understanding, I sought to identify where, in these system 
dynamics, are potential points for knowledge transparency and, therefore, social change 
that integrates a more balanced approach to economic, political and social health 
(http://people.ucalgary.ca/~rseiler/critical.htm). An integral part of shaping public policy 
in a democracy is creating opportunities of developing shared understanding and or 
illuminating knowledge discrepancies within and between public participants. Habermas’ 
critical theory suggests specific criteria that need to be met for public communication and 
understanding to occur:  
 adequate opportunity for people to speak, 
 adequate opportunity to challenge the rules or the topic of discussion, 
 adequate opportunity to acquire the skills of discourse (including those of the 
media), and 
 adequate opportunity to be free of violence and other forms of coercion. 
(http://people.ucalgary.ca/~rseiler/critical.htm) 
My research illustrates how these criteria are currently met and not met in 
developing the science and public policy for agricultural biotechnology. I chose this 
study because of the controversy surrounding the design and outcome of Séralini’s 
research and how this controversy links concepts of credible and valid science to the 
creation and use of knowledge in case related policy and regulation for consumer and 
industry protection. Critical theorists recognized the challenge in public enlightenment 
when technical rationality (in this study I will focus on the government and industry use 
of “sound science”) “on the one hand…was a critical arbiter and espoused the ideal of 
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impartial analysis of truth and on the other hand it became the instrument of perpetrating 
domination of nature and humans by technicalising administrative, political, and 
bureaucratic processes” (http://www.unipune.ac.in/snc/cssh/ipq/english/IPQ/21-
25%20volumes/25%2002/PDF/25-2-7.pdf). Overall, critical theory, as it is used in this 
research, seeks to explain social ideologies in terms of “human emancipation through 
consciousness and self-reflection” by “evaluating the rationality of any system of 
domination in view of certain standards of justice” (http://www.iep.utm.edu/frankfur/). In 
this study I will analyze the role agricultural biotechnology plays in whether/how 
individual, institutional, state and corporate security (as it pertains to independence, 
power and status) impact the transformation of knowledge.  
Systems theory. 
In order to analyze such complexity, I have conducted my research through the 
lens of systems theory, framing my analysis of how science, industry and politics 
influence, and are influenced by, each other in terms of interrelated elements of a 
complex web—identifying and analyzing the dynamics between access points of 
influence, outcomes generated, feedback loops, delays and leverage points (Meadows, 
2008). Systems theory in regards to science and public policy development could be 
interpreted as a challenge to scientific validity if one perceives science as the means to 
“explain observable phenomena by reducing them to an interplay of elementary units 
investigable independently of each other” 
(http://www.panarchy.org/vonbertalanffy/systems.1968.html). Agricultural 
biotechnology as is it regulated in the U.S. could be argued to support such a classical 
24 
 
worldview as plant DNA parts, although considered complex, are replaceable because the 
plant system is assumed to be mechanistic and the mechanisms are assumed (by some) to 
be understood and predictable in identifying a piece of the puzzle. But it does not 
describe the whole picture. Systems theory seeks to integrate “elementary units” within a 
broader dynamic context in which the parts are analyzed in relation to the whole 
(Meadows, 2008; Laszlo, 1996; 
http://www.panarchy.org/vonbertalanffy/systems.1968.html). Systems theory is integral 
in my research and analysis because it provides an opportunity to discover how the parts: 
the research, the relationships, the perceptions and the public policy interact and 
influence each other to maintain and/or change the system within which they operate. It 
also provides a foundational assumption that public policy that utilizes scientific data as a 
basis for decision-making potentially inhibits the system within which it operates, if the 
“elementary units” of scientific data are insufficient to effectively exist within the broader 
social and environmental contexts. 
Taking into consideration that a researcher’s selection of data is not a complete 
picture, the best I can offer is a perspective (a version—a socially constructed reality of 
how things happen or what “actually” happened). Thus, it becomes necessary to 
triangulate a variety of perspectives, integrating and respecting the voices and values of 
relevant stakeholders in order to create a more balanced representation of “reality”. 
Throughout this process, it is also my responsibility and priority, as a researcher, to 
maintain consciousness of, and strive to minimize (if not eliminate), personal biases 
throughout the research process. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Background 
Introduction 
Genetically modified, GMO’s, bioengineered, transgenic and genetically 
engineered (GE) are all different ways to talk about the same thing—the seeds/plants 
which have been modified through r-DNA techniques, which is, according to the U.S. 
National Institute of Health, “foods [that] have had foreign genes (genes from other 
plants or animals) inserted into their genetic codes” 
(www.nlm.nig.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/002432.htm). Within this text, agricultural 
biotechnology refers to the agricultural system that utilizes genetically engineered crops 
and the chemical applications with which they are designed to work. This system is often 
referred to within the context of innovation and technology. Agricultural bio-technology 
industry refers to the companies that develop and market genetically engineered seeds 
(and the chemical pesticide applications with which they are designed to work). To 
clarify the distinction between hybridization and genetically engineered food, the process 
of inserting foreign genes distinguishes genetically modified food from food that has 
been modified through hybridization (which manipulates genetic qualities through same-
species modifications). The development and promotion of food innovation technologies 
is currently being promoted as a viable solution to the overuse of chemical agricultural 
applications as well as a potential solution to food shortages across the globe. 
Since corn is a significant commodity for the U.S. economy, the policies and 
regulations surrounding its evolution from seed to consumer have a major impact on the 
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industries that research and develop seed varieties as well as the farmers who grow them, 
the environment they’re grown in, and the consumers (human and animal) who eat any of 
the corn products available on the market. Balancing risk with benefits is not simply 
about consumer and environmental health, but also about the economic health of the 
agricultural industry and national interests that extend from local to global contexts. The 
economic, environmental and social implications of biotech corn production, trade and 
consumption make it a key target for public, private and political debate. Innovative food 
technology seems to be a key factor in maintaining U.S. economic and political status as 
a global leader. 
According to Kogan (2007) and the USDA, biotechnology in agriculture has 
gained prominence within commercial and industrial markets and promises a level of 
political power in terms of increasing economic advantage within the international 
market (http://www.usda.gov/documents/BIOTECHNOLOGY.pdf, n.d.). However, 
Domingo and Bordanaba (2011) note in their study that much of the published research 
promoting GM varieties as safe was conducted by “biotechnology companies or 
associates, which are also responsible [for] commercializing these GM plants” (p. 741). 
According to the USDA, the science involved in testing the safety of specific bio-
agricultural products is not free from external influence, but rather it is part of a system in 
which the needs and interests of industry, national governments and the public compete 
(USDA Office of Communications, March 2003).  
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Crop Significance 
 According to the most recent Prospective Planting survey, corn is arguably the 
most significant commercial crop grown in the U.S. with total crop acreage equaling 93.6 
million acres (USDA NASS, March 31, 2016). This is impressive, considering that from 
1900 to 1956, corn crop acreage decreased by approximately 40 million acres (94.9 
million acres to 54.6 million acres) and has gradually regained that acreage throughout 
the last sixty years with about 25% of that gain in just the last five years (According to 
the National Corn Growers Association, approximately 31% of total U.S. harvested crop 
land is used to grow corn 
(http://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/Field_Crops/index.asp). According to 
Fausti (2015), the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, aka The 
Freedom to Farm Act, offered payment incentives that made farming at a large scale 
more affordable, and a series of biofuel policies offered “motivation [that] opened the 
door for producers to adopt a corn/soybean monoculture production system” (p.2). 
According to Weeks (1992), however, “[w]hen a city or nation has only one or two major 
industries or exports, it is quite vulnerable to economic downfall when that one industry 
or export suffers hard times” (p. 35). Currently, there is more corn produced in the U.S. 
than all the other grain crops combined and it is, by far, the largest feed crop in the U.S. 
more commonly grown for human consumption and industrial uses (Capehart, Oct. 16, 
2014). It is processed into starch, oil, alcohol, sweeteners and ethanol fuel (ibid). As the 
global leader in corn production, the U.S. is also the leading trade partner in international 
corn and coarse grains trade, with 20% of U.S. corn crops being exported (which 
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accounts for a total of 32% of the world’s corn) (Capehart, Oct. 16, 2014; 
http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/ag101/cropmajor.html, Apr. 11, 2013).   
Herbicide Tolerant Corn 
Of the approximate 90 million acres of commercial corn that is grown in the U.S., 
92% is genetically modified to be herbicide tolerant (Fernandez-Cornejo and Weschler, 
July 9, 2015). Of the eleven most commonly used herbicides in U.S. commercial 
agriculture (plus one category generalized as “other”), glyphosate accounted for 38% 
(Fernandez-Cornejo, Osteen, Nehring, and Wechsler, June 2014). Since its introduction 
into commercial agriculture, glyphosate (the active ingredient in Roundup) has 
dominated the market for herbicide applications, mainly because of the widespread 
adoption of genetically engineered herbicide tolerant crops (i.e. Roundup-Ready crops) 
that are designed to tolerate glyphosate. However, single-trait Roundup-Ready crops are 
not the only GMO crops designed to withstand glyphosate applications; the market for 
genetically engineered seeds has broadened from single trait seeds (e.g. seeds engineered 
to internally produce a specific insecticide or seeds that are tolerant of a specific 
herbicide) to seeds with stacked traits, making them resistant to, for example, to a 
specific type of insect or fungus and tolerant of herbicidal (specifically glyphosate) 
applications. This means that Monsanto, in addition to other major agricultural bio-
technology companies, such as Dow and Syngenta, among others, are producing a variety 
of crop options that can withstand glyphosate applications. The patent expiration of 
Roundup Ready corn (mentioned above) opens market opportunities for generic brands 
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of Roundup tolerant corn, potentially increasing the amount of glyphosate tolerant corn 
that is already grown as farmers will be able to save generic seeds for replanting.  
But Roundup is not limited to genetically engineered crops; Roundup, and other 
glyphosate formulations, can also be applied, in diluted concentrations, to conventional 
crops (as well as in forestry applications, ditches and golf courses, lawns, etc.) as a “plant 
growth regulator”. In fact, prior to the introduction of the first Roundup Ready crop, the 
1993 EPA Reregistration Eligibility record lists numerous types of crops (twenty-nine) 
on which glyphosate was applied (EPA, Sept. 1993). When used in this capacity, 
glyphosate formulations are usually applied just prior to harvest as a means to modify 
plant growth and expedite the ripening process 
(http://www3.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/reg_actions/reregistration/red_PC-
417300_1-Sep-93.pdf).  
Genetically modified herbicide corn became an attractive alternative to 
conventionally grown corn for farmers looking, in part, to reduce the amount of herbicide 
application necessary to effectively combat weeds and, in turn, increase their crop 
productivity and improve environmental quality of local land and water resources. With 
widespread adoption of Roundup Ready crops and subsequent use of Roundup and other 
glyphosate products, several weed varieties have grown tolerant as well to glyphosate. 
With Monsanto’s Roundup Ready 2 corn line, farmers will be able to address this 
problem by applying higher rates (within EPA standards) and extending the number of 
times they apply herbicide. The USDA’s Economic Research Service found that in 1996 
(when herbicide tolerant crops were first introduced), herbicide applications on U.S. corn 
30 
 
crops initially decreased but then increased in subsequent years (Fernandez-Cornejo, 
Wechsler and Livingston, March 04, 2014). Between 2002 and 2005, glyphosate 
application rates increased five-fold while corn crop acreage only increased three-fold for 
the same time frame (http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/2009-glyphosate-
registration-review--final-9-21-09_48080.pdf). 
Science and Public Policy 
From a historical perspective, there is cause for public concern when a new 
agricultural technology enters the market that could potentially harm public health. For 
example, the lag time between the first reports of negative health effects and effective 
government legislation and regulation of products, such as with DDT and lead, can be 
decades to over a century apart, respectively (Kraft and Kamieniecki, 2007; Murray, 
1983). In the meantime, according to Domingo and Bordanaba’s research reviewing 
GMO safety testing, for about the first decade of testing, the majority of research on 
genetically modified food safety weighed in favor that GMO’s were safe, but in recent 
decades, there appears to be an increasing balance between research groups that promote 
genetically modified products and/or their chemical counterparts as safe and research 
groups that indicate that there is a serious cause for concern (Feb. 5, 2011).   
Considering that as of Sept. 29
th, 2000, the USDA determined a “non-regulated 
status” for NK603, it seems critical to analyze how policies change when/if new scientific 
information challenges the validity of those policies 
(http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/petitions_table_pending.shtml). However, 
Sowell (2007) offers a precautionary note suggesting that “evidence need not be falsified 
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in order to be evaded” (p. 233). Sowell (ibid) goes on to suggest that visions (e.g. 
economic progress, political strength, concepts of innovation, etc.) can be effectively 
protected from evidence to the contrary by being situated within the context of a theory 
that “may be so stated that nothing could possibly happen that would prove it wrong. In 
this case, the theory is reduced to the empirical meaninglessness; since all possible 
outcomes are consistent with it, it predicts nothing” (p. 233).     
 Snell’s, et al (2011) study of the available research surrounding long-term (longer 
than 90 days up to two years) toxicity studies, also cross referenced available 90-day 
studies to see if there were significant differences in toxicology results in the long-term 
studies as compared with the 90-day studies. The authors concluded that while they noted 
small differences in some of the test results, there were no statistically significant changes 
in the long-term studies and, therefore, also concluded that 90-day studies were sufficient 
and that genetically modified food did not pose a risk to human health.  But what is 
appropriate regarding the necessity perceived that would validate a long-term toxicity 
study is also under debate and is a key factor in whether Séralini’s study is considered 
valid or unnecessary. A major factor contributing to the debate about genetically 
engineered crops is whether the internationally accepted norm of 90-day feeding trials is 
adequate to assume long-term safety. Proponents of current safety standards vouch for 
the 90-day feeding trial as sufficient time to demonstrate whether a product is safe or not 
(Agricultural Research Service, USDA, Feb. 23, 2015; Snell, et.al, 2011). But others, like 
Séralini, emphasize the need for longer studies.   
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Domingo and Bordanaba (Feb. 5, 2005) analyzed safety assessment studies of 
genetically modified plants from 2006-2010, as a follow-up to their previous study of 
published safety tests from 2000-2006. The purpose of their study was to qualitatively 
analyze current published studies regarding genetically modified crops that are grown for 
human consumption. They conclude that although the number of studies have grown 
considerably since their initial study (from 2000-2006), there is a relative dearth of 
comparable research, meaning that although there are a multitude of studies, there is a 
lack of consistency within the study design (e.g. length of study, specific parameters 
measured, type of study—rodent, avian, amphibian, dog, in vitro, etc.) which seems to 
me to be a potential factor driving conflicting perspectives. European Food Safety 
Authority joined U.S. political response to Séralini’s et al (2012) research emphasizing 
methodological flaws in his research, stating that the “authors’ conclusions cannot be 
regarded as scientifically sound because of inadequacies in the design, reporting and 
analysis of the study as outlined in the paper” as the reason for rejecting his claims  and 
that the “EFSA finds there is no need to re-examine its previous safety evaluations of 
NK603 or to consider these findings in the ongoing assessment of glyphosate” 
(http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/121128 ; 
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/121004.htm; 
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Review%20Of%20Seralini%
20Paper%20By%20German%20Govt._Berlin_Germany_10-2-2012.pdf). Séralini, et al 
(2012), responded to critics of their study with an article that explained the motive behind 
conducting the 2-year study, the design methodology and detailed how it adhered to 
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OECD guideline 452 for chronic toxicity testing, and went further into detail regarding 
how their results, although not conclusive, suggested a need for further testing 
(http://www.gmoseralini.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Seralinial-AnswersCritics-
FCT_2013.pdf).  However, Domingo and Bordanaba’s (Feb. 5, 2005) reach similar 
conclusions as Heinemann (Nov. 6, 2012), finding that upon analysis, other GMO and/or 
glyphosate studies have been accepted as valid by scholarly reviewers and government 
representatives even though these studies indicate similar flaws, in research methodology, 
as was found in Séralini’s et al (2012) research. Meyer and Hilbeck’s (2013) comparative 
evaluation, of Séralini’s study with two other (13-week and 90-day) NK603 studies, 
analyzes comparable design and reporting flaws that the EFSA considered sufficient to 
determine Séralini’s study defective, but the authors point out that the other two studies 
(published by Hammond, 2000 and Monsanto, 2001) were not criticized for the same 
flaws. The authors suggest that this type of evaluative double standard needs to be 
addressed. Interestingly, the EFSA (June 3, 2015) recently posted a report detailing how 
they (the EFSA) will be improving their methods for evaluating science through 
increased rigor and enhanced consistency 
(http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/150603.htm).  
Since U.S. public food policy relies on science-based risk assessment, it seems 
critical that the assessment data and criteria for establishing scientific knowledge are 
derived from a balance of sources that meet the needs and interests of major public and 
private stakeholders. Such balance come into question if we consider the USDA’s 
statements: “Agricultural biotechnology is rewriting the rules in several key areas—
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agricultural policy, industry structure, production and marketing, consumer preference, 
and world food demand—and public policy is struggling to keep up” and “[c]ritical to the 
efficient and equitable advance of agricultural biotechnology is determining the unique 
role of public research and when and how the public sector should interact with the 
private sector” (USDA, Office of Communications, March 2003, p.8). Meyer and 
Hilbeck’s (2013) research highlighted key points of divergence in how scientific 
knowledge is perceived by powerful government decision-makers. Their study was a 
comparative analysis of Séralini’s el al (2012) study with two other NK603 studies—one 
a 13-week study and the other, including Monsanto’s 90-day rat study that Séralini’s 
team was replicating (but with a 2-year rather than 90-day duration). Meyer and Hilbeck 
(2013) also reviewed 21 other chronic toxicity rat studies. The result of their review 
concluded that there are “critical double standards in the evaluation of feeding studies 
submitted as proof of safety for regulatory approval to EFSA” as each of the three studies 
were comparable in their adherence or lack of adherence to the EFSA’s testing criteria (p. 
9). Although the scope of Meyer and Hilbeck’s (2013) work is limited to the EFSA, their 
findings suggest potential factors that influence not only the EFSA, but also the decision-
making processes of other policy-making bodies. The scope of both Snell, et al (2012) 
and Domingo and Bordanaba’s (2011) research, each of which examined a multitude of 
safety assessment studies on genetically modified plants, are considerably broader than 
my topic and their studies did not incorporate Séralini’s NK603/Roundup toxicity study. 
In addition, although each of their studies offered a comprehensive analysis of those 
safety assessments, their focus did not include a systemic analysis of how those studies 
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interconnect with research protocols, industry and public policy, indicating a gap in the 
research. Nevertheless, the results of their research illustrate the need for continued in-
depth analysis of how science is interpreted and used to satisfy political, commercial and 
public needs and interests. 
Science and Industry 
But conducting scientific research and obtaining knowledge about bioengineered 
products is sometimes hindered by external factors such as patent rights, corporate 
protective measures (e.g. rules to protect privacy, property rights and confidentiality) and 
even narrowly defined federal research goals. Monsanto has maintained strict control 
over how its products are tested as a means to protect its investment. Controversy arises 
when the public’s demand for unbiased (i.e. independent) studies conflicts with the 
industry’s desire to protect its property and intellectual rights (Snell, C., et al, 2012). 
However, Monsanto suggests that securing patents for their products supports their (and 
other biotech companies) capacity for further innovation and, in turn, producing better 
products for farmers (http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/roundup-ready-patent-
expiration.aspx).  
What It Means for the Field of Conflict Analysis and Resolution 
Developing national and international corporate networks and investments, 
according to Diamond and McDonald (1996), inevitably encourages companies to 
consider the “cultural, economic and political conditions” of its target market, but 
inevitably “[t]o improve its business success, it will naturally want to do what it can to 
protect its investment” (p. 54). According to Weeks (1992), conflicts often stem from 
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differences in what one considers as needs, values, interests and goals simply because the 
differences derive from an alternative perspective. Diamond and McDonald (1996) go on 
to describe that the basis for an increasing number of international “disputes, alliances, 
and posturing between nations” stem from geo-economies (i.e. “the integration of 
international politics and international business and trade”) (p. 56). Weeks (1992) 
suggests that when parties perceive that their needs are incompatible with the needs of 
other parties, it increases the potential for serious conflicts. These conflicts may arise, for 
example, as parties ignore the needs of others or, in an effort to gain competitive 
advantage over others in order to meet their own needs, a party’s actions hinder another’s 
capacity to effectively meet their needs— “even when the needs are not as opposite or 
incompatible as they appear” (Weeks, 1992, p. 36). According to Diamond and 
McDonald (1996), businesses that are deeply invested in international trade and heavily 
influenced by certain trade policies “become, to some extent, both a party to emerging 
geo-economic disputes and a resource for their resolutions” (p. 56). Power (e.g. economic 
strength and political influence) is often a key factor in negotiating international 
diplomacy and, according to Diamond and McDonald (ibid), nations that perceive 
themselves to be in a position of strength will use “coercion, leverage, [and] threat” as a 
means to exert influence on another nation, and, within this system, “the nation itself, or 
its government, …is the vehicle of power” (p. 26). In other words, “we have developed 
an international system of relationships based primarily on the nation-state… [in which] 
[p]eoples, cultures, religious, ethnic or political identity groups and private citizens have 
no formal standing” (ibid, p. 26).  
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Policy changes that impact geo-political affairs, as suggested by Diamond and 
McDonald (1996), increasingly and systematically have been separated from public 
influence, lending to “the mystification of Track One [government level diplomacy] as a 
realm of unreachable experts” (p. 26). Although, according to the authors, there is “much 
relevant expertise about international relations, peace, and conflict resolution, the 
boundaries [that shield public policy makers from the general public] are so tight and so 
closely guarded that such expertise frequently has no way of getting through to the people 
who need access to it” (p. 30). Diamond and McDonald (1996) suggest that such barriers 
disrupt and/or hinder not only government to government attempts to analyze and resolve 
conflicts but also the multitude of other levels of influence which include 
organizational/institutional, community, grassroots, etc. Diamond and McDonald (1996) 
suggest that “repeated acts of political will and courage from many Track One figures 
will be needed to correct the situation” (p. 30). 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
I have used a case study approach that utilizes a specific case, involving a 
research study conducted by Gilles Eric Séralini and his colleagues, as a basis for 
understanding the larger context of agricultural biotechnology. Séralini’s research on 
Monsanto’s NK603 genetically modified corn and the herbicide, Roundup, for which 
NK603 is designed to tolerate, is the central context for this study. Surrounding the 
publication, retraction and republication of this article are a multitude of systemic public, 
academic/scientific, corporate and government responses. I gathered and analyzed a 
comprehensive data set related to this specific case including two interviews with 
scientists who have conducted extensive research with transgenic crops and glyphosate. I 
also conducted a basic comparative analysis of how lead (as lead arsenate and leaded 
gasoline) and DDT were introduced as viable commercial products and what information 
(based on written government documentation) was used to develop and implement public 
policy regarding them. The purpose of using these examples as comparison for the 
current case is to identify possible patterns of knowledge development and public policy 
regarding research, industry, government and public safety. My working assumption is 
that there is a lag time between current public policy development and current scientific 
research—particularly research related to public health (Morris, Wooding and Grant, 
2012; Brownson, Kreuter, Arrington and True, 2006). The processes that take place 
within this lag time seem to reposition public policy from industry-oriented to public 
health-oriented. This case study compared the current case with those of DDT and lead to 
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identify a potential pattern of knowledge production-transformation in the lag time 
between research and public policy implementation. 
I chose to use a case study approach to research and analyze this topic because the 
key elements of my research design lend favorably to a case study methodology more 
than other methodologies.  For example, contrary to strictly historical research, I have 
selected a contemporary case in which there are living individuals who can contribute to 
my research data in addition to research based on past events. In researching past and 
current events, I have integrated documents, archival records and mainstream media 
rather than rely strictly on survey data with the intent to provide a richer context for a 
more in-depth understanding of my topic. Although the boundaries of this case can 
reasonably be defined, this case is situated within a complex system with a multitude of 
variables that incorporate science, economics and politics that cannot be controlled, and 
therefore, would not be feasible to design and carry out an experiment (Yin, 2014). A 
phenomenological approach, however, would be a good alternative for this topic as it 
would allow those directly involved with the information/knowledge flow an opportunity 
to voice their experiences. Access to, and participation from, appropriate participants 
(e.g. scientists, industry representatives, U.S. government representatives, EU Food 
Safety Authority and EU Commission representatives, as well as WHO representatives), 
however, would be a challenge and are beyond the scope of my capacity at this time. 
Because of the complexity inherent within this topic, I have chosen to use case study 
methodology to help maintain the scope of my project while allowing me to explore a 
variety of sources that will provide rich, contextually-based data set in a real-world 
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context. By limiting the scope, especially limiting the number of interviews (particularly 
from individuals who have personally/professionally experienced the processes that I 
researched), I inevitably limited the capacity, context, depth and breadth of understanding 
the topic as a whole. But through the process of in-depth analysis, triangulation and 
comparative analysis, I hope to compensate, in part, for this shortcoming and offer a 
credible investigation into the processes of knowledge transformation and, perhaps, 
illustrate potential change indicators for public policy transitions. 
Integrating Analyses 
I analyzed the potential for these transitions with what seems to be evolving 
perceptions of risk vs. benefit. There appears to be a divergence between U.S. and E.U. 
perceptions of risk taking and precautionary measures in regards to balancing the positive 
rewards and the negative consequences of new technology, with the U.S. seemingly more 
willing to take risk and the European Union taking a more precautionary stance (Kogan, 
winter/spring 2004). Factors that seem to promote this divergence are the criteria that 
justify cause for concern and, thus, cause for risk-taking or precautionary measures. This 
is a key reason for me to include a basic comparison/contrast with DDT and lead. I was at 
first tentative to explicitly include them in this study because I felt it might automatically 
taint the bio-agriculture industry in a negative light. However, considering the shift in 
how government policy accepted and promoted DDT and lead initially, as viable industry 
products, and then later banned or restricted the use of those products, it seems a viable 
question to ask whether the research and policy trends surrounding the current case are 
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comparable in terms of how science, industry, and government shape knowledge, policy 
and regulations. 
By focusing on a single case as my primary topic and then comparing it with two 
other cases (three if one considers the two different applications of lead presented in this 
study), I initially begin with a comprehensive internal analysis and then include a basic 
comparative analysis relying mainly on secondary sources with two interviews as 
primary data from public researchers who have conducted research on transgenic crops 
and glyphosate. Throughout this process, I maintained a constant effort to appropriately 
balance and relate emic issues (relevant to policymakers, scientists and industry) to etic 
issues of public safety (Stake, 1995).  
Data Sources  
I am highly aware that I am assuming Séralini’s research potentially indicates 
similar early warnings that are illustrated in the lead and DDT cases. To ensure a 
balanced perspective, I included the perspectives of scientists, industry representatives 
and government as valid sources for analysis. This information came from scholarly 
research articles (from academic, independent and industry-supported researchers), 
industry reports, government documents, and science, academic, industry and 
government websites. A more thorough explanation of the data types and how I intend to 
use them in my research can be found in the “Criteria” sections below. 
In addition to print media, my research included two email interviews from adult 
participants who have conducted research on behalf of the government, academia and/or 
industry that relates to this specific case. In working with human subjects, I respected the 
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rights and privacy of the interviewees. In requesting interviews, I respected and informed 
my potential informants that interview participation was voluntary and that they could 
withdraw from the interview at any time. In respecting the privacy of the participants, I 
asked for their preference in regards to including information that could personally 
identify them. From the interview process, I used interview/informant information that 
was directly relevant to my research and that the participant had given consent for me to 
use. I presented their information in a way that reflects the original intent and context of 
meaning so as not to misrepresent the participant’s information. As part of ensuring that 
my interpretations were accurate, I allowed each participant to review and suggest 
revisions on the text that specifically used their information and identified them 
personally. I asked if the content accurately reflected their message or if there were any 
revision suggestions. I received approval with no revision suggestions from one and I 
received suggestions for revision from the other, which I did and resubmitted to the 
participant, and subsequently received approval. I have saved the emails and attachments 
from these two email interviews on a thumb drive, which is stored in a safe location and 
will be treated as confidential information and I will not share them outside of the 
immediate context of my written dissertation. Upon approval of my dissertation, I will 
safely store the emails/thumb-drive, for the IRB required 36-months and then safely 
dispose of them if the interview participants request it.  
Documentary criteria. 
There is an extensive amount and variety of print information available from 
which to analyze existing information regarding this case (as well as DDT and lead) and 
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the processes of knowledge, policy and regulation creation. To ensure that my data is 
balanced and representative of the interests of relevant stakeholders (e.g. researchers, 
industry, and government) I have conscientiously drawn from a wide range of credible 
sources and, as Yin (2004) suggests, in using a variety of documents, I have 
“appreciate[d] the differences in perspectives, if not ideologies, represented by the 
authors of the various types of documents” (p. 156). But it is not only the author’s 
perspective that I have kept in mind, but also the ideologies promoted for the broader 
stakeholders’ interests and I strive to fairly represent their information with integrity. To 
conserve time and maintain a reasonable scope, I have also followed Stake’s (1995) 
suggestion and purposefully triangulated “only the important data and claims” (p. 112). 
But what I consider important is subjective; however, I considered the interests of those 
who might oppose such a claim, in order to better deduce what is academically (and not 
just personally) important.  
The bulk of my information directly relates to the research and policy process of 
NK603 and glyphosate as it relates to public safety. Although Roundup has been 
commercially available since the 1970’s, most of the research available is on its main 
ingredient, glyphosate, but when available, I included information that directly related to 
Roundup and since I will be analyzing this issue as part of a larger system, I also included 
data related to the development of research design protocols that have been used in 
testing the safety of NK603, Roundup/glyphosate and related products and the political 
processes that have been developed to assess the validity of those safety tests. There are 
certain socio-cultural, socio-political and socio-economic factors that contribute to the 
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conflict, so I researched key issues such as the EU Precautionary Principle, risk-based 
policies, cultural, economic and political interests and perceptions, national and 
international trade policies, patents and intellectual property. I collected data from:  
Scholarly books, research and journal articles.  
I used information and articles about recent research studies that have been 
published (and unpublished) regarding the scientific research and assessments, policies, 
regulations and perceptions of safety of genetically modified Roundup Ready corn, 
Roundup/glyphosate and related products. This information came from a multitude of 
books such as: Business and Environmental Policy: Corporate Interests in the American 
Political System; Democratizing Global Politics: Discourse Norms, International 
Regimes and Political Community; International Food Policy Research Institute; 
Uncertain Risks Regulated. Journals selected for research and articles included Chemical 
Research in Toxicology; Crop Science Society of America; Entropy; Environment 
International; Environmental Sciences and Policy; Environmental Sciences Europe; Food 
and Chemical Toxicology; Global Trade and Customs Journal; International Journal of 
Environmental Analysis and Chemistry; Journal of Epidemiology and Community 
Health; Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine; International Journal of Environmental 
Analysis and Chemistry; Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology; Seton Hall Journal 
of Diplomacy and International Relations; Society of Environmental Analysis and 
Chemistry and Vermont Law Review. In selecting the books and journals/articles for this 
research, my criteria required that they were peer reviewed, that they related directly to 
one or more of the following: the subject of NK603 and/or agricultural biotechnology, 
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Roundup and/or glyphosate, socio-political, economic or cultural issues that directly 
relate to NK603/agricultural biotechnology and/or Roundup/glyphosate—either in 
regards to scientific study, assessment or review, and that, as a whole, the sources 
represented a balanced representation of relevant stakeholder perspectives from scientists 
and industry. This data collected, along with Séralini’s research study in itself, was 
integral in observing and analyzing the variety of research available in order to compare 
with the research that has been used to develop public policy which also helps to 
illustrate the types of research used as well as how science is validated and knowledge is 
created and utilized within the realm of Science as well as in the bio-agriculture industry 
and within U.S. and E.U. agriculture and trade policy and regulation.  For my 
comparative analysis I found existing comprehensive analyses that detail the stages of 
product and policy development and used them to fill in the blanks as needed to address 
the specifics of my own research, following the same pattern of investigation as described 
below.  
Websites/databases (e.g. government, international organizations; 
industry, science forums, agricultural forums, etc.)  
In addition to scientific and academic research published in books and scholarly 
journals, I collected data directly from political and/or industry sources that related to 
policy making, regulations, product development and marketing of NK603 maize 
(including subsequent revised or stacked versions)/ agricultural biotechnology crops, 
Roundup/glyphosate. From the following government and international websites and 
databases  I collected data regarding: safety standards and required safety tests for 
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genetically modified food crops (particularly NK603 maize); safety standards and safety 
tests for herbicides (particularly Roundup/glyphosate); current and proposed policies and 
regulations for NK603 maize, Roundup/glyphosate and related agricultural biotechnology 
crops and pesticides (e.g. a Congressional Act might generalize genetically engineered 
crops or pesticides and Agency regulations might specify individual crops and 
pesticides); communications (e.g. EPA memorandums, industry applications for 
regulatory approval or non-regulatory status) between industry interests and federal 
agencies regarding, for example, safety tests, research outcomes, policies and/or 
regulation of NK603 maize and Roundup/glyphosate; reports from U.S. and European 
agencies and authorities regarding safety and safety standards for agricultural 
biotechnology—specifically GMO corn and Roundup/glyphosate; past and current GMO 
crop statistics of herbicide tolerant corn (of which NK603 is a significant part) and 
herbicide use of Roundup/glyphosate (within U.S. as well as globally); and educational 
outreach materials regarding GMO corn and Roundup to see how scientific information 
evolves from laboratory and safety reports within the context of public policy:  
 fda.gov-- for data regarding safety of NK603 maize and pesticide residues for 
human consumption;  
 usda.gov websites—for crop regulations and pesticide residue information, crop 
statistics, and USDA crop research; 
 epa.gov—for data pesticide regulation;  
 whitehouse.gov, gov.track—for congressional hearings and executive branch 
communications; 
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 gpo.gov—for government publications and public notices; 
 nih.gov—for health related research; 
 gao.gov—for internal government agency assessments;  
 reaganlibrary.archives.gov—for key perceptions from the Executive Branch that 
was in office when many agricultural biotechnology policies were established;  
 National Academies Press—for federal scientific assessments and reports;  
 legcounsel.house.gov—for information regarding specific lawsuits;  
 bfr.bund.de/en—for information regarding European glyphosate assessment;  
 oecd.org—for information regarding international toxicity testing standards and 
economic objectives for agricultural biotechnology and accompanying pesticides;  
 europa.eu, ec.europa.eu, europarl.europa.eu and eur-lex.europa.edu—for 
information regarding EU policy process and legislation 
 efsa.europa.eu and EFSA Journal—for information regarding safety assessments;  
 tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu—for EU public news releases;  
 ey.com—although this is a commercial website, the data I collected was an article 
written by a former EU Commissioner for Research, Innovation & Science that 
provides information about EU technology goals;  
 iarc.fr/en—for information regarding the 2015 IARC glyphosate assessment;  
 European Environment Agency—for information about EU cultural, health and 
environmental interests;  
 glyphosate.eu—for information specifically about glyphosate in the EU;  
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 Michele-rivasi.eu and ota.fas.org—for information about current European 
controversial issues;  
 who.int and fao.org—for information about past and recent international 
collaborative assessments of glyphosate 
I have also reviewed information from international science-based resources such 
as the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (isaaa.org) 
which is a database that offers a comprehensive list of genetically modified crops, their 
regulatory status according to country, product (event) description, etc. From the industry 
websites (specifically monsanto.com) I gathered industry perspective to see how 
scientific information is utilized and presented at the industry level. From science and 
agricultural forums (e.g. agri-pulse.com and university extension sites), I gained a variety 
of perspectives regarding what scientists and agricultural stakeholders consider key issues 
for genetically engineered food crop safety as well as what they consider as sound or 
faulty science. A key reason for including science and agricultural forums is that this is 
an outlet that invites relevant stakeholders to share how industry and public policy 
impacts or influences their interests. It offers a type of feedback that contributes to a type 
of information loop that may or may not, as the research indicates, influence the current 
agricultural system. 
Interview criteria.  
Through purposive sampling, I selected my interview participants based on their 
experience with bio-agriculture technology and the research that is specifically related to 
Roundup Ready Corn and/or Roundup. The two interview participants with whom I 
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chose to communicate directly are both recently retired from government research and/or 
academic research positions that enabled them to work directly with federal agricultural 
biotechnology programs and their long-standing careers as public-supported scientists in 
the fields of microbiology and plant pathology offer a high level of validation in regards 
to their experience with and expertise in Roundup Ready crops and Roundup/glyphosate 
safety and safety assessments. Upon my initial investigation into this topic, it seems that 
the independent and public-supported researcher perspective is least officially 
documented and, therefore, potentially needs more clarification. Below is a brief 
description that highlights how the work of these two participants relates to my research 
topic.  
Don M. Huber is a plant pathologist with an active fifty-eight years of experience 
within the U.S. government and academia holding such positions as: Senior Medical 
Analyst and Commander in the United States Army Strategic Medical Intelligence; 
Advisory Board Member for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment—now 
the Congressional Research Service and the National Plant Disease Recovery System 
(NPDRS) –a program designed to meet, in part, the Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive; associate professor as a cereal pathologist at the University of Idaho; and 
full/emeritus professor of soil-borne diseases at Purdue University). Perhaps most 
relevant to my research, however, is Dr. Huber’s relationship with the USDA as member 
and former Chairman of the USDA’s Cooperative State Research Education and 
Extension Services and his 40-year membership with the Department of Defense and 
USDA-APS National Threat Pathogens Committee. The purpose in detailing Huber’s 
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work experience is to create a sense of credibility, i.e. he is a reputable scientist with 
extensive experience in the U.S. government and academia. I directly communicated with 
Dr. Don M. Huber (May 23-June 7, 2016) via email through which he included: a 
confidential letter that he had sent to the USDA’s Secretary of Agriculture, Tom Vilsak; a 
follow-up letter to the U.K.’s Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs, Caroline Spelman, MP; a handout generalizing the negative impacts of 
glyphosate, Roundup and genetically engineered products; and additional information 
regarding his experiences with the USDA. 
Dr. Kremer is recently retired after working with the USDA-ARS for 
approximately 30 years as a microbiologist—the last (approximately) 17 years of it was 
dedicated mainly to researching glyphosate interactions with soil and plant (conventional 
and transgenic) microbiological systems. In 1996, Kremer participated in a collaborative 
project between the USDA and the University of Missouri that initially focused on the 
effects of pesticides on soil organisms as well as how to control for a certain pathogen 
specific to soy. Their research extended to include transgenic soy as it became 
commercially available. But research outcomes were modest and funding for the project 
was not renewed. Kremer and one other USDA researcher, however, were able to 
transition their research on transgenic soy, glyphosate and soil interactions into their 
existing projects within the USDA.  Since then he has published several articles and 
papers, co-organized a symposium for the 2002 American Society of Agronomy 
meetings, and presented in several symposia including two in Brazil (in 2005 and 2007) 
on glyphosate and transgenic crops. Kremer has also been invited to present or work on 
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special projects for a multitude of agricultural related groups, consulting firms, industry 
and academic meetings, panels and symposia and edited a 2009 special edition of the 
European Journal of Agronomy. I selected Dr. Kremer because the length of his career in 
the USDA and his work with herbicide tolerant crops and glyphosate offer a valuable 
input regarding knowledge and public policy transitions, within the context of public 
research and agency support, since the beginning of commercialized herbicide tolerant 
crops. 
In conducting interviews, I prepared a brief set of questions to help initiate and 
focus the topic and encouraged the participants to share any other relevant information 
that they considered important. The purpose of getting personal input from interview 
participants is to incorporate primary research that can be compared and/or contrasted 
with secondary research. Including peoples’ stories also adds an element of verifiability, 
life and alternative perspectives to the topic. Whether I used secondary sources in my 
research or included primary information, I verified my data findings through multiple 
sources. I am highly conscious of my own biases and have been vigilant in checking my 
assumptions and keeping my mind open to alternative perspectives. My interviews were 
loosely guided by the following questions that were presented to either or both of the 
participants (see Appendix C for more details on follow-up questions and the context 
within which I ask them):  
1. How was your research received by the USDA?  
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2. From your experiences and observations working with the USDA-ARS, what are 
key factors that influence how USDA decision-makers select and validate 
knowledge/data for regulatory and policy change?  
3. From your perspective, how does the current USDA system (of data selection, 
collection and use in regards to glyphosate/glyphosate formulations and 
transgenic crops) impact the USDA’s capacity to function as a public agency?  
4. How do you envision this system changing? 
5. There is a lot of chatter on the mainstream web about a letter that you had sent to 
the USDA’s Tom Vilsack but I couldn’t find any official documentation of it. 
Please let me know if I am overstepping my boundaries, but I was wondering if 
you really sent one or if the rumor-mill created it. If you did send it, would you be 
able to tell me what it was about and how Vilsack responded? 
6. Have you attempted to communicate your research findings, and subsequent 
public and political implications, regarding your recent research findings with the 
USDA (or any other government body) prior to that letter or since that letter, and 
if so, what was their response? 
7. Based on your extensive experience as a publicly supported researcher, how do 
government regulatory policies for agricultural biotechnology reflect the general 
state of, and use of, agricultural science and the data generated from it? (How do 
your recent research discoveries relate to this?) 
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8. How do you envision a significant positive transformation of the current policy-
making, regulatory, and/or agricultural system—i.e. what do you think it will take 
to shift the balance in the current system? 
I emailed my interviewees, introducing myself and the purpose of my research 
and the purpose of my contacting them. Each participant explicitly invited me to 
interview him. In seeking participation, I provided written assurance that participation 
was voluntary and that the interview/communication process would be conducted and 
information collected would be treated within academic ethical guidelines. I made every 
effort to preserve the integrity of their contribution and invited them to review any 
material generated with their specific information, which they did, upon which I sought 
their verification that I represented them fairly and accurately and asked if they 
recommended any revisions. One approved the initial draft I sent and the other asked for 
a few revisions, which I did and resubmitted the draft for his approval, which he then 
granted.  
Inductive and Deductive Category Development 
In terms of my overall topic, the overarching theme for this research is the 
phenomenological process of knowledge transformation as it pertains to science, industry 
and government bio-agriculture safety testing. I conducted an exhaustive review of the 
data related to this case (and a brief review of the two comparative analysis examples). 
As part of the data collecting and analysis process, I read/reviewed the data, making notes 
in the margins that summarized the content of small portions of the data and highlighted 
questions that required additional research. This was the beginning and middle of my 
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coding process as I revisited these codes to clarify vague terms, condense redundancy and 
streamline main ideas that served as an initial step in developing and connecting relevant 
categories and themes to my research questions, theories and propositions. From there, I 
began to link, focus and reduce the various codes into categories and subcategories 
(Lichtman, 2013). I revised my categories using Philip Mayring’s (2000) models (see 
Appendix 1 and 2) as loose guides for checking my coding to category processes as I 
inductively developed codes from the data and categories from the codes, making sure 
that the categories were appropriate for the research questions and, in turn, my research 
questions were still appropriate for the case. I also used a type of deductive category 
development as a way to check my theories and proposition. I anticipated key 
concepts/themes would emerge as I worked through the code to category process. And, as 
suggested by Lichtman (2013), I limited my concepts/themes in order to refine the focus 
and depth of my research. The themes I arrived at are as follows:  
1. “Developing Standards”.  
2. “Data Access Restrictions”.  
3. “Data Gaps”.  
4. “Perceptions of Safety and Validity”.  
Chapters four and five maintain the themes in the order presented above. Chapter 
six uses the same themes, but the order is different so as to present a more fluid narrative. 
The actual process of collecting and organizing the data was less linear than what I have 
described above, as I collected and reviewed the data and made my notes, categories and 
themes evolved and were integrated not only with my research questions, theories and 
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propositions, but also with my research goals. However, the process was similar to trying 
to appropriately organize a library in which all of the books contain a similar topic thread 
but discuss a multitude of issues within that topic that overlap and share qualities that 
make them difficult to tease apart. In other words, the themes that I finally arrived at 
sometimes overlap, but they are each distinct enough to hold their own.  It was a messy 
process of back and forth searching, discovery and analysis that finally evolved into a 
coherent story.  
Researcher Role 
How this topic was selected and why I chose to research it are important factors in 
understanding the perspective from which this project has grown. Like many people, I 
love food. However, about 15 years ago, I had to exclude certain foods from my diet 
(mainly wheat, rye and barley) in an attempt to correct a thyroid problem, which, after 
further tests in the following years, it did. Over the years I became more conscientious 
about the food I, and my family, consumed but my research pursuits were little more than 
personal exploration. My interest in the topic of agricultural biotechnology and Séralini’s 
case evolved shortly after the initial positive/negative media perspectives were published 
regarding Séralini’s et al (2012) study. Until that point, I was unaware of the extent to 
which agricultural biotechnology, and herbicide-tolerant corn, had become integrated 
within the U.S. agricultural system. The outcomes of Séralini’s et al (2012) study and the 
responses from the public, scientists, industry and government in terms of safety, 
scientific validation and public policy intrigued me enough to not only want to learn more 
but also to make it the topic of my dissertation.  I wanted to learn more about the topic in 
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general and I wanted to understand the underlying factors that contributed to the conflict 
and in order to do that, I felt that I needed to understand the context and perspectives 
from which each of the parties were situating their positions and interests. Therefore, my 
role as a researcher is one of relativist interpreter with a constructivist view. As Stake 
(1995) puts it, I was an “agent of new interpretation, new knowledge, but also new 
illusion” as I collected, interpreted and now present raw and secondary data for my 
readers (pp. 99-102).  
Expected Contributions 
The USDA’s Office of Communications (March 2003) statement that 
“[a]gricultural biotechnology is rewriting the rules in several key areas—agricultural 
policy, industry structure, production and marketing, consumer preference, and world 
food demand—and public policy is struggling to keep up”, invites a significant question: 
How is this system created and sustained and are there trigger points for change that 
might give the U.S. government an opportunity to not only “keep up”, but perhaps 
influence how the system operates? Underlying my curiosity about how Séralini’s case 
relates to lead and DDT cases is what seems to be the critical factor of lag time between 
science (knowledge discovery) and mainstream action (which significantly relies on how 
the original knowledge has been shaped and disseminated). This study has examined the 
complex interconnected systems that help create and transform food safety policies of a 
specific biotechnology and has compared them to how lead and DDT policies were 
transformed (from the researcher to policy development). The resulting analysis found 
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similarities in scientific validation, policy decisions, public awareness, independent 
science development and policy change.  
Qualitative research is openly interpretative and thus, as stated in Stake (1995), 
more about developing “assertions” than discovering “findings”. But in order to develop 
assertions one has to explore (or at least consider) a multitude of possibilities and 
perspectives—not just our own realities but also those of others as we imagine/perceive 
them. Becoming so familiar with the multiple elements of a case enables one to better 
relate the case’s unique qualities with common elements that relate the case to other 
events (p. 42-44). This, in turn, might invite further investigation into other current policy 
processes that utilize science (e.g. nutritional pyramids to global warming) to protect 
public health and industry interests. In terms of conflict analysis and resolution, I hope 
that my research will make hidden and/or complex relationships and systemic factors and 
processes more transparent. By making these relationships, factors and processes more 
transparent, I hope to provide an opportunity to better understand current assumptions 
and expectations of science and the complex systems within which scientific knowledge 
is created, transformed and used in regards to agricultural biotechnology public policy. 
By better understanding current assumptions and expectations, there is a window of 
opportunity to recognize new perspectives and worldviews. From this understanding, I 
hope my research provides an inspiration for positive change, whether it is at an 
individual, institutional or government level. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction  
There are several reasons for conducting this research, the three most important 
are: 1) corn is a major crop that impacts U.S. and global economies, health and 
environment, 2) NK603 corn (whether it is grown as a single GE trait or stacked) makes 
up a significant percentage of corn crop acreage and Roundup is one of the most widely 
used agricultural herbicides, and 3) the on-going controversy between scientists, 
government and industry regarding the safety of these products suggests there is a 
potential red flag in the scientific-industry-government triangle of knowledge production, 
dissemination and implementation. From the research and analysis, the following themes, 
listed below, have evolved.  
 Developing Standards 
 Data Access Restrictions 
 Data Gaps 
 Perceptions of Safety and Validity 
Introducing the U.S. Agricultural System 
The federal process of regulating public health and safety in terms of bio-
agriculture product consumption is part of a system in which Congress passes laws 
(Congressional Acts) and Agencies (e.g. FDA, USDA, and EPA) develop regulations 
meant to help implement and enforce those laws. In other words, the laws provide the 
outline and the regulations provide the details that make the law actionable. The terms 
“policy”, “public policy”, “government policy” are often used interchangeably with 
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“rules and regulations”. Policy can be described as an umbrella term that encompasses 
those laws and regulations.  But policy is more than that; it also encompasses the social, 
moral and economic principles that help influence how these acts and regulations are 
developed (http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-fs-laws-
policies-regs-commonterms-2015.pdf).  
As a way to try to ensure the federal government is operating according to those 
social, moral and economic principles, the Government Accounting Office (GAO), often 
called the “congressional watchdog”, audits, investigates and analyzes the efficiency and 
integrity of the U.S. government. The GAO operates as an independent agency headed by 
the Comptroller General of the U.S., who, according to a 1980 GAO report, is very well-
insulated from interest group pressures (Eschwege, Aug. 7, 1980). It is GAO’s job to 
“advise Congress and the heads of executive agencies about ways to make government 
more efficient, effective, ethical, equitable and responsive” (http://www.gao.gov/about/). 
(Their reports are included in my research because they offer, to an extent, a relatively 
neutral government perspective and focus on critical analysis (that is independent of the 
EPA, USDA and FDA) that can influence organizational and policy change.)  
Theme 1: Developing Standards 
Cultural Transitions 
Until recent decades, agricultural research and development was a public 
endeavor. Federal funding for a variety of state projects allowed for flexible, local and 
contextually-based funding that met local needs while offering a high return (~50%) on 
government investments. As technology transitioned from labor-intensive technologies to 
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industrial technologies that focused on developing mechanical labor and 
fertilizer/pesticide technologies, the government has seen financial investment returns of 
over 100% as agricultural output more than doubled since the 1950’s (Wang, Heisey, 
Schimmelpfennig and Ball, July 2015; Committee on a National Strategy for 
Biotechnology in Agriculture, 1987). According to an OECD report, in addition to 
dramatic production increases, labor decreased by approximately 88% and mechanization 
and herbicides contributed to a fourfold increase in U.S. corn production rates between 
1930 and 1980 (Sundquist, Dec. 1989). Sundquist (ibid) suggested that since 
conventional agricultural techniques had led to such significant yield increases, 
biotechnology was envisioned as a complementary tool to help advance the potential of 
agricultural biotechnology. 
Prior to the 1970’s, the United States Patent and Trademark Office denied 
permission to patent seeds on the grounds that they are naturally occurring life forms and, 
therefore, are not patentable. However, the groundwork for new legislation was laid in 
the early 1970’s when a scientist, Ananda Mohan Chakrabarty, tried to patent a lab-
created bacterium, arguing that this strain of bacteria was not naturally occurring but 
rather man-made (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/303/case.html#311). 
According to the document, the Chakrabarty case was guided by the 35
th
 U.S. Congress § 
101 (based on the writings of Thomas Jefferson), which states, "Whoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title”, the question of whether “manufacture” and 
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“composition of matter” applies to life forms became the central argument (ibid). The 
document stated that the petitioner in this case raised a precautionary note specifically 
addressing the question of biotechnology patents and the potential negative consequences 
if we are unable to fully control the forces our human ingenuity creates (ibid). In 
addition, according to the document, former Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and 
Powell expressed concern regarding whether the rights to a manufactured life form 
should be allowed to be monopolized by an individual and their argument questioned the 
extent to which the U.S. Constitution, under Article one Section 8 (“To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”), authorizes 
individual claim to life forms 
(https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/303/case.html#311).  
In a back-and-forth exchange, according to the author, between court rejection 
and respondent appeal that lasted from 1972 to 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court deliberated 
on the semantics of the law (stating that their job was to interpret the existing law and 
that it was Congress’ job to change the law) decided in a five-to-four vote (with Justices 
Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens assenting) that genetically 
engineered bacteria was patentable because it was not a product reproducible in nature 
(i.e. that specific life-form existed from man-made processes). The authors suggested that 
that particular ruling was a turning point for agricultural biotechnology commerce as 
numerous patents for bio-engineered seeds and plants were awarded in the following 
decades, laying the groundwork for a handful of corporations to retain the rights to their 
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versions of bioengineered seeds and plants 
(https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/303/case.html). 
The National Science and Technology Policy Organization and Priorities Act of 
1976 (94
th
 Congress, May 11, 1976) spoke of strengthening the innovative capacities of 
government, institutions and industry through, in part, “the elimination of needless 
barriers to scientific and technological innovation” (94th Congress, May 11, 1976). Both 
the National Science and Technology Policy Organization and Priorities Act of 1976 
(ibid) and the Stevenson Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 promoted the 
integration and interdependence of industry, technological development and government 
to advance agricultural innovation by fostering connections between institutional research 
and commercial application. The Stevenson Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 
emphasized that industry, technology and innovation “are central to the…economic, 
environmental, and social well-being of citizens of the United States…[and] would 
reduce trade deficits, stabilize the dollar, increase productivity gains, increase 
employment, and stabilize prices (https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Stevenson-
wydler%20Technology%20Innovation%20Act%20Of%201980.pdf). Implementing both 
acts, according to the discussion in the 94
th
 Congressional hearing, would provide the 
economic security and bridge academic research with commercial applications as the 
means by which public investment in academia would achieve its tangible returns (94
th
 
Congress, May 11, 1976).  
By the 1980’s the U.S. government began committing a portion of the federal 
budget to developing agricultural biotechnologies. According to a survey of projects 
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being funded by the USDA, by 1985 there were 778 bio-agricultural technology projects 
underway at the time—the majority of which focused on r-DNA technology with 
approximately $40.5 million—approximately 6% of total USDA expenditures that were 
allocated for 1984-1985 (GAO, Oct. 1985).  
Salomon Wald (1996), the Directorate of the OECD’s Science, Technology and 
Industry, suggested that biotechnology (as a whole science that included pharmaceutical, 
environmental and agricultural) had the potential to compare with the whole societal 
permeation that electronic innovation accomplished. Wald (1996), however, also 
predicted that consumer resistance to agricultural biotechnology would challenge 
industry marketability and that agricultural biotechnology companies, as a reaction to this 
resistance, might exaggerate “regulatory hurdles that have been used as instruments of 
delay”, without recognizing or acknowledging that underlying these barriers is the 
“absence of a genuine demand pull for new biotechnology-derived foodstuffs” (p.11).  
Wald (1996) suggested agricultural biotechnology marketing strategies to boost 
its public acceptance: as a product of convenience [marketing simple solutions that solve 
a real problem]; as a nutritional product [promise of specific nutritional qualities]; as a 
healthy and safe product [substantially equivalent to “normal” product]; or as an 
ecologically sound solution [reduce pesticide use and tillage]. Agricultural biotechnology 
was also expected to meet future climate change needs and become an essential tool to 
address increased environmental degradation (p. 11). Wald (1996) noted that 
“[b]iotechnology can help to meet these needs, but is not the only, and often not the most 
readily accepted, tool for developing new foods to meet these public demands and hopes” 
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(p. 11). Wald (1996) recognized that, although at the time the agricultural market was 
saturated, the perceived need for agricultural biotechnology was expected to increase as 
an answer to meeting food supply needs for a growing global population (in a mid to 
long-term projection). However, in regards to pesticide application, agricultural 
biotechnology was expected to replace conventional techniques (Sundquist, Dec. 1989). 
According to NAS and OECD and the USDA, although herbicide tolerant crop 
acreage has increased exponentially compared to its conventional counterparts, there is 
no conclusive evidence of a subsequent increase in crop yields (National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 2016; OECD, 2016; Fernandez-Cornejo, Wechsler, 
Livingston and Mitchell, June 2014).  In the National Research Council’s (NRC) (2014) 
review of USDA agriculture and research, they stated that:  
A progressive slowing of U.S. (and global) agricultural productivity growth from 
the historically high growth rates of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s has been 
observed in the last 20 years (Table 2-2). In every region of the United States, 
average annual multifactor productivity growth rates for the more recent period, 
1990–2007, were significantly lower than in the previous period, 1949–1990. 
(ibid) 
A recent study from the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and 
Medicine was tasked with analyzing the safety of current and future genetically modified 
crops and, according to a New York Times article, indicated that although genetically 
engineered crops have, in some cases, provided economic benefit for farmers, the overall 
national yield averages are relatively insignificant, bringing into question the ideology 
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that agricultural biotechnology was “essential…to feeding the world as the population 
grows” (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/business/genetically-engineered-crops-are-
safe-analysis-finds.html?_r=1).  
According to Davies, (Feb. 17, 2016), since the USDA, in 2000, approved NK603 
for non-regulated status, single-trait herbicide tolerant corn grown in the U.S. has 
doubled and stacked trait corn (many of which include glyphosate tolerance) has 
increased from 1% to 77%. In addition, since 1990, the emphasis on innovative 
agricultural biotechnologies has simplified rather than diversified the overall U.S. 
agricultural production, limiting the majority of U.S. crop commodity crops to corn, soy, 
wheat and cotton which, since 1990 has grown from 218 million to 242 million acres 
(https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/). According to an opinion statement of the 
European Economic and Social Committee,  
One key objective of EU agricultural policy must be to maintain diversified 
agricultural production and promote it across the EU. Maintaining the rich 
diversity of high quality food from different rural areas throughout the Union for 
EU citizens will provide the right strategic solution for the EU food policy. 
(Krauze, 2011) 
On a similar note, the EC (June 8, 2016), along with EU High Representatives for 
Foreign Affairs and Security police, published a statement that underscores EU value on 
culture in a press release titled: “A new strategy to put culture at the heart of EU 
international relations”. Within their statement, “EU High Representative and Vice-
President Federica Modherini said: ‘Culture has to be part and parcel of our foreign 
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policy...It can also be an engine for economic and social development…[C]ultural 
diplomacy must be at the core of our relationship with today’s world’” (EC, June 8, 
2016). While the press release integrated cultural objectives beyond agricultural trade 
relations, the overall message reflects a key factor in EU resistance to GMO market and 
crop integration (ibid).  But the WTO recently proposed a new trade stipulation that 
prohibits the EU’s capacity to refuse GMO’s on the basis of health or environmental 
hazard (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm). In 
response, the EU, in 2015, gave permission to its member states to ban GM crop 
cultivation (but not importation) on the basis of “socioeconomic impacts or other 
compelling grounds not linked to risks to human health or the environment” (EPRS, July 
3, 2015).  
Some proponents of agricultural biotechnology frame E.U.’s precautionary 
approach in competitive terms when comparing the E.U. to the U.S. For example, the 
European Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science, Geoghegan-Quinn 
(2014), described the E.U. as “lagging behind” and needing a solid “action plan” to 
ensure a “level playing field” in order to “retain our competitiveness” (p. 1). According to 
Wirth, (2012-2013), although the EU is not opposed to biotechnology and has been an 
active participant in developing strategies and action plans to promote and advance the 
development of biotechnology (agriculture included), the overall drive to replace current 
agricultural systems and permeate society with this new technology, does not match that 
of the U.S. According to the European Economic and Social Committee, “[a]griculture 
has traditionally been a sticking point in the negotiations because most countries defend 
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their own production on the grounds of basic security” (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52008AE1668, sect. 3.3.3).  Le Menestrel and Rode 
(2013) note that from an international trade perspective, it seems that many socio-cultural 
and environmental risks are generally beyond the parameters for internal, industry-level 
decision-making processes except when those risks threaten the security of ‘legal 
fortitude, the non-restrictive state of regulatory conditions, or reputational advantages’. In 
other words, the nature of international crop commodities trading is responsive to self-
protective measures of legal rights, regulatory freedom and marketing advantages.  
The Director General of the E.C. Health and Consumer Protection Directorate, in 
a comparative case study analysis between risk management policies between the EU and 
the US, mentioned a number of limits to science in regards to public policy” (Coleman, 
Jan. 11-12, 2002). Coleman (Jan. 11-12, 2002) went on to detail those limits as factors of 
time, perceptions of validity, and subjectivity, stating specifically that it takes time to 
“generate the experience, the raw data, which will permit reliable scientific analysis of 
innovation to be done”; that there is “still unsettled debate concerning the difficulties of 
determining what, in a given field at a given time, science or “sound science” actually 
is”; and that there is the “virtually unavoidable… introduction [of] subjective elements of 
value judgement in the course of planning, conducting and evaluating the process of 
scientific investigations” as in toxicological studies where, for example: 
the choice of the test animal species, the strain, the sex, the age of the animals, the 
route and the duration of the administration of the test substance, the length of the 
observation period, the choice of the test parameters to be evaluated and many 
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other factor can profoundly influence indeed determine, the outcome of the test” 
(Coleman, Jan. 11-12, 2002, p. 3).  
Cohen (1996) states that time is one of culture’s most “insidious” features as it 
impacts one’s “judgment of the right moment for the performance of a given action; 
and…the sense of the appropriate rate of progress or transition from one move to the 
next” (p.119). Concern within the EU government regarding the safety of glyphosate and, 
particularly, its accompanying adjuvants (including POEAs) has EU officials discussing 
patent law revisions, and regulatory policy changes (EC, Council of the European Union, 
March, 2016).  The 2016 U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and 
Medicine study emphasized that “[t]here is an indisputable case for regulation to be 
informed by accurate scientific information, but history makes clear that solely “science-
based regulation” is rare and not necessarily desirable…[and] decisions about how to 
govern new crops needs to be made by societies” (National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering and Medicine, 2016, p.x). 
Defining Roles in the U.S.  
In 1983, the Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy met to discuss the 
efficacy of biotechnology (Committee on Science and Technology, Feb. 3, 1983).  The 
Committee discussed how federal government (after WWII) became the parent supporter 
of scientific research in the U.S., operating under the assumption that “science had 
become a significant factor in maintaining a strong defense and a strong economy, and 
also in recognition of the fact that, at the funding level required, no source other than the 
government could assume that responsibility” (Committee on Science and Technology, 
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Feb. 3, 1983, p. 7). But regardless of the intentions, the committee recognized that more 
funding than the government could afford was needed, that academic research was 
consistently underfunded, and institutions were ill-equipped to meet the needs of industry 
(Committee on Science and Technology, Feb. 3, 1983). It might be useful to note that the 
goal of the Executive Branch, at the time, was “to nurture the strength and vitality of the 
American people by reducing the burdensome, intrusive role of the Federal Government” 
(Reagan, 1981). President Reagan stated: “It is our basic belief that only by reducing the 
growth of government can we increase the growth of the economy”” (ibid). The 
sentiments of minimizing financial and regulatory burden on private industry were not 
only priority for the U.S., but also echoed in the OECD (OECD, Sept. 1982).  Inviting 
biotechnology industry stakeholders, from various fields, to take part in developing 
regulatory processes was a government strategy to create a more efficient system for 
industry and government to get the most out of biotechnology benefits while striving to 
minimize the risks (Committee on Energy and Commerce, Dec. 18, 1985, 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/imgsrv/image?id=umn.31951d00283126s;seq=7;width=85
01985).  
Cooperation between industry and government extended to the agencies (EPA, 
USDA and FDA). According to the EPA, the goal of the EPA—to “establish and enforce 
environmental standards consistent with national environmental goals” — plays a 
significant role in protecting public health and the environment 
(https://www.epa.gov/history/origins-epa; https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/ash-
council-memo.html). But, according to the 1970 Ash Council Memo, from the start, it 
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was known that the EPA would be operating “on the horns of a dilemma” as an advocate 
and enforcer for public and environmental health in the face of the economic progress 
that matches, and perhaps also drives, our accustomed or desired standard of living. As 
stated in the Ash Council Memo for President Nixon which initially laid out the rationale 
and structure for the EPA, a  
[s]ound environmental administration must reconcile divergent interests and serve 
the total public constituency. It must appreciate and take fully into account 
competing social and economic claims… [in order to] sustain a well-articulated 
attack on the practices which debase the air we breathe, the water we drink and 
the land that grows our food. (https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/ash-council-
memo.html) 
In regards to agricultural biotechnology, EPA regulations state that the majority of 
the EPA’s authority is in setting and enforcing pesticide standards that are granted under 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) which charges the EPA 
with assuring that each pesticide registered will not cause:  
(1) any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the 
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any 
pesticide, or (2) a human dietary risk from residues that result from a use of a 
pesticide in or on any food inconsistent with the standard under section 408 of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act '' (https://www.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/summary-federal-insecticide-fungicide-and-rodenticide-act).  
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By the 1980’s however, federal funding had been significantly cut back from EPA 
applied research budget, restricting their capacity to develop and maintain applicable (and 
competitive) bio-technological research that could provide a useful knowledge 
background in their assessments (Committee on Science and Technology, Feb. 3, 1983). 
Coincidentally, according to multiple sources, in addition to regulating pesticides, the 
EPA had proposed, in 1983, to regulate agricultural biotechnology under the authority of 
the Toxic Substances Control Act but was quickly challenged (in 1984) by a 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment report that suggested another solution 
was necessary to ensure the preeminence of U.S. global leadership in biotechnology. In 
general, the U.S. government recognized the need for federal oversight and through a 
series of committee meetings and congressional hearings, devised a plan to address those 
concerns more effectively through intergovernmental coordinated regulation and 
oversight. The response of the Executive branch (at the end of 1984), according to the 
sources, was to reallocate regulatory responsibility for agricultural biotechnology with 
the “Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology” (Hilts, Aug. 9, 1983; 
Office of Technology Assessment, Jan. 1984; OSTP, Dec. 31, 1984). The Coordinated 
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology policy was adopted in 1985 which delegated 
responsibilities between various federal departments, programs and agencies (Sheingate, 
Apr. 2006; OECD, Sept. 1982). According to a GAO (Mar. 1986) report, the Executive 
Branch’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) held the authority and 
obligation to help develop and manage federal biotechnology programs.  But within a 
year after the Coordinated Framework was implemented, it became evident that the 
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overall process of delegated authorities was unclear and interagency/ intergovernmental 
coordinated responsibilities needed to be more thoroughly detailed, particularly for the 
USDA (GAO, Mar. 1986).  
According to a GAO (Mar. 1986) report, APHIS, in addition to avoiding 
overstepping authoritative boundaries with OSTP, was at first tentative in making 
authoritative decisions and/or creating their own regulatory policies that might needlessly 
stifle innovation. In addition to role confusion and disorganization, public resistance to 
gene technology had led to public lawsuits against the government, highlighting the 
tensions between diverging ideologies of the government’s risk-based policies and the 
public’s call for precaution and making the USDA hesitant to act (GAO, Mar. 1986). 
Overall, the GAO, at the time, indicated that until the USDA developed an effective and 
efficient organizational structure that clearly outlined procedures, delegated 
responsibilities, and defined authority, it would be incapable of managing and overseeing 
current and future biotechnology research and field trial approvals (GAO, Mar. 1986). As 
a means to clarify its role and “[t]o strengthen its relationship with industry, APHIS 
broadened participation of affected groups in developing regulations through such 
approaches as negotiated rulemaking, which involved stakeholders in the early stages of 
drafting new regulations” and by 1986, APHIS (and industry) had become central in 
determining the regulatory status of genetically engineered crops in terms of whether (or 
to what extent) they posed as a plant pest risk 
(https://www.aphis.usda.gov/about_aphis/downloads/40_Year_Retrospective.pdf). 
 Shortly after the GAO (Mar. 1986) review, the White House’s recently created 
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Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee announced its decision regarding 
biotechnology, stating that “[t]he manufacture of food…and pesticides will be reviewed 
by FDA, USDA, and EPA in essentially the same manner for safety and efficacy as 
products obtained by other techniques” (OSTP, June 26, 1986, p. 6). Accordingly, the 
FDA regulates genetically modified food through the food additive provision, in which 
the FDA regulates general food safety from a post-market position, and the general safety 
provisions of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, which allows the FDA to 
determine if an added ingredient is “generally recognized as safe” (GRAS). According to 
the FDA (Oct. 30, 2015), it is the “responsibility [of the manufacturers] to determine that 
their products meet the general safety standards…labeling requirements and to the extent 
the food additive provisions apply, to make sure that they are in compliance with those as 
well” (p. 68-69). In 1997, the FDA implemented a “premarket consultation process” that 
allows manufacturers an opportunity to (voluntarily) discuss with the FDA the safety, 
nutrition, and labeling requirements of their products (FDA, Oct. 30, 2015). In addition to 
the FDA’s role in post-market food safety, it is also responsible for ensuring that the 
chemical pesticide residues in and on post-market food is within regulatory limits. The 
FDA developed the Total Diet Study (TDS), which analyzes approximately 280 “table 
ready” products most commonly used in U.S. diets not only for pesticide residue, but also 
other chemicals, toxins and nutrient levels (e.g. checking manufacturer data for 
nutritional labeling accuracy on packaged goods—nutritional labeling for fresh produce, 
however, is voluntary) 
(http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/TotalDietStudy/ucm184232.htm).  
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After the EPA’s proposal to regulate agricultural biotechnology was challenged 
and rejected with the implementation of the Coordinated Framework, the EPA, pursued 
with a proposal that under the TSCA the EPA had authority to assess and regulate new 
microbial substances (which would include certain substances used in r-DNA research) 
(EPA, Sept. 1, 1994).  This proposal was never set forth as a rule and the EPA’s role with 
biotechnology remained limited to assessing and regulating pesticides and chemicals. 
(EPA, Sept.1, 1994). According to the OSTP (June 26, 1986), “…future scientific 
developments will lead to further refinement”, suggesting that “regulatory regimens 
could be modified [as they had been in the past] to reflect a more complete understanding 
of the potential risks involved”, meaning that existing regulatory processes for 
conventional agriculture could be used for transgenic agriculture and modified to address 
specific risk factors (p. 4).   
According to the EPA, from the start, and continuing after the implementation of 
the Coordinated Framework, one the EPA’s major roles was to “review…pesticide 
formulations for efficacy and hazard” and that a key method used to accomplish that goal 
was to analyze “all scientific data on the pesticide and develop comprehensive risk 
assessments that examine the potential effects of the product or ingredient on the human 
population and environment” in order to appropriately set standards for pesticide 
registration and regulation (https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-order-11102; 
https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-science-and-assessing-pesticide-risks/assessing-human-
health-risk-pesticides; https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/about-pesticide-
registration). Part of that regulation extends to advising the USDA on which pesticides 
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are recommended for residue testing. The USDA operates the Pesticide Data Program in 
which samples of certain fruits, vegetables, grains and legumes are selected from various 
grocery/distribution outlets across the U.S. (USDA, Apr. 1994). The USDA then tests 
these foods for pesticide residue levels, using various methods that involve more science 
than I am capable of explaining. The USDA claims that “[t]he Pesticide Data Program 
(PDP)…produces the most comprehensive pesticide residue database in the U.S.” 
(USDA, https://www.ams.usda.gov/datasets/pdp). 
According to a GAO report, the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act was developed 
in recognition that as science evolves and new information becomes available, certain 
chemicals might need to be registered and regulated differently. Under this act, the EPA 
would be required to reassess each pesticide (every fifteen years) as a means of 
maintaining registration and regulatory standards that are based on the best available 
science (http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/85152.pdf).  To help expedite the EPA’s 
assessment process, the GAO (1986) recommended that Congress change the pesticide 
laws to require that industry provide all required data for EPA assessment, self-certify 
and self-regulate their products according to EPA guidelines and standards. The EPA 
responded that it was in agreement, to a certain extent, with that proposal as they had, in 
the early 1980’s, conducted a pilot test allowing industry registrants to evaluate their own 
data, identify gaps and, basically, help develop registration standards. However, 
according to EPA’s response, the discrepancy between EPA and industry expectations on 
what was considered necessary data was disappointing and demonstrated the need for the 
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EPA to develop specific, comprehensive criteria and standardized guidelines that 
effectively covered public and environmental health concerns (ibid). 
Since the beginning stages of agricultural biotechnology development in the U.S., 
industry representatives have worked closely with the Executive branch, including the 
EPA, USDA and FDA creating regulatory procedures and policies for agricultural 
biotechnology. In contrast, Dr. Kremer noted that “one of the main themes of [USDA] 
ARS policy is that we, as scientists, conduct research only—we do not make any 
recommendations for regulatory or policy issues…” (personal communication, June 2, 
2016). (This theme topic was raised by other scientists, who were working on 
nanoparticle technology, who emphasized that “there are deep differences between 
science and policy, the line between policy-relevant and policy-prescriptive science is 
under continual negotiation, and there is no uniquely ‘objective’ way of characterizing 
facts”) (Jamieson, Oreskes and Oppenheimer, Jan. 2015). According to Kremer, even if a 
policy is directly related to the results of a scientist’s work, the USDA-ARS prohibits 
them from suggesting regulatory or policy changes (personal communication, June 2, 
2016).  
Henry Miller, had worked in the mid-1970’s, for three years, helping the U.S. 
National Health Institute refine emerging r-DNA techniques and later worked various 
positions within the FDA from 1979-1994 on biotechnology policy development in such 
positions as Special Assistant to the FDA Commissioner and founding director of the 
FDA's Office of Biotechnology and is currently a research fellow at Stanford 
University’s Hoover Institution, focusing his research on science, government, federal 
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and international regulatory processes and biotechnology 
(http://www.hoover.org/profiles/henry-i-miller). Miller was quoted in a 2001 New York 
Times article referencing the relationship between industry and federal agencies: “In this 
area, the U.S. government agencies have done exactly what big agribusiness has asked 
them to do and told them to do” 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/25/business/25FOOD.html?pagewanted=all). In 
addition to the bio-agricultural industry interests in the FDA, the bio-pharmaceutical 
industry emphasized the importance of public trust and how the FDA could provide a 
level of consumer confidence not easily achieved through industry marketing alone. 
According to Stone (2002), the pharmaceutical industry had been hindered by the slow 
and costly FDA regulatory approval process. However, when Congress, in 1995, 
proposed to privatize several FDA functions, the pharmaceutical industry supported the 
FDA because “without the seal of government approval for its drugs, the industry would 
lose the ‘world’s confidence in the superiority of American drugs’ and the public’s 
confidence in the superiority of American drugs” (p. 5). Representatives of the 
pharmaceutical industry were quoted in Stone (2002), stating: “We are for a strong 
F.D.A. They are our credibility” (p. 5).  
Defining Roles in the E.U. 
Reflective of the surging glyphosate-tolerant crop research and field testing in the 
1990’s, in 1993, over a dozen chemical and agricultural biotechnology companies 
initially notified the European Commission of their interest in incorporating glyphosate 
as a plant protection product in the Directive 91/414/EEC. In 1995, they divided into task 
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forces (indicating a level of international industry cooperation) and submitted their 
dossiers (within two weeks of each other) to the EU Rapporteur Member State 
(Germany), which reviewed the dossiers and submitted a draft report to the EFSA (Health 
& Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Jan. 21, 2002). The EFSA reviewed the 
draft report (and assessed industry materials if necessary) and, upon approval, passed 
them on to the European Commission for a final decision 
(http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/approval_active_substances/index_en.htm). 
The EFSA evolved (in 2002), in part, as a response to address food safety and 
public health concerns following a widespread outbreak of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE)—mad cow disease—that had started in the U.K. in the 1980’s and 
spread throughout parts of Europe, the U.S. and other parts of the world 
(http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Factsheets/pdfs/bovine_spongiform_encephalopathy.pdf). 
According to the EU, the EFSA plays a key role in the approval process for transgenic 
crops and chemical pesticides. The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and 
Food Safety, issued an annex to the Committee on Budgetary Control that was voted 
favorably and defined the purpose for the EFSA to be:      
the provision of independent scientific advice on matters with a direct or indirect 
impact on food safety, the conduct of risk assessments to provide Union 
institutions, Member States and policy-making bodies with a sound scientific 
basis for defining policy-driven legislative or regulatory measures and the 
collection and analysis of scientific data.  
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http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-
 2012-0106&language=EN&mode=XML. 
Other International Collaborations  
In addition to U.S. federal government and the E.U., pesticide and/or GMO 
safety, the World Health Organization (WHO) often works in conjunction with the 
U.N.’s Food and Agriculture Organization, among other projects, “for the purpose of 
harmonizing the requirements and the risk assessment on the pesticide residues” 
(http://www.fao.org/agriculture/crops/thematic-sitemap/theme/pests/jmpr/en/). And 
IARC is the World Health Organization’s International Agency for Research on Cancer 
and their mission is to foster international cooperation in cancer research, part of which 
included a recent assessment of glyphosate and glyphosate formulations as part of a 
comprehensive review of a multitude of currently marketed chemicals 
(https://www.iarc.fr/en/about/index.php).  
Prior to the recent IARC review, the USDA emphasized that corn is a major 
international trade commodity for the U.S. and most of that corn is genetically 
engineered, therefore, protecting the economic viability of such a crop “means that 
working with our trading partners is critical to help them understand the technical aspects 
of new products and how we have determined that they meet our high safety standards, to 
open up new markets, and to ensure that our products are treated fairly in the global 
marketplace” (http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=BIOTECH).   
As a response to the global integration of new information technologies, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) originally formed in 1995 and by 2000-2001 was 
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preparing for a new global agricultural biotechnology market integration. A multitude of 
countries joined as members, the U.S. and E.U. (as representative of E.U. member 
countries) included, in a collaborative effort to liberalize trade through minimizing trade 
barriers and providing a forum in which to resolve trade disputes as a means to 
harmonize commodity standards and streamline international trade between member 
nations (https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr01_e.htm; 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm). 
Harmonizing Roundup/Glyphosate 
The data for which the industry applicants were required to submit with the 
dossiers for glyphosate regulatory approval in Europe was similar to what was required in 
the U.S. (e.g. detailed chemical description/property identification, environmental fate, 
eco- and mammalian toxicology, and residue analysis) 
(http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/eu-pesticides-
database/public/?event=activesubstance.detail&language=EN&selectedID=1438).  
According to the EPA, under guidance from FIFRA and the National Research Council, 
the EPA developed a system to streamline registration and re-registration by adopting a 
four-part assessment process to identify potential hazards, determine toxicity thresholds, 
analyze exposure levels and conduct risk assessments. As part of the EPA’s goal to create 
an integrated approach to assessing the systemic effects of each chemical they proposed 
finding a “common mechanism of toxicity” in order to create chemical groups that would 
help streamline the process. With such a wide array of pesticides on the market, the 
cumulative impact of pesticides with a “common mechanism of toxicity” had become a 
81 
 
prominent concern to which the EPA was required to address under the authority of the 
Food Quality Protection Act (https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-science-and-assessing-
pesticide-risks/overview-risk-assessment-pesticide-program). In addition, the EPA also 
developed the “Integrated Risk Information System” (IRIS) which mainly operates under 
the legislative guidance of the Toxic Substances and Control Act, (i.e. non-pesticide 
substances) (https://www.epa.gov/iris). The EPA, in response to the GAO’s suggestion, 
agreed that with appropriate guidance materials, complete data-sets from industry-led 
studies could help accelerate the registration process (GAO, 1986).  
Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, the OECD had also been working towards 
harmonizing toxicity test guidelines across member country borders by developing 
standard test designs and procedures for a multitude of toxicity measurements. U.S. 
federal agencies coordinated in this effort, along with international “regulatory authorities 
and industry associations to promote harmonization of regulatory requirements” (FDA, 
Mar. 1, 1994). Such harmonization of internationally agreed upon protocols could help 
streamline trade and regulatory processes within and between member (and non-member) 
countries.  
According to the EFSA (2015), “[r]egarding carcinogenicity, the EFSA 
assessment focused on the pesticide active substance and considered in a weight of 
evidence all available information” (p.2). Such conclusions are based on criteria set forth 
in EC regulation No 1272/2008 and although this is a 1355-page document that, I admit, I 
did not examine in its entirety, it seems that article 30 sets precedence for the persistent 
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conclusions of safety based on tests using the active ingredient rather than the whole 
formulation:  
Testing that is carried out for the sole purpose of this Regulation should be carried 
out on the substance or mixture in the form(s) or physical state(s) in which the 
substance or mixture is placed on the market and in which it can reasonably be 
expected to be used. It should, however, be possible to use, for the purpose of this 
Regulation, the results of tests that are carried out to comply with other regulatory 
requirements, including those laid down by third countries, even if the tests were 
not carried out on the substance or mixture in the form(s) or physical state(s) in 
which it is placed on the market and in which it can reasonably be expected to be 
used.  
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:353:0001: 
1355:en:PDF) 
Changes to EC 1272/2008 include amendment EC 1907/2006 (which outlines 
EU’s position on the Registration Evaluation Authorization and Restriction of 
Chemicals—REACH) in which the first article (among many) was amended in 2008 
from: 
This Regulation should ensure a high level of protection of human health and the 
environment as well as the free movement of substances, on their own, in 
mixtures and in articles, while enhancing competitiveness and innovation. This 
Regulation should also promote the development of alternative methods for the 
assessment of hazards of substances. (emphasis added) 
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to this: “This Regulation should ensure a high level of protection of human health and the 
environment as well as the free movement of chemical substances, mixtures and certain 
specific articles, while enhancing competitiveness and innovation” http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:353:0001:1355:en:PDF.  
While OECD toxicity testing guidelines focused on standardizing animal testing 
methodology, the National Research Council has been developing, in coordination with 
other groups of scientists, new technology and methods using human cells and 
computers, partly because animal testing is useful to an extent, but its accuracy in 
determining how a substance will affect humans is limited and the time and resources to 
conduct such tests are costly. Tox21 was established in 2008 as the collaboration between 
the EPA, FDA and NIH to actively develop this new methodology to replace the need for 
animal testing and (hopefully) produce more accurate results. (NIH, Feb. 14, 2008; 
http://www.pcrm.org/research/animaltestalt/chemtesting/chemical-testing-basics-toxicity-
testing). 
Harmonizing NK603 (GMO’s)  
Within the E.U., there are three main pieces of legislation regarding genetically 
modified food, feed and cultivation. Directive 2001/18/EC legislates GE crop cultivation 
and it was amended by Directive 2015/412, to allow member states to opt out, or ban, GE 
crop cultivation on the basis of “agricultural or environmental policy objectives, 
socioeconomic impacts or other compelling grounds not linked to risks to human health 
or the environment” (EPRS, Oct. 19, 2015, p.3). The second piece of legislation is (EC) 
1829/2003 which covers GE food and feed and (EC) 1830/2003 covers GE food and feed 
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labeling. However, within these three pieces of legislation are a multitude of amendments 
and revisions. Overall, NK603 is encompassed by the following EC Regulations: EC 
2001/18; EC 1829/2003; EC 178/2002; EC 1830/2003; 1801/2001; 2283/2015, etc. (i.e. a 
multitude of regulations impact the policy-making process for NK603) (see Appendix 9 
for a list of regulations related to NK603). Moving a pesticide or GMO product from 
initial petition to final approval can take approximately three to five years (See Appendix 
9 for a list of legislative amendments pertaining to GMO’s) 
(http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/approval_active_substances/index_en.htm). For 
GMO approval, an applicant (company/manufacturer) submits an application and 
required product-related data to the Competent Authority (CA) of the country in which 
the company intends to first market their product. In the case of NK603, Spain was the 
initial CA. The CA reviews the applicant’s dossier, (which includes a product 
description, environmental assessments, toxicology assessments, labeling and detection 
methods) and if approved, submits the application and submission materials to the EFSA 
who then reviews the dossier and provides the European Commission with an opinion. 
The EC considers the EFSA’s opinion and each member country (represented by the 
Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health) votes whether to grant 
authorization or reject it. If the EC Standing Committee cannot reach a majority 
consensus, it gets passed to the European Council of Ministers. If the Council does not 
make a decision within a specified timeframe or obtain a qualified majority vote, then it 
returns to the Commission who then adopts the decision (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-07-117_en.htm).  
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In the U.S., GMO’s are less regulated. The USDA has the authority to assess and 
regulate plants, including transgenic plants that are considered pests or pose potential 
harm to other plants or beneficial insects. If a petitioner provides data demonstrating that 
their proposed crop line is not a “plant pest”, then APHIS has the authority to approve 
field trials and/or deregulate it. By the mid-1990’s, APHIS established a rule simplifying 
GMO crop regulation by further aligning most GMO crops with conventional 
requirements (APHIS, Apr. 24, 1997). Unless a “food…contains any added deleterious 
substance which ‘may render it injurious to health’”, the FDA established a pre-market 
consultation process and maintained post-product authority in regulating food safety 
(quoted in Frisbie, Apr. 1936, p.372). Consultations review any potential health concerns 
or additional clarification needed to ensure the product does not pose public health risk. 
The FDA considers these voluntary consultations “prudent practice” for businesses to 
address potential issues early in the process and to demonstrate participatory effort in the 
FDA’s system of regulatory compliance (FDA, May 29, 1992).  
According to the FDA, the 1980’s signaled the beginning stages of public policy 
and regulatory development for biotechnology as the U.S. government promoted 
biotechnological innovation as a key to economic, political, food and even more broadly, 
cultural security 
(http://www.fda.gov/downloads/newsevents/meetingsconferencesworkshops/ucm477576.
pdf. According to an OECD document (https://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/24508541.pdf), 
by 1982, international biotechnology patent policies were in various stages from one 
country to the next and in order to streamline trade it recognized that a more harmonized 
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patent system between countries was necessary to promote consistent protection for 
patent holders within global interactions. According to Sheingate (Apr. 2006), by 1986 
the U.S. had already determined (unofficially) that further studies that focus on the 
distinction between transgenic and conventional agricultural biological/microbiological 
processes were not a priority and a focus on the product rather than the process would not 
only reduce regulatory responsibility of government and unnecessary burden on industry, 
but it would promote agricultural biotechnology as a substantially equivalent comparison 
to traditional crops.  In 1993, the OECD adopted the FDA’s “generally recognized as 
safe” (GRAS) policy as well as the U.S. concept of substantial equivalence 
(https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2604). Qualifying genetically engineered 
foods as essentially the same as the consumer-approved conventional foods, according to 
the OECD, has been recently reiterated as a basis for minimizing trade barriers between 
OECD member and non-member nations (OECD, Apr. 3, 2015). U.S. federal agencies 
coordinated in this effort, along with international “regulatory authorities and industry 
associations to promote harmonization of regulatory requirements” (FDA, Mar. 1, 1994). 
By 2007, biotechnology had explicitly become the agricultural crop system of U.S. 
national priority (Homeland Security, USDA, FDA., May 7, 2007, p. 4).     
Theme 2: Data Access Restrictions 
Protecting Innovation: Benefits and Barriers  
In petitioning for pesticide registration approval, the EPA clarified that companies 
submitting formulations for registrations (or re-registration) must provide the EPA with a 
complete list of the formulation’s active and “other ingredients” 
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(https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/pesticide-registration-manual-chapter-15-
submitting-data-and-confidential#claims). In order to protect a company’s trade secrets 
(i.e. patent and intellectual property rights) when government reviews are published and 
made available to the public, the “other ingredients” are often replaced with the initials 
“CBI” (i.e. confidential business information). Confidential business information 
includes: 
information that discloses manufacturing or quality control processes (FIFRA  
10(d)(1)(A)); information that discloses methods for testing and measuring the 
quantity of deliberately added inert ingredients (FIFRA 10(d)(1)(B)); and 
information that discloses the identity or percentage quantity of deliberately added 
inert ingredients (FIFRA 10(d)(1)(C)). (ibid) 
Other means of protecting confidential information in government documents was 
evidenced in blacked out sections of data that was, presumably, proprietary. In my 
research, I came across several EPA memos about Roundup and glyphosate assessments 
in which certain sections, including inert ingredient information, had been blacked out 
(see Appendix Ea for examples of redacted material). Confidentiality extends across 
national borders as well. For example, in regards to assessing the safety of glyphosate in 
the EU, Portier et al (Nov. 27, 2015) reasoned that the EFSA’s “use of confidential data 
submitted to the BfR makes it impossible for any scientist not associated with BfR to 
review this conclusion with scientific confidence” (pp. 5-6). (Note: BfR, “Bundesinstitut 
für Risikobewertung”, was commissioned in 2015 by Germany to re-assess glyphosate—
see below for further discussion.) In the U.S., the Office of Management and Budget 
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(2002) “Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and 
Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies” illustrated the balance 
between the level of transparency needed to gain and maintain public trust and the degree 
of protection needed to maintain industry proprietary confidentiality. Within these 
guidelines, according to the OMB, Agencies are given discretionary authority to 
determine the appropriate data requirements and scientific rigor required to adequately 
assess industry products while protecting proprietary information (ibid). The guidelines 
distinguish agency-disseminated scientific data (i.e. official viewpoint of the agency) 
from data published by a Federally employed researcher (unofficial viewpoint of the 
researcher), noting also that a Federally employed researcher wishing to publish their 
findings should include “an appropriate disclaimer in the publication or speech to the 
effect that the “views are mine, and do not necessarily reflect the view” of the agency 
(ibid, p. 8454). In terms of peer review, the OMB guidelines generally agree that “peer 
review is clearly valuable” but “additional quality checks…are appropriate” particularly 
when a research topic or content contains “influential” information that, if disseminated, 
“will have or does have a clear and substantial impact on important public policies or 
important private sector decisions” (Office of Management and Budget, 2002, p. 8455). 
What is defined as “influential” is dependent upon the interpretation of the agency (ibid).   
Dr. Kremer, recently retired from the USDA, noted that within the last 10 years, 
USDA-ARS researchers have been increasingly prohibited from making opinion 
statements and prohibited from discussing “anything other than the facts relative to your 
research and the discussion had to be based on information already approved and 
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published” (Kremer, personal communication, June 2, 2016). Kremer stated that, in 
regards to the USDA’s support for his research, the USDA was, until about 2009, quite 
supportive, approving his projects, publications and presentations with minimal revision. 
In addition, the agency encouraged their scientists to talk to the public about their 
research. But he began to notice a shift in policy that restricted the content disseminated 
from the Agency and that certain issues, including transgenic crops, required 
administrative approval from USDA’s Beltsville, MD office before any content could be 
released. In other words, Kremer noted a significant upscaling of department censorship 
and “questioning of research”, suggesting of the USDA that “the climate now is…we 
don’t want to offend anyone” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UDLdTXe2koo, 
24.20). To reiterate the OMB guidelines (discussed above), each agency is given a certain 
level of latitude, in terms of how research is reviewed and disseminated if it is considered 
“influential” in relation to private sector interests and public policy (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2002, p. 8457).  
According to an OECD document, it was recognized that patents potentially 
“hamper further innovation, especially when it limits access to essential knowledge” 
(https://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/24508541.pdf). In an International Food Policy 
Research Institute discussion paper, Michiels and Koo (Sept. 2008) also raised a concern 
regarding the potential constraints that patents create for new knowledge creation and 
dissemination specifically within public and academic domains. However, Monsanto 
stated that it endorses an “Academic Research License” (ARL) that “enables academic 
researchers to do research with commercialized products with as few constraints as 
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possible. ARLs are in place with all major agriculturally-focused US universities – about 
100 in total” (http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/public-research-
agreements.aspx).  
In an article discussing confidentiality agreements within the context of academic 
research, university extension researchers noted that using a company’s intellectual 
property for research allows academic researchers access to ground floor industry 
materials, technology and resources while providing industry with valuable third party 
studies and data (http://www.agriculture.com/crops/tech-tour/confidentiality-
agreements_196-ar45164). The author also noted that it’s a potential symbiotic 
relationship in theory but in practice, confidentiality agreements, intellectual property 
rights and patent rights permit industry to limit research parameters and direct research 
design in a way that may or may not benefit the local needs of university research goals. 
The author went on to state that it is a system with a built-in imbalance of power in 
regards to who maintains authority over what and how knowledge is created (ibid).   
Michiels and Koo (Sept. 2008) suggested that the U.S. Congress passed the Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980 to ensure that not only private parties, but also universities (or other 
public institution) retain the right to patent or license the results of their research if part of 
its research project is funded by the federal government. The authors illustrated that from 
the 1980’s to about 2002, privatization in both industry and academics rose significantly 
in bio-agricultural research as licenses and patents for genetically altered plant processes 
and traits became incentive to generate, and protect, scientific knowledge (Michiels and 
Koo, Sept. 2008; http://pazoulay.scripts.mit.edu/docs/generating_ideas.pdf ). King and 
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Hessey (Nov. 1, 2003) noted that in agriculture, the upward trend in biotechnology 
patents was much steeper than the overall patent. The authors stated that the rise in 
patents during this period also indicates a marked shift from basic to applied research 
(ibid). The U.S. government, according to Howard (Oct. 19, 2015) has encouraged 
private development and ownership rights by ‘reduc[ing] the enforcement of antitrust 
laws and increas[ing] the enforcement of alleged intellectual property infringements’ 
(p.1).   
Monsanto and others in the bio-agriculture industry provide statements for the 
public that state: “Patents encourage and reward innovation” and  “patents, for better or 
worse, may be the only way to provide incentives for innovation while ensuring that a 
biotech company can recoup development costs” (http://www.monsanto.com/food-
inc/pages/seeds-patent-history.aspx; 
https://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2014/04/22/patents-and-gmos-should-biotech-
companies-turn-innovations-over-to-public-cost-free/). For example, according to Mutz, 
et al (July 7, 1997) developing the GA21 corn line (glyphosate tolerant pre-cursor to 
NK603), Monsanto/DEKALB Genetics invested six years and several million dollars. 
Mutz described that an effective way to try to recoup the financial costs is to shield key 
techniques and information from its competitors, thus limiting competition from 
capitalizing on the time and money that Monsanto/DEKALB spent in developing the 
technology/product (ibid).  But, according to Howard, (Oct. 19, 2015) another way to 
alleviate cost is to consolidate. What used to be an industry populated by small, family-
owned businesses is now an industry “dominated by a handful of large, diversified 
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companies (http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/genengcrops.pdf). Currently, 
there are mainly three biotech companies that control “more than half of the global 
proprietary seed market” (ibid). According to Okoro (May 9, 2005), if one considers the 
extraordinary number of gene sequence patent applications in just 2002 (~3 million) and 
the limited number of genes used for agricultural biotechnology, overlapping patents on 
the same gene has created a complex, costly and time-taking development process that 
consolidation significantly minimizes. But, McEowen (Sept. 2006) noted that in the case 
Pullen Seeds and Soils v Monsanto in 2006, Pullen accused Monsanto of monopolizing 
the glyphosate-tolerant market by “acquiring seed companies that were developing 
modified seed technology [and] eliminating those projects that could have led to the 
development of genetically modified seeds that could be used with non-glyphosate 
herbicide” (ibid).  
As stated by Carl Shapiro (2001) “The essence of science is cumulative 
investigation combined with hypothesis testing. The notion of cumulative innovation, 
each discovery building on many previous findings, is central to the scientific method” 
(p. 119). Stanford University’s Stanley Cohen and UC-San Francisco biochemist Herbert 
Boyer were awarded the National Medal for Technology and Innovation for transforming 
the basic science of molecular biology and the biotechnology industry research and could 
be argued as initiating the “birth of the biotech industry”. Through a “non-exclusive 
licensing program”, developed by Stanford University’s Niel Reimer, Columbia 
University was able to build upon the knowledge of Cohen and Boyer, for a price, and in 
turn, further advance recombinant DNA techniques to develop DNA transformation, 
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which Columbia University then patented in the 1980’s, 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/nmti/recipients/1989.jsp; 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/21stC/issue-3.1/odza.html; 
https://www.biotechhistory.org/magazine-article/vital-tools-brief-history-cho-cells/). In 
an article spotlighting the three Columbia University students who patented DNA 
transformation (a.k.a. The Axel Patent), the authors noted that these proprietary rights 
reaped millions in profit for the university as well as the researchers who claimed 
authorship of the patented discovery, although at the time, according to the article, with 
two of the three Columbia University researchers on that project (Michael Wigler and 
Richard Axel), patenting their work was not the motivation for their research. Even after 
the Columbia researchers patented their discovery, one of the researchers stated that he 
was still skeptical about its value beyond the university walls. But in the seventeen years 
that the university owned these patents, it would claim approximately $790 million 
dollars in private sector licensing fees and that it would become one of the landmark 
cases for alternative public university revenue 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2750841/#b24). Since the 1980’s there 
has been a significant increase in the number of university patents (in bio-agriculture); 
but economic success (such that Columbia University experienced) is rare and depends 
on whether the knowledge or innovation fits a specific commercial need at the right time 
when it is needed. (Pérez-Peña, Nov. 20, 2013; Dai, Dec. 2007). 
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Transitions: Basic/Public to Applied/Private Research  
According to the United State Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research 
Service (USDA-ERS), investments in public research and development grew most 
rapidly between 1948 and the 1980’s but by 2012, they were six percent lower than 1982, 
whereas private research and development, since the 1980’s, has nearly doubled 
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1875384/err189_summary.pdf). Paul Berg (Sept. 18, 
2008), one of the scientists who organized the Asilomar Conference (see “Perceptions of 
Safety and Validity” section for more information), posed the question of whether 
another Asilomar Conference might mitigate the current conflict surrounding the 
perceived and real risks and benefits of biotechnology between industry, independent and 
public scientific research, government policy and public perception. Berg suggested 
several key reasons that such a conference now would not have the productive, 
transformational impact it did in the 1970’s, one of which, in Berg’s assessment, is the 
transition from public to private institutional research which embeds “economic self-
interest” as a research priority which, in turn, inhibits researchers from engaging in open, 
unbiased discussion. According to a 2009 New York Times article, Berg’s assessment is 
echoed by several other scientists (many of whom work for land-grant universities), who 
voiced frustration at how restricted access to commercial biotechnology outcomes limits 
the available research on genetically modified crops (Pollack, Feb. 19, 2009). The article 
detailed that such limitations include: requiring farmers to sign contracts that “prohibit 
growing the crops for research purposes”; requiring company permission to study its 
product and often requiring the option for the company to review the study and make 
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changes prior to publication; and company prerogative to withdraw permission to 
research after the study was approved and initiated (Pollack, Feb. 19, 2009).   
A group of 26 scientists, hired by the USDA and EPA as part of a Technical 
Advisory Committee for “Regional Research Projects NCCC-46 ‘Development, 
Optimization, and Delivery of Management Strategies for Corn Rootworms and Other 
Below-ground Insect Pests of Maize’” submitted the following formal statement to the 
EPA in 2008, but according to Don Huber (personal communication, June 9, 2016), the 
26 scientists would not sign their name to the statement because to do so could have 
resulted in them losing their jobs.: 
Technology/stewardship agreements required for the purchase of genetically 
modified seed explicitly prohibit research. These agreements inhibit public 
scientists from pursuing their mandated role on behalf of the public good unless 
the research is approved by industry. As a result of restricted access, no truly 
independent research can be legally conducted on many critical questions 
regarding the technology, its performance, its management implications, IRM, 
and its interactions with insect biology. Consequently, data flowing to an EPA 
Scientific Advisory Panel from the public sector is unduly limited. (See Appendix 
7) 
The experiences of the above referenced scientists, along with the barriers 
described in Berg’s assessment, contrast with Ury’s (1993) suggestion that “[y]ou get the 
most satisfying solutions and the most optimal relationships when both sides are doing 
their best to engage the very real problems dividing them” (p. xi). 
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Unpublished Data  
The scientists referenced above expressed frustration with how patent rights and 
confidentiality agreements limited the researchers’ capacity to not only explore beyond 
the scope and focus of industry interests but also to obtain permission to research 
patented products in the first place. Evidence of limited public and independent research 
is evidenced in how research is represented in glyphosate and NK603 applications, 
assessments and approvals. For example, glyphosate was assessed and re-registered by 
the EPA, in 1993, citing over 100 non-published industry studies (the majority of which 
were from Monsanto) in its reference sections to support the assessment criteria (EPA, 
Sept. 1993). The International Program on Chemical Safety (INCHEM), a collaboration 
between the U.N., the WHO and the International Labor Organization, published a 
review of glyphosate in 1994 in which approximately 150 of the 350 studies listed in the 
reference section were unpublished studies, the majority of which were submitted by 
Monsanto (http://www.inchem.org/documents/ehc/ehc/ehc159.htm). The FAO has also 
been an active partner with EFSA and WHO in evaluating glyphosate. In seeking data 
from governing sources, I found a Google Book preview of the UN’s Food and 
Agriculture Organization’s 2005 publication regarding pesticide residues in food, which 
showed the References listed for glyphosate and of the approximate 112 studies 
referenced by the FAO for glyphosate, over 100 were unpublished studies conducted by 
researchers from (listed in order of majority contribution) Monsanto, Cheminova (a 
Danish pesticide maker), Zeneca (a  biopharmaceutical company) and Syngenta 
(https://books.google.com/books?id=yIlSy6UZJjwC&pg=PA474&dq=Food+and+Agricu
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lture+Organization+2005+pesticide+residues+glyphosate&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKE
wj3_aWa_-
bPAhXG4iYKHU2SCCMQ6AEINjAA#v=onepage&q=Food%20and%20Agriculture%2
0Organization%202005%20pesticide%20residues%20glyphosate&f=false). In an 
FAO/WHO (2016) international glyphosate assessment it was stated that “[t]he current 
meeting evaluated all previously considered toxicological data in addition to new 
published or unpublished toxicological studies and published epidemiological studies on 
cancer outcomes…[and] [t]he evaluation”, but the references were not listed according to 
study (p. 19).  
According to Portier’s et al (Mar. 3, 2016) comparative analysis between IARC’s 
and the EFSA’s glyphosate assessments, the EFSA’s (2015) report, illustrates that the 
evidence considered in policy-making is still weighted in favor of industry. Portier and a 
group of ninety-three other scientists (microbiologists, biomedical cancer researchers, 
biochemists, molecular and cellular biologists, pathologists, epidemiologists, etc.) co-
authored an article (which was first submitted as a letter to EU’s Commissioner Health & 
Food Safety, Vytenis Andriukaitis on Nov.27, 2015) comparing the WHO IARC and the 
EFSA glyphosate assessments. They analyzed the studies used in the assessment as well 
as how the assessment was conducted. Their conclusion emphasized that the BfR 
assessment lacked credibility because it relied on non-published industry research that 
were not accessible to the public, suggesting a significant lack of transparency (Portier, et 
al Mar. 3, 2016).   
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General Barriers  
Unpublished industry studies were not the only challenge to researching data on 
Roundup, inert ingredients, NK603 and other transgenic crops. For example, trying to 
find information on polyethoxylated tallowamines (POEAs) on the EPA’s website has 
been challenging. After trying various key words (e.g. polyethoxylated tallow amines; 
tallow amines; tallowamines; tallow; polyethoxylated; POEA, etc.) in the main website, 
NCEP and archives, my search produced only an extremely limited description for 
Tallowamines as a pre-harvest application covered under §180.920  which exempts it 
from tolerance requirements, describing it as a surfactant or adjuvant: “Tallowamine, 
ethoxylated, mixture of dihydrogen phosphate and monohydrogen phosphate esters and 
the corresponding ammonium, calcium, potassium, and sodium salts of the phosphate 
esters, where the poly(oxyethylene) content averages 2-20 moles (CAS Reg. No. 68308-
48-5)” and does not exceed 20% of the formulation  
https://iaspub.epa.gov/apex/pesticides/f?p=INERTFINDER:3:::NO::P3_ID:6832. 
According to the information listed on the EPA’s Substance Registry Services, the main 
distinction between CAS number 68308-485 and CAS number 61791-26-2 appears to be 
that the former includes phosphates but does not provide a product name (e.g. MON 
0818—see below). A search using the EPA CAS number 61791-26-2, which was listed in 
the above EPA Federal Register notice (Jul. 7, 1995), provided a little more detail that 
described the inert pesticide ingredient, POEA, as “Tallow alkyl amines ethoxylated” but 
the substance was categorized as List 3 (unknown toxicity). The information provided is 
extremely limited and does not provide any details about how the substance was assessed 
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(EPA, Sept. 15, 2015). Noting that the technical name for POEA (that the EPA used in a 
memo assessing two Roundup product labeling requirements—see “Data gaps” for more 
information), polyoxyethylene alkylamine, differs from the term, polyethoxylated 
tallowamine (which is used in a multitude of other sources), I searched the EPA’s 
National Service Center for Environmental Publications (NSCEP) using the EPA’s term 
and CAS number. One of the four search results was a 1992 “List of Pesticide Product 
Inert Ingredients”; inserting the CAS number into the NSEP search box for this document 
resulted in one “hit”, which did not have a CAS number next to it but was described as 
“Soap (Source undefined)”. The document stated that “OPP records do not readily permit 
the confirmation of the presence of any given listed inert in currently registered pesticide 
products” (https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/tiff2png.cgi/9101W9JG.PNG?-r+75+-
g+7+D%3A%5CZYFILES%5CINDEX%20DATA%5C91THRU94%5CTIFF%5C00002
966%5C9101W9JG.TIF). One of the remaining three search results was the EPA’s 
Substance Registry Services, which provided a list of statutes, regulations and EPA 
applications/systems and valid synonyms, including Mon 0818, which presumably, is the 
product name linked to the CAS number. However, neither of the CAS numbers listed 
above shows the common name “polyethoxylated tallowamine” in its “synonym” list 
(https://ofmpub.epa.gov/sor_internet/registry/substreg/searchandretrieve/substancesearch/
search.do?details=displayDetails&selectedSubstanceId=15792#HealthAndOther). In 
terms of searching for particular glyphosate studies, several studies are referenced as 
supporting evidence for the EPA Tier One Endocrine Screening Assays for glyphosate 
conclusions (e.g. MRID 4886510 and 48671305), but those studies cannot be found 
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anywhere else on EPA’s current, archive and National Service Center for Environmental 
Publications (nepis.epa.gov) websites.  
  In regards to transparency in the current conflict about glyphosate, obtaining an 
online version of the recent glyphosate assessment that Germany was tasked to conduct—
the BfR report—is proving extraordinarily difficult to find, in its full and original report, 
as is obtaining the draft report that BfR submitted to EFSA that summarized this study, 
thus limiting my access to the basic design and timeline of the study. Multiple key 
word/phrase searches (e.g. BfR; BfR report; German Rapporteur Member State 
glyphosate; glyphosate assessment; RMS glyphosate; etc.) in various search engines and 
within the EFSA website show no results for the BfR report. Several internal links within 
the EFSA website where related information should have been available result in pages 
displaying: Server Not Found. In addition, along with the EFSA public statement 
regarding their conclusions about the peer review of BfR’s draft as an assessment 
response to IARC’s “probable carcinogen” claim, the EFSA includes a link to the WHO’s 
IARC report but when clicked, displays the message: The Page You Have Requested 
Does Not Exist (http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/150730).  Portier, et al (Mar. 3, 
2016) noted that the BfR evaluators were not listed and the studies used in their 
assessment were unpublished and not publicly accessible. The EFSA continued, stating 
that they disagreed with Portier et al’s (Mar.3, 2016) conclusion that BfR’s assessment 
process was not transparent and that all of the “related background documents which run 
to around 6,000 pages have been published on EFSA’s website” 
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/151119a (ibid, p. 2). Accessing the documents 
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for glyphosate from this website, however, requires one to submit their personal 
information in an online document request form. In my web search (described above) this 
page did not appear. Stated on the homepage of this website, however, the EFSA claims 
that the BfR report is accessible, but in “updated” form “to take account of comments and 
discussions during the peer review…” 
(http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/151119a). In other words, the original 
assessment report is not available.  
Theme 3: Data Gaps 
Roundup received its first pending registration with the EPA in 1974 and was 
subsequently marketed as a broad spectrum herbicide. Although the original registration 
for Roundup and/or glyphosate seems to be absent from the EPA’s National Service 
Center for Environmental Publications (NSCEP) document database, a simple search for 
pre-1976 information on glyphosate produces eight results, one of which discussed 
tolerance levels and indicated that by 1975 several glyphosate tolerance levels were 
established but there were no toxicology studies referenced to support why or how those 
levels were determined. In that document, the EPA stated that glyphosate toxicity was 
minimal but admitted that the mode of action for glyphosate was “not know[n]; may 
inhibit the aromatic amino biosynthesis” (Office of Pesticides Program, Mar. 30, 1977; 
EPA, 1975, www.gao.gov.assets/120/11 p.ii). Within a few years after Roundup was 
registered, it was noted that “while there are ample toxicity studies at hand concerning 
this material, there is no information available concerning the mechanism whereby the 
compound affects mammalian systems”, including how it is metabolized (Bailey, n.d.).  
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By 1975, according to a GAO report, there were 35,000 pesticides (new and 
existing) in the U.S. that needed to be evaluated according to current scientific standards. 
Many pesticide tolerance levels were outdated and many (approximately 140 out of 230 
active ingredients) were not even tested (GAO, Dec. 4, 1975). The GAO (ibid) report of 
the EPA also indicated several factors contributing to the Agency’s failing to meet these 
goals, emphasizing that in regards to protecting public health and the environment, the 
GAO stated that for several pesticides, the EPA failed to obtain appropriate studies to 
assess many of the pesticides’ short and long-term impact on reproductive health, child 
growth, and genetic changes (ibid). According to a later report, the EPA expressed 
frustration at how difficult it was to obtain appropriate studies from registrants in a timely 
manner (Eschwege, Aug. 7, 1980). Similarly, the EFSA noted several data gaps and 
inconsistencies between applicant (glyphosate manufacturers) claims and their supporting 
evidence (Monsanto included) (EFSA, 2015). In addition, in 2013, the GAO noted that 
[t]he extent to which EPA ensures that companies submit additional required data 
and EPA reviews these data is unknown. Specifically, EPA does not have a 
reliable system, such as an automated data system, to track key information 
related to conditional registrations, including whether companies have submitted 
additional data within required time frames. (http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
13-145)   
By the 1980’s, according to a GAO (1986) report, the EPA still needed to revise 
their assessment system as the number of new applicants for registration continued to 
stack on top of a growing backlog of existing ones and the EPA was unable to keep up. 
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By the mid-1980’s, there were 50,000 pesticides with 600 different active ingredients and 
900 different inert ingredients (ibid). The GAO (1986) review also noted that the EPA 
had only been able to complete approximately 124 preliminary assessments of active 
ingredients—in approximately 15 years. In addition, the GAO (ibid) review emphasized 
concerns regarding the lack of substantive subchronic and chronic toxicity assessments. 
(Interestingly, that was the same year that glyphosate was being reviewed for 
reregistration—as discussed in the “Perceptions of Safety and Validity” section). I 
searched ProQuest’s Biological Sciences database using the search terms “tox*” AND 
“glyphosate*” OR “Roundup” in the abstract for peer reviewed toxicological studies on 
glyphosate/Roundup prior to 1994; but the majority of the studies, 26 out of 30 results, 
focused on how the pesticide (mainly the active ingredient glyphosate) functioned as an 
herbicide on various crops, aquatic life and insects but there were only four (publicly 
accessible) toxicological studies that tested the impact of glyphosate and/or Roundup on 
mammals and/or or humans. Three of the four studies analyzed the toxic impact (on 
human health) of the surfactant used in Roundup formulations (POEA) and one analyzed 
the toxicity of glyphosate on an Australian bird, rodent and marsupial species. According 
to the abstracts, the overall conclusion from these four studies indicated that glyphosate 
was mildly toxic but the Roundup formulation and surfactant (POEA) was much more 
toxic (ibid). However, as the numbers indicate, the studies are limited. Tomerlin (May 8, 
2006), noted that by 2006, the EPA also “lack[ed] sufficient monitoring exposure data to 
complete a comprehensive dietary exposure analysis and risk assessment for glyphosate 
in drinking water. Likewise, in the E.U. the EFSA’s (2015) report also stated that there 
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are multiple gaps in the research in such areas as pesticide residue levels and water 
toxicity. 
In the most recent re-registration of glyphosate, the EPA noted that it was 
“seeking toxicity data on formulated products containing the surfactant POEA, due to 
uncertainty about its risk to aquatic animals" (but in the assessment report, there was no 
mention in the requirement about POEA toxicity tests in regards to human health) (EPA, 
June 17, 2009). However, in a 2010 memo, the EPA stated that “[i]t is known from 
toxicity testing in the open literature that one surfactant mixture that has been used in 
glyphosate products is considerably more toxic to aquatic organisms than technical 
glyphosate. That surfactant is polyoxyethylene alkylamine mixture (POEA, CAS number 
61791-26-2)”, however, there are “no studies…available for POEA alone” 
(https://www3.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/cleared_reviews/csr_PC-103613_26-Oct-
10_a.pdf). (See the “Data Access Restrictions: General barriers” section for more 
information on CAS number 61791-26-2). 
In terms of beginning to fill prior data gaps, according to the article abstracts 
discussed above (found in ProQuest’s Biological Sciences database using the search 
terms “tox*” AND “glyphosate*” OR “Roundup” in the abstract for peer reviewed 
toxicological studies on glyphosate/Roundup prior to 1994), some of the studies indicated 
evidence that the mode of action of glyphosate was beginning to be understood by the 
mid to late 1980’s and by 1991, had been determined. Several of the other studies in the 
results list discussed the microbiological impact that glyphosate had on crop root 
systems. According to the abstracts for those articles, the outcomes were mixed, 
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depending upon which study was referenced, between indicating that the presence of 
glyphosate promoted hazardous or non-hazardous pathogenic microbial growth (ibid). A 
1982 OECD report stated that “it would be extremely short–sighted to neglect studies of 
microbial taxonomy and descriptive ecology: the bottle–neck which can arise here is the 
lack of awareness by the applied scientist and technologist of the richness of microbial 
types and activities” (Bull, Holt and Lilly, 1982, p. 23). The 1982 OECD report also 
noted that “strong support will be necessary to increase basic knowledge of plant 
physiology and plant genetics if governments want the expected agricultural impacts of 
biotechnology to materialize” (ibid, p. 10).  Bull, Holt and Lilly (1982) also noted that 
although microbiology was considered, at the time, more advanced than plant science, 
microbial physiology was “almost a universal bottleneck” where “[i]ndustry does little or 
no fundamental research in this discipline which thus needs public support” (p. 10). 
Recently, government and academic researchers such as Dr. Huber (plant pathologist), 
Dr. Kremer and Dr. Lucero (microbiologists) have expressed that the U.S. federal 
recognition, time and resources that are needed to appropriately conduct safety studies on 
GMO’s, as well as the impact that glyphosate and other agricultural chemical inputs have 
in the environment and on public health, is sorely inadequate 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UDLdTXe2koo). The National Academies of 
Science, in 2004, stated that ‘‘there remain sizable gaps in our ability to identify 
compositional changes that result from genetic modification of organisms intended for 
food’’ (NAS, 2004, p 15). A recent National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and 
Medicine report (2016) stated that “[m]olecular biology has advanced substantially since 
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introduction of GE crops two decades ago” and should be further invested in as a strategy 
to “address food security and other challenges”, emphasizing that omics technologies 
need further development to effectively test for and analyze unintended effects from GE 
and conventional “new crop varieties” (ibid, p. xviii).   However, the report concluded 
that the current scientific data does not offer conclusive evidence that consumption of 
genetically engineered crops is hazardous to human health.  
One method that the U.S. has utilized to help limit exposure to health hazards is 
the USDA and FDA pesticide residue assessment programs. Since its implementation in 
1991, the EPA had been using the USDA’s Pesticide Data Program (PDP) results to help 
determine dietary exposure levels of pesticides during its RED (Reregistration Eligibility 
Review) reviews for existing pesticides. The EPA provides the USDA with a list of 
pesticides to assess based on “compounds with acute and chronic endpoints, including 
suspected carcinogens,” however, since the implementation of the program in 1991, 
glyphosate has not been included (USDA, April 1994). A recent GAO (Oct. 7, 2014) 
report recommended that the USDA and FDA revise their pesticide residue programs to 
better reflect consumer exposure. But the USDA does not choose which pesticides to test; 
instead, that decision comes from the EPA’s recommendations. The EPA reasoned that 
glyphosate was demonstrated to be a low-level hazard concern and thus did not warrant 
costly assessment. Echoing this response, the FDA and the USDA added that glyphosate 
residue tests were more cost prohibitive compared to other pesticides and, therefore, 
rarely tested (Davies, Feb. 17, 2016; Gillam, Apr. 20, 2015).  The FDA and a GAO (Oct. 
2014) report further explain that the FDA has not included glyphosate in its annual 
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monitoring studies mainly because it requires costly “selective residue testing” (GAO, 
Oct. 2014, p. 7; FDA, 2012; FDA, 2006). In addition, the GAO (Oct. 2014) report stated 
that the FDA “does not disclose the pesticides with tolerances for which it does not test or 
the potential effect that not testing could have on its detection of violations” (p. 55). The 
FDA responded to these concerns suggesting that it was weighing the cost of 
implementing glyphosate testing methods with the “extent of the use of genetically 
engineered crops for human foods” (GAO, Oct. 2014, p. 26). Since the USDA began its 
Pesticide Data Program in 1991 to the most recent sampling results of 2014, according to 
the yearly USDA PDP datasheets, sweet corn (canned or frozen) was often tested, but 
corn as a grain was only tested in 2007 and 2008 and glyphosate residue was apparently 
only tested once, on soy, in 2011 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/datasets/pdp/pdpdata). The 
GAO (Oct. 2014) report also suggested that the FDA work with the OMB in developing a 
comprehensive list of pesticides (that have pesticide residue levels) that have and have 
not been tested. The GAO report also suggested that the FDA develop a more public-
friendly means of disseminating this information in order to decrease the potential for 
misinformation (ibid). 
Theme 4: Perceptions of Safety and Validity 
Introduction 
In a 1976 Congressional hearing, agricultural biotechnology was introduced as a 
potentially safer (and more lucrative) method than conventional agriculture, but being a 
new field of study using new technologies, there were also great reservations regarding 
its safety. Participants in the hearing discussed the need for appropriate research in order 
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to determine the parameters of safety, viability and applicability of this new science and 
technology (94
th
 Congress, May 11, 1976). Berg (Sept. 18, 2008) stated that by the 
1970’s, the promise and potential of biotechnology could be envisioned not only for the 
medical and pharmaceutical field, but for agriculture as well. However, Berg continued, 
there were mixed messages from the innovators—researchers/scientists—as initial 
excitement and promising potential of a new and exciting field of research was tempered 
with scientists calling for a moratorium on r-DNA work until a more thorough risk 
assessment was performed (Berg, Sept. 18, 2008).  
The Asilomar Conference was a group of 140 scientists, government 
representatives, journalists and lawyers who, in 1973, met in California to discuss the 
risks and merits of r-DNA research. Throughout the conference quite “often scientists 
willingly acknowledged the risks in other’s experiments but not in their own” (Berg, 
Sept. 18, 2008, p.290).  However, after much debate, the Asilomar conference 
participants were able to reach a consensus for a set of risk management strategies that 
satisfied everyone and set the stage for future r-DNA research and regulatory guidelines 
(Berg, Sept. 18, 2008).   
The OECD worked collaboratively with member nations and relevant 
stakeholders, including industry and organizational interests, to develop a multitude of 
toxicology testing guidelines that would make international trade safer, for the public and 
environment, and easier for commercial interests (FDA, Mar. 1, 1994). According to an 
OECD report (1986), the safety of biotechnology was established, based upon three 
“compelling lines of evidence”: 1.) risk assessment studies had “failed to demonstrate” 
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that transferred DNA could create “unexpected hazardous properties” in the host 
organism, 2.) “more rigorous evaluation of existing information regarding basic 
immunology, pathogenicity and infectious disease processes has resulted in the relaxation 
of containment specifications recommended by national authorities”, and 3.) “the 
experimentation conducted in recent years has elicited no observable novel hazard (p.27).  
Transitions: Basic to Applied Research 
Cramo, Brewer and Lac (2015) discussed the limitations of applied 
research/R&D, stating: “To the extent that applied research is restricted to the 
examination of variations in a particular A-B relationship, it is unlikely to uncover an 
explanatory principle that accounts for C-D and E-F, along with A-B” (Cramo, Brewer 
and Lac, 2015, p. 31). In other words, the authors suggested that applied research/R&D 
are extremely useful tools to use when there is a specific need to fill but innovative 
processes or products are not arrived at or sustained in a bubble. To ensure public and 
environmental safety this research must also be open to criticism and change that 
includes holistic exploration surrounding the impact (potential and real) of implementing 
the new process/product (ibid). However, in a public meeting addressing the FDA’s 1992 
policy for regulating bioengineered crops, it was stated: “It is the characteristics of the 
organism, the environment and the application that determine risk or lack thereof, of the 
introduction not the technique used to produce the organism” (FDA, Oct. 30, 2015).  
By 1992, there were approximately 30 different genetically engineered crops 
being field tested in the U.S. According to the FDA, the benefits of utilizing genetic 
engineering would provide safer, more consistent and desirable outcomes than, for 
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example, the less precise and less reliable mutagenic techniques or the more times-taking 
gene transfer techniques (FDA, Oct. 30, 2015). According to the FDA, bio-agricultural 
technology was considered an improvement to the traditional agricultural system. But the 
FDA reiterated that this did not suggest that the U.S.’s traditional crop development was 
unsafe, but that it is because of the U.S.’s long history of safe traditional crop 
development that the FDA derived confidence in considering bio-agricultural technology 
as simply another step in improving agricultural systems (ibid).  
But how does one arrive at a determination of “safe”? A survey of sixty-two life 
sciences researchers suggests that funding sources and professional training influence 
individual perceptions regarding the safety and predictability of transgenic crops. The 
survey found that:  
Scientists with industry funding and/or those trained in molecular biology were 
very likely to have a positive attitude to GM crops and to hold that they do not 
represent any unique risks, while publicly-funded scientists working 
independently of GM crop developer companies and/or those trained in ecology 
were more likely to hold a “moderately negative” attitude to GM crop safety and 
to emphasize the uncertainty and ignorance involved. (ENSSER, Oct. 21, 2013)? 
Kahan, et al’s (2013) study explains how one’s culture influences how individuals 
interpret scientific or mathematical information, concluding that professional affiliations 
influenced one’s perception of scientific or mathematical interpretations. Another study 
analyzed 94 peer reviewed articles “that report on health risks or nutritional value of 
genetically modified food products” and concluded that there was “a strong 
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association…between author affiliation to industry (professional conflict of interest)” and 
“study outcomes that cast genetically modified products in a favorable light” (Diels, et al, 
2011). 
In a recent New York Times article the authors described how academic 
researchers are being selected and supported by private funders to speak on behalf of 
industry interests in an effort to improve stakeholder, policy makers and public credibility 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/us/food-industry-enlisted-academics-in-gmo-
lobbying-war-emails-show.html?_r=0). Although the article focuses on a specific 
academic researcher who was hired by Monsanto to promote agricultural biotech crops, it 
points out that academic researchers are also working for the organic food industry. The 
New York Times collected and reviewed several documents and emails communications 
from the academics who worked for the organic industry and concluded that while [t]here 
was no evidence that academic work was compromised” the emails did illustrate a trend 
from academics to lobbying for both organic and agricultural biotechnology interests. 
According to the article, the emails they evaluated from academics who worked for the 
agricultural biotechnology industry 
provide a rare view into the strategy and tactics of a lobbying campaign that has 
transformed ivory tower elites into powerful players. The use by both sides of 
third-party scientists, and their supposedly unbiased research, helps explain why 
the American public is often confused as it processes the conflicting information. 
(ibid).  
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The article quoted an agricultural biotechnology company email response to a 
researcher whom they had recently hired which stated that hiring academic researchers 
was “a new way to build trust, dialogue and support for biotech in agriculture” (ibid). 
Weight of Evidence  
In the 1960’s, claims of safety for the PCB industry (e.g. Bayer, Monsanto, Brush 
Wellman, Exxon), according to Le Menestrel and Rone (2013), were based on a lack of 
certainty that their product caused harm (i.e. operating from the perspective of scientific 
uncertainty in which industry claimed that additional research was needed to conclusively 
verify hazard). LeMenestrel and Rone (2013) stated that contrary to those previous 
industries, whose products were removed or limited from the market due to lack of 
convincing evidence of safety, agricultural biotechnology companies have produced, in 
conjunction with academic and industry-supportive researchers, an extensive amount of 
data from which to make scientifically-backed claims of safety. However, an OECD 
(Apr. 13, 2012) Guidance Document stated that “[a] reasoned scientific approach to the 
assessment of substances for chronic toxicity or carcinogenicity must first include an 
assessment of all available information that has the potential to influence the study 
design” (p. 25).   
A search on the EPA’s archive website produced a multitude of internal memos 
containing registration and toxicological data (mainly derived from or in regards to 
industry data) for glyphosate and various formulations of Roundup and other pesticides 
(https://archive.epa.gov/pesticides/chemicals/foia/web/pdf/103601/103601.htm).  
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The EFSA’s (2015) glyphosate assessment contrasts with that of the IARC, concluding 
that the active substance glyphosate is “unlikely to pose a carcinogenic hazard to 
humans” (p. 1). The EFSA (2015) stated that “[in reference] to the unusually large data 
base available, it was considered appropriate by the EU Expert peer review to adopt 
consistently a weight of evidence approach” (EFSA, 2015). According to Balls, et al 
(Dec. 2006), using a “weight of evidence approach” is usually considered in situations of 
uncertainty. However, Balls, et al (ibid) analyzed 272 studies, concluding that in 
approximately one third of those studies, there was “frequent lack of definition of the 
term, multiple uses of the term and a lack of consensus about its meaning, and…many 
different kinds of weights, both qualitative and quantitative” (Balls, et al, Dec. 2006). An 
OECD (Apr. 13, 2012) Draft Guidance Document on the Design and Conduct of Chronic 
Toxicity and Carcinogenicity Studies stated that the “weight-of-evidence approaches 
differ among OECD countries and regulatory sectors” (p. 26).  
Parts vs Whole: CP4 enzyme and NK603 
According to OECD (1986; 1992) reports, the microbiology and plant pathology 
research needs mainly focused on the potential problem and solution for super-weeds and 
superbugs. Data and discussion in the 1986 OECD report emphasized microbial research 
for its potential contributions to reducing pesticides through r-DNA techniques and 
development. Of concern, according to the report, was the possibility that micro-
organisms from trans-genetic processes might create, host or alter pathogens that might 
cause plant and/or human disease. However, the 1986 OECD report reasoned that 
“[s]ingle gene modifications of micro-organisms with no pathogenic potential or history, 
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or introduction of several genes contributing to pathogenicity, do not appear likely to 
result in unanticipated pathogenicity” (p.29). Subsequent risk assessment was developed, 
according to the 1986 and 1992 OECD reports, on the premise that the r-DNA technique 
was accurate, predictable and safe, posing no more risk to human or target plant health 
than conventionally grown plants (OECD, 1986; OECD 1992).   
An OECD (1993) follow-up to their 1986 guiding principles report discusses the 
merits of substantial equivalence, reasoning that just because a food is genetically altered 
does not make it inherently unsafe. By 1996, an overview of biotechnology by the OECD 
stated that “[t]he great controversies over DNA recombination per se are more a thing of 
the past than of the future” (Wald, p. 9). But later Wald (1996) comments about how 
biologists have been persistently “overly-cautious” about the rate and state of agricultural 
biotechnology (p. 16).  The controversies that had largely been resolved, according to the 
1996 OECD report, encompassed an array of uncertainties regarding potential health and 
environmental hazards but even by the mid-1980’s, when the U.S., as well as the OECD, 
was debating about the risk and benefit of agricultural biotechnology, the discussions 
focused mainly on environmental risk (because existing toxicological studies and how 
their results were interpreted allayed fears regarding at least immediate foreseeable health 
risks) (Sheingate, Apr. 2006).  
The health risks that had been of particular concern with NK603 was the plant 
pathogen used to develop the CP4 enzyme that enables the plant to withstand glyphosate. 
The OSTP (June 26, 1986) however, had set the tone early on stating that “[i]t should be 
noted that microorganisms play many essential and varied roles in agriculture and the 
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environment …and as a rule these agricultural and environmental introductions have 
taken place without harm to the environment” (p.5). In 1992, the FDA (reiterating its role 
in determining how GE crops are assessed and regulated) interpreted the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act to include bio-engineered food regulation in the same category as 
traditional food. According to the FDA:  
The regulatory status of a food, irrespective of the method by which it is 
developed, is dependent upon objective characteristics of the food and the 
intended use of the food (or its components). The method by which food is 
produced or developed may in some cases help to understand the safety or 
nutritional characteristics of the finished food. However, the key factors in 
reviewing safety concerns should be the characteristics of the food product, rather 
than the fact that the new methods are used. (FDA, May 29, 1992). 
Per FDA policy, if the genetically modified product is “generally recognized as 
safe” (GRAS) or if it can be proven to be substantially equivalent to its conventional 
counterpart, it does not have to undergo federal regulation 
(http://www.fda.gov/food/ingredientspackaginglabeling/gras/default.htm). Consequently, 
in 1993, the OECD guidelines adopted this policy as well 
(https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2604).  
USDA reported that field trials for NK603 demonstrated that “there were no 
deleterious effects on plant, non-target organisms, or the environment” (APHIS, Aug. 30, 
2000). However, it should be noted that when APHIS simplified GMO registration 
procedures (discussed above), they also simplified GMO field testing by “reducing the 
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field test reporting requirements for certain multi-year field trials” (APHIS, Apr. 24, 
1997). But Monsanto reasoned that, like GA21, NK603 was not a plant pest (e.g. it was 
not found growing wild and they claimed that pollination drift to other fields could be 
managed; it would not damage commodities or harm non-target or beneficial species) and 
APHIS granted it non-regulated status, which means it can be grown and transported 
within the U.S. without federal oversight (APHIS, Aug. 30, 2000).   
“Section 402(a)(1) of the [Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic] act is most 
frequently used by FDA to regulate the presence in food of unavoidable environmental 
contaminants such as lead, mercury, dioxin, and aflatoxin” (FDA, May 29, 1992). The 
FDA’s main obligation in food safety is post-market but if (in the case of genetically 
engineered components) the genetic component is thought to be a potential health 
concern then the FDA would initiate a pre-market investigation (FDA, May 29, 1992). 
However, because of the historically safe development of traditional plant breeding 
techniques, “the FDA has not found it necessary to conduct, prior to marketing, routine 
safety reviews of whole foods derived from plants”, including plants derived from 
biotechnology (FDA, May 29, 1992). According to a cross-agency report titled 
“Agricultural Biotechnology Risk Analysis Research in the Federal Government”, 
toxicology and allergenicity research and assessments focus only on the individual 
protein that is inserted into the plant DNA (AGRA, 2004).  If the protein inserted into the 
plant DNA is considered toxicologically safe it is assumed that the subsequent plant will 
not pose a risk any different than its conventional counterpart. When Monsanto submitted 
their petition to the USDA’s APHIS for non-regulated status for NK603, they concluded 
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stating that “NK603 was demonstrated to be equivalent to both the E. coli-expressed CP4 
EPSPS protein used for safety studies and CP4 EPSPS expressed by a commercial RR 
soybean variety” (Croon, Jan. 7, 2000). Now for a little layman’s science…the EPSPS 
enzyme is in all plants as part of the shikimate pathway, which helps plants biosynthesize 
aromatic amino acids, which are critical for plant survival. Glyphosate tolerant plants, 
however, have an altered EPSPS enzyme called CP4 (which is derived from 
agrobacterium and cauliflower mosaic virus) EPSPS that enables the plant to tolerate 
glyphosate. Glyphosate binds to the CP4 EPSPS enzyme in a way that, according to 
some, does not inhibit the growth of an herbicide (glyphosate) tolerant plant (Funke, July 
12, 2006).   
In terms of human consumption of transgenic herbicide tolerant plants Monsanto 
presented the results of an acute oral toxicity mouse study, which was submitted in 
support of Monsanto’s initial transgenic crop registration petition. Monsanto concluded 
that CP4 EPSPS is as safe as a plant’s natural EPSPs, explaining that the mice were given 
the purified CP4 EPSPS protein at rates much higher than normal consumption would be 
expected before a NOEL was reached 
(https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/00_01101p.pdf; 
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/93_25801p.pdf).  “Acute” studies, according 
to OECD standards, are typically high dose studies conducted on 6-9 animals for a period 
of less than twenty-eight days (OECDa, Sept. 21, 1998).  
Monsanto also presented the results of feeding studies using conventional 
soybeans and the glyphosate tolerant soybeans on rats, cows, chickens, catfish and quail 
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that ranged from 5 days to 10 weeks. Monsanto concluded from these tests that 
“All…samples tested provided similar growth and feed efficiency for rats, chickens, 
catfish and quail. The nutritional value or wholesomeness of GTS [glyphosate tolerant 
soybeans] 40-3-2…was the same as conventional varieties of soybeans” (Results of the 
cow test were not mentioned.) (http://cera-gmc.org/GmCropDatabaseEvent/GTS%2040-
3-2). Based on the studies presented in the GTS 40-3-2 petition for non-regulated status, 
Monsanto petitioned for NK603, highlighting the similar technology and attributes 
between the two illustrates that NK603 is as safe as GA21, which was illustrated to be as 
safe as GTS 40-3-2 and thus merits similar judgment regarding regulatory status.  The 
data used to evaluate the safety of the CP4 EPSPS enzyme and NK603 as a whole was 
provided by Monsanto. In response to Monsanto’s petition for non-regulated status for 
NK603, the FDA stated: 
Monsanto has concluded that its transgenic NK603 corn is not materially different 
in terms of food safety and nutritional profile from non-transgenic corn hybrids 
currently on the market. At this time, based on Monsanto’s description of its data 
and analysis, the agency considers Monsanto’s consultation on the Roundup 
Ready® NK603 corn line to be complete. (FDA, Oct. 9, 2000). 
The European Commission clarifies, however, in (EC) Regulation 1829/2003 that 
“[w]hilst substantial equivalence is a key step in the procedure for assessment of the 
safety of genetically modified foods, it is not a safety assessment in itself” (EC, Sept. 22, 
2003, no. 6). The Regulation also includes a recommendation that “genetically modified 
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food and feed should undergo a safety assessment through a Community procedure 
before being placed on the market” (E.C., Sept. 22, 2003, no. 3).  
From 1994 to 2000 (when NK603 was introduced to the EU’s Spanish Competent 
Authority), the EU had received twenty-four petitions for various crops (e.g. potatoes, 
cotton, corn, rapeseed, sugar beets, tomatoes and soybeans), the majority of which were 
submitted by either Syngenta, Bayer or Monsanto. Currently, however, there are a 
multitude of transgenic crops that have been approved for importation but only one, Mon 
810 (Monsanto’s Bt corn, in which the Bt toxin is inserted in the plant genes to protect 
against the European corn borer) has been approved for cultivation—the majority of 
which is grown in Spain (http://www.isaaa.org/). When the Spanish Competent Authority 
(CA) assessed and approved NK603, the application and materials were then submitted to 
the EFSA for further evaluation concluding that? 
according to the current state of scientific knowledge and after examining the 
existing information and data provided by the Monsanto Company, the Spanish 
Commission on Biosafety could give a favourable opinion to the 
commercialisation in the E.U. of maize NK603 if proposals and conditions 
established in the ERA report are implemented. (EFSA, May 27, 2009)  
The original application for NK603 included a request to approve it for food, feed 
and cultivation, but the application was later modified, retracting the request for 
cultivation approval (only one transgenic crop – Bt Corn – is cultivated in the E.U.). As 
part of required materials for E.U. approval for importing NK603, Monsanto submitted 
the Acute study (discussed above) in which mice were given oral doses of the CP4 
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EPSPS enzyme, although the EFSA emphasized that it did not advocate these tests since 
the naturally occurring protein was not found to be a health risk. Monsanto also 
submitted sub-chronic toxicity studies which indicated changes in the blood in the high 
dose female rat group. The panel agreed with Monsanto’s conclusion that because “no 
other observations of treatment related effects were made” the variations did not indicate 
statistical or significant biological findings (EFSA, 2003, p. 9).  Monsanto also conducted 
a supplemental “13 week safety assurance study” for NK603 in which ten groups of rats 
with twenty rats per sex per group were tested (Hammond, Dudek, Lemen and Nemeth, 
Feb. 12, 2004). The minimum requirement for subchronic toxicity studies (i.e. 90-day 
studies) 10 rats/sex/group according to OECD standards (OECDb, Sept. 21, 1998). 
However, the blood and urine analysis was conducted on ten out of the 20 rats per sex per 
group, the results of which, as stated by Monsanto, did not produce statistically 
significant differences. In Monsanto’s report describing this study, there is no explanation 
regarding the other half of the test subjects (ibid).  
By 2004, the EC approved, by default (i.e. E.U. Committee and Council members 
did not reach a majority vote so the E.C., according to legislative rules, approved it), 
NK603 for food and feed purposes (E.C., July 19, 2004). Of the approximate 131 GMO 
varieties that were brought to the Commission for decision, from 2004-2015, sixty-six of 
them resulted in Council votes that did not reach majority consensus, which means that 
approximately half of the GMO products, in the E.U. market, were approved by default 
rather than majority consensus (http://ec.europa.eu/food/dyna/gm_register/index_en.cfm). 
In the case of NK603, there were twenty-five member states voting, nine voted in favor, 
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nine voted against and seven abstained. In looking at the individual votes, there were 124 
total votes, forty-eight voted in favor, forty-three voted against and thirty-three abstained. 
A qualified majority for 124 votes is sixty-two. Just recently NK603 registration was up 
for renewal and it was granted by default, again, as neither the Standing Committee nor 
the Council rejected the renewal or was able to reach a qualified majority vote (EC, Apr. 
4, 2015; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4843_en.htm). 
Parts vs Whole: Glyphosate, Inerts, Roundup 
The Office of Strategic Development (Nov. 1995) emphasized the need for the 
EPA to develop an assessment system to achieve a more integrated approach to the 
human ecology. The EPA developed criteria for a multitude of studies that, for example, 
address the chemical impact on wildlife (birds, mammals and aquatic), plant life, water 
quality, soil quality, reproduction, worker safety, carcinogenicity, etc. However, by 1997, 
the EPA stated that it did not know how to identify and integrate common mechanisms of 
toxicity with cumulative exposure and risk assessments, but it was assumed that 
glyphosate did not pose a danger because it “[did] not appear to produce a toxic 
metabolite produced by other substances”. The EPA stated that future reregistration, 
however, would require the registrant to provide common mechanism of toxicity data. 
(https://www3.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/reg_actions/reregistration/tred_PC-
417300_11-Apr-97.pdf, p.7).  However, in Monsanto’s petition to increase certain 
glyphosate tolerance levels in 2002, the EPA stated that it still did not have common 
mechanism of toxicity data for glyphosate (EPA, Mar. 2002). 
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Glyphosate and its metabolite AMPA have similar toxicological profiles and both 
have, until recently, been accepted by government and international health, 
environmental and regulatory agencies and organizations as generally safe (Monsanto, 
2015; WHO, 2004). According to an EU website, a significant factor in determining its 
current safety is its mode of action—which, in glyphosate works by disrupting the 
synthesis of the enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate (EPSP or shikimate pathway) where it 
blocks the EPSP from catalyzing the synthesis of, basically, essential plant metabolites 
such as the aromatic amino acids phenylalanine, tyrosine and tryptophan (which are also 
essential amino acids for humans). The website also explains that the mainstream 
assumption has been that the shikimate pathway does not exist in mammals, including 
humans, so glyphosates enzymatic disruption would not physically impact mammalian 
biological systems; however, according to the information provided on the website, that 
assumption does not include consideration that the shikimate pathway also exists in 
bacteria (http://www.glyphosate.eu/glyphosate-basics/how-glyphosate-works).  
A review of a multitude of studies in the last fifteen years has revealed that human 
beneficial gut bacteria rely on EPSP synthesis and that glyphosate has been shown to 
inhibit that synthesis, thus potentially inhibiting critical amino acid synthesis that could, 
subsequently have a negative systemic impact on human and animal health. The authors 
link a host of health problems that could potentially stem from ingesting small amounts 
of glyphosate residue. (Samsel and Seneff, Apr. 18, 2013) However, this article is 
published in Entropy, and the publisher posted an “Expression of Concern” pointing out 
that the editors of the journal had received multiple complaints suggesting that the 
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authors used biased sources, but since “the nature of the claims against the paper concern 
speculation and opinion, and not fraud or academic misconduct” readers were offered a 
precautionary note (http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/15/4/1416). 
By 2002, the EPA stated conclusively that glyphosate poses “no evidence of 
carcinogenic potential” (EPA, Mar. 2002, Sec. B,5; C,3,ii; C,4,iii;). The 2016 FAO/WHO 
report, confirming the non-carcinogenic status of glyphosate, stated that although it 
considered evidence of glyphosate formulations, “[t]he scope [of the evaluation] was 
restricted to the active ingredient” (http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5693e.pdf, p. 19).  However, 
in the most recent re-registration of glyphosate, the EPA noted that it was “seeking 
toxicity data on formulated products containing the surfactant POEA, due to uncertainty 
about its risk to aquatic animals", but in the assessment report, there was no mention in 
the requirement about POEA toxicity tests in regards to human health (EPA, June 17, 
2009).  
In addition to the EPA’s established position that glyphosate is non-carcinogenic, 
the EPA recently concluded that glyphosate (independent of its adjuvant formulations) is 
not an endocrine disruptor (EPA, June 29, 2015). In the weight of evidence, the EPA 
(ibid) noted (as suggested in the study’s title) that they only considered research on the 
active ingredient rather than formulations with adjuvants. In order to conduct their 
assessment, the EPA (ibid) completed, in 2015, the first (Tier 1) of a multi-phase 
endocrine assessment project (that was supposed to be completed between 2004 and 2005 
according to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, sec. 408(p)). A chemical passing 
Tier 1 (of which glyphosate was one) means it poses no risk to the endocrine system 
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(ibid). According to the EPA’s recent Tier One Endocrine Screening Assays for 
glyphosate, “…glyphosate demonstrates no convincing evidence of potential interaction 
with the estrogen, androgen or thyroid pathways in mammals or wildlife” (Akerman and 
Blankinship, June 29, 2015, p. 26).   
But how did Roundup get separated into active and inert ingredients in the first 
place? During the first decade of the EPA’s existence, the high volume of pending 
pesticide registration called for a more efficient method of parsing out what could be 
considered safe, and therefore not requiring assessment, and what could be considered 
potentially hazardous. The EPA’s solution was to classify certain substances, such as 
inert (or “other”) ingredients that are used in various formulations, in graduated levels of 
hazard. By 1975, the GAO noted in their report that the Agency was only testing the 
active ingredient rather than the complete formulation and that the assessments of inert 
ingredients were weak (GAO, Dec. 4, 1975).  
However, the International Program on Chemical Safety (IPCS) evaluation of 
glyphosate in 1994 concluded that although rodent studies indicated “a low acute toxicity 
by the oral and dermal administration routes [t]he role of adjuvants in the toxicity of 
glyphosate formulations needs to be investigated further in laboratory mammals and 
organisms in the environment” because “[t]he formulation Roundup is acutely toxic to 
humans when ingested intentionally or accidentally. No controlled studies are available 
and therefore the human NOAEL cannot be derived” (but IPCS made interim 
recommendations that suggested the use of protective clothing and the need for “a market 
based survey” to better estimate exposure rates of the general public) 
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(http://www.inchem.org/documents/ehc/ehc/ehc159.htm). The EPA, in 1995, however, 
published a notice in the Federal Register detailing a list of inert ingredients that were 
“reviewed by the Structure Activity Team of EPA’s Office of Pollution Prevention and 
Toxics…and evaluated by the Office of Pesticide Program’s Inert Review Group” (EPA, 
Jul. 7, 1995, p. 35397). The inert ingredients in this list, including polyethoxylated 
tallowamine (POEA)—a common ingredient in Roundup formulations—had been 
determined to be minimal risk to human health and were therefore reclassified from the 
List 3 (unknown toxicity) to the List 4b in which the EPA asserts that they have 
“sufficient information to conclude that [its] current use pattern in pesticide products will 
not adversely affect public health and the environment” (ibid). (See Appendix 6 for 
toxicity chart).  At the time, Roundup (of which some claim that the majority of Roundup 
formulations utilize POEA’s) had been registered for over twenty years. Roundup’s 
versatility as a defoliant and plant growth regulator made it one of the leading pesticides 
in the world—even prior to the introduction of the first Roundup Ready crop (Székács 
and Darvas, 2012 (http://cdn.intechweb.org/pdfs/25624.pdf).  However, recall that in 
2015, glyphosate was reclassified (as discussed in Data Access Restrictions), again, back 
to List 3 (EPA, Sept. 15, 2015). 
The 1993 RED included reference to §156.10 – Labeling Requirements under 
Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which states that “[t]he Administrator may 
require the name of any inert ingredient(s) to be listed in the ingredients statement if he 
determines that such ingredient(s) may pose a hazard to man or the environment” (EPA, 
Sept. 1993, p. 196).  Monsanto (April, 2005) stated, in a letter responding to a study on 
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Roundup toxicity in aquatic systems, that “[i]t is misleading…to suggest that ‘Roundup’ 
and ‘glyphosate’ are synonymous” (p. 4). Monsanto further explained that most Roundup 
formulations contain a surfactant and that it is “inappropriate to attribute the effects 
observed [from surfactants] to glyphosate” (p.4). A 1979 study on the aquatic impact 
from glyphosate, Roundup and its surfactant, MON 0818—POEA, (which Monsanto’s 
April, 2005 letter referenced to support its argument), stated that “[t]oxicities of the 
surfactant were similar to those of the Roundup formulation” (Folmar, Sanders and Julin, 
1979, p. 1). In 2005, the EPA’s Environmental Fate and Effects Division review of a 
study on amphibians that included glyphosate with one of the most common surfactants 
used herbicide applications—Polyethoxylated Tallowamine (POEA), stating that “the 
[e]ffects on metamorphosis, gonadal morphology and thyroid hormone gene expressions, 
suggest that POEA and glyphosate formulations containing POEA can impact endocrine-
mediated processes” (Howe, et al, Aug. 2004, abstract).  In addition, an EPA memo 
validated an Australian frog study on the effects of glyphosate and a Roundup 
formulation that found Roundup formulations more toxic than glyphosate alone (Oct. 
1985). As early as 1985, according to one article, the EPA reviewed and commented on a 
study conducted by Folmar, Sanders and Julin (1979), and reiterated in 1997, that “the 
surfactants increased the toxicity of the product” (McLane, Apr 17, 1997).  Another study 
that was reviewed by the EPA concluded that the surfactant, POEA, was not only toxic 
itself, but combined with glyphosate multiplies the toxicity of both active ingredient and 
surfactant (Carey, et al, Oct. 7, 2008).   
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In the E.U., pesticides registrations are, like in the U.S., granted for a limited time 
before they are required to be reassessed. And, like the U.S., assessment is conducted on 
the active ingredient. On June 19, 2013, the Glyphosate Task Force, a compilation of the 
agro-chemical manufacturers who originally applied for glyphosate approval, requested 
that Germany be the Rapporteur Member State (RMS) to conduct the assessment (N.A., 
June 19, 2013). (Germany was also the RMS that conducted the previous assessment in 
1995.) Based on EFSA (2015) description of the RMS report, Germany assessed whether 
the dossier submitted by the Glyphosate Task Force was complete. Based on Germany’s 
assessment and recommendations, the EFSA determined it was necessary to “seek expert 
consultation” for certain toxicological studies, the conclusion of which all but one of the 
peer review experts agreed that “glyphosate is unlikely to pose a carcinogenic hazard to 
humans and the evidence does not support classification with regard to its carcinogenic 
potential according to the CLP Regulation” (EFSA, 2015, p. 11). (CLP regulation is 
based upon EC 1272/2008—discussed above in Developing Standards: Harmonizing 
Roundup/glyphosate.) 
The IARC Monographs, of which the controversial glyphosate review is a part, 
are a collection of studies conducted by interdisciplinary scientists that “review the 
published studies and evaluate the weight of the evidence that an agent can increase the 
risk of cancer” (http://monographs.iarc.fr/). After the WHO’s IARC panel published their 
glyphosate assessment (IARC, 2015) which concluded that glyphosate is a “probable 
carcinogen”, the EFSA called on the Rapporteur Member State (Germany) to consider 
IARC’s research in its assessment. Germany’s BfR (German Federal Institute for Risk 
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Assessment) carried out the review and submitted their draft report to EFSA. According 
to the BfR, the review consisted of 150 new and 300 previous toxicology studies on 
glyphosate as well as approximately 200 journal publications, the results of which, BfR 
concluded, indicated that glyphosate is non-carcinogenic, non-terratogenic and non-toxic 
to the reproductive system, although a reference list, specifying which studies were part 
of the assessment, was not provided in this report 
(http://www.bfr.bund.de/en/the_bfr_has_finalised_its_draft_report_for_the_re_evaluation
_of_glyphosate-188632.html). The BfR stated that their studies also included a look at 
the adjuvants that make up some formulations of glyphosate and concluded that “there is 
convincing evidence that the measured toxicity of some glyphosate containing herbicides 
is the result of the co-formulants in the plant protection products (e.g., tallow-amines 
used as surfactants)” (ibid). BfR followed up this discovery by examining the results of 
one study that examined a glyphosate-containing herbicide (not specified in their 
summary), initiated by the BfR and conducted by the University of Veterinary Medicine 
in Hanover (ibid). BfR states that this study suggests that glyphosate is not disruptive to 
the gut flora of ruminants (ibid).  
The BfR submitted their assessment and recommendations to the EFSA. In the 
BfR’s summary of their assessment, they stated “[a]fter sending the draft re-assessment 
report of glyphosate to EFSA, it will constitute the basis for the public consultation with 
all interested stakeholders as well as for the so-called “peer review procedure” by experts 
from other EU member states” (BfR, Apr. 4, 2015).  After reviewing IARC’s study, the 
BfR suggested that their comments on the IARC report would be “inexpedient” and 
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strongly recommends that all of the EU states and competent authorities, the EFSA, EC, 
ECHA (European Chemical Agency), WHO, IARC and JMPR (FAO/WHO Joint 
Meeting on Pesticide Residues) should, at various stages, be involved in discussing, 
assessing and finalizing conclusions regarding further approval of glyphosate. In this six 
paragraph, one-page summary, the BfR dedicated three paragraphs—half the page—to 
this recommendation.  According to available public information, however, this 
recommendation was not carried out and the EFSA based their final assessment for the 
reregistration of glyphosate on the BfR’s report (EFSA, 2015; 
http://www.bfr.bund.de/cm/349/bfr-contribution-to-the-eu-approval-process-of-
glyphosate-is-finalised.pdf). The EFSA’s conclusions, however, do not take into 
consideration the BfR’s suggestion regarding the potential role that co-formulants play in 
measured toxicity in some pesticide formulations (although the EFSA did not recognize 
this as a data gap because, according to the EFSA, only the active ingredient was being 
evaluated) (EFSA, 2015). Shortly after the EFSA assessment was published, the EC 
formally requested that the EFSA provide a statement addressing the toxicity of POE 
tallowamines (a.k.a POEAs) “based on the toxicological evaluation of POE-tallowamine 
presented by the rapporteur Member State Germany in the context of the peer review of 
the active substance glyphosate” 
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/j.efsa.2015.4303/epdf). Recently, in an 
addendum to the EU 2002 review of glyphosate, the E.C. stated that “a significant 
toxicity of POE-tallowamine (CAS No 61791-26-2), a substance frequently used as a co-
formulant in plant protection products containing glyphosate, was observed on all 
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endpoints investigated” and a new regulation went into effect August 1, 2016, declaring 
that Member States shall ensure that plant protection products containing glyphosate do 
not contain the co-formulant POE-tallowamine (CAS No 61791-26-2) (EC. July 11, 
2016; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1313 ). 
Data Details and Interpretations  
Portier, et al (Mar. 3, 2016) stated that the BfR’s recent glyphosate assessment 
lacked scientific rigor by dismissing statistically significant data, dismissing valid and 
relevant epidemiological studies and neglecting OECD guidelines in interpreting chronic 
and carcinogenicity studies. The EFSA letter responded to the points made by Portier, et 
al (Mar. 3, 2016) refuting each claim of weak scientific rigor, emphasizing that the IARC 
assessment was a great “first step” but that “we should not compare this first screening 
assessment with the more comprehensive hazard assessment done by authorities such as 
EFSA, which are designed to support the regulatory process for pesticides in close 
cooperation with the Member States in the EU” (EFSA, Jan. 13, 2016, p. 1).  
In 1986, the EPA produced the first Reregistration Eligibility Decision (RED) for 
glyphosate and in the reference section of that document one can find several studies 
conducted in the early to mid-1970s. A 1977 memo regarding Monsanto’s petition, to 
amend certain pesticide tolerance levels, referenced several industry studies (e.g. acute, 
dermal, reproductive, etc.) including two two-year studies (rat and dog). However, 
according to the EPA, in setting tolerances, the EPA criteria is based off of the acute 
toxicity NOEL’s (EPA, Feb. 2, 1977). Using these studies, the EPA approved an increase 
in tolerance for several commodities from .05 to .1 ppm (corn grain was included in the 
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amended tolerance) (ibid). During the review process in 1985, the EPA’s Toxicology 
Branch AD Hoc Committee reviewed Monsanto’s glyphosate carcinogenicity study on 
mice, one on rats and a chronic study on beagle dogs. Upon review of these studies, the 
Review Committee noted that there were changes in the pituitaries of the beagles in the 
dog study for which the EPA requested additional data to “address findings in this study” 
and provided Monsanto (the registrant) a 50-month timeframe to submit the data (EPA, 
June 1986, p. 83). In the meantime, the EPA allowed a tentative pesticide residue NOEL 
(no observed effect level) of 20 mg/kg/day (ibid). The rat study, according to the EPA, 
revealed no significant chronic toxicity concerns, but the study needed to be re-done to 
include higher dosages so as to reach a maximum tolerance level.    
The mouse study, however, revealed a rare type of tumor in the male mice. In an 
exchange of memos between Monsanto and the EPA, Monsanto claimed that the tumors 
that showed up in the mouse study were not related to the treatment but were rather 
examples of false positives that should be disregarded. However, one of EPA’s 
Toxicological Branch’s statistician’s response to Monsanto referred to the statistical data 
and provided a detailed explanation, based on the data, why “a prudent person would 
reject the Monsanto assumption that Glyphosate dosing has no effect on kidney tumor 
production” (Lacayo, Feb. 26, 1985) (See Appendix 4 for EPA memos related to this 
issue). The following month, a group consensus review from the EPA’s Toxicological 
Branch discussed the data and concluded, as summed up by review member, William 
Dykstra (Mar. 20, 1985) that “[g]lyphosate has been identified as an oncogene in male 
mice. A dose-related increase in renal tubule adenomas was found. These tumors are 
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considered compound-related”. The study on mice showed kidney tumors and the Review 
Committee declared glyphosate a Group C carcinogen (“limited evidence that it can 
cause cancer in animals in the absence of human data, but at present it is not conclusive) 
and the Agency determined that the studies needed additional review (Farber, et al. Mar. 
4, 1985; http://www.greenfacts.org/glossary/def/epa-cancer-classification.htm).  
The studies were then reexamined by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act’s (FIFRA’s) Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) which found that although 
the mouse study showed significant results compared to historical control evidence 
(which suggests that previous studies were used in comparison) they determined that such 
significance was overridden by the current study control group’s lower survival rate than 
its high-dose test group. In addition, the SAP stated that the maximum tolerated dose 
(MTD) had not been achieved in the rat study and the significant differences in dose 
levels between the mouse study and the rat study (the rats were given approximately 
1/100 the dose of the mice) made the two incomparable, rendering evidence to determine 
carcinogenicity inconclusive. Therefore, they determined glyphosate as a Group D 
carcinogen (“inadequate animal evidence of oncogenicity”), requesting that the mouse 
and rat studies be repeated and submitted (also within a 50-month timeframe) to address 
protocol standards and reach MTD, respectively (EPA, June 1986).  
A second mouse study was never submitted, but a second rat study was conducted 
and in 1991 (after multiple review panels discussed not only the rare tumors found in the 
mouse studies, but also the potential significance of the high rates of pancreatic adenoma 
that occurred in the rat study) the findings were reviewed by the Health Effects Division 
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Carcinogenicity Peer Review Committee which subsequently classified glyphosate as a 
Group E pesticide, indicating that there is strong evidence of non-carcinogenicity “based 
upon lack of convincing carcinogenicity evidence in adequate studies in two animal 
species” (Dykstra, Oct. 30, 1991, p.i). The review committee went on to clarify that “[i]t 
should be emphasized, however, that designation of an agent in Group E is based on the 
available evidence at the time of evaluation and should not be interpreted as a definitive 
conclusion that the agent will not be a carcinogen under any circumstances” (Dykstra, 
Oct. 30, 1991, p. i). The 1993 RED reiterates this precautionary note, reminding 
registrants that, in regards to the registered pesticide, if they obtain “any factual 
information…from whatever source, including but not limited to interim or preliminary 
results of studies, regarding unreasonable adverse effects on man or the environment” the 
registrants must notify the Agency per requirements of FIFRA section 8(a)(2) (EPA, 
Sept. 1993, pp. 225-226). 
Six of the 1993 RED studies (out of over 100 studies listed) were chronic and/or 
carcinogenicity studies, two of which were albino rat studies that were not described 
within the chronic/carcinogenicity section. In addition to the six chronic and/or 
carcinogenic studies listed in the 1993 RED, an Addendum was mentioned in the 
reference section regarding the pathology assessment for the initial study on mice, and, 
although I was not able to locate the addendum in the EPA archive database, it coincides 
with a follow-up memo that discussed the results of further review of the existing tumor 
samples as well as three more samples taken from each of the affected mice (ibid). Under 
the “Data Supporting Guideline Requirements for the Reregistration of Glyphosate” 
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section in Appendix B of the 1993 RED, the two albino rat studies are mentioned in 
reference to supporting data for the oncogenicity – rat” requirements (EPA, Sept. 1993). 
In addition, it was stated that one of the albino studies also was used to support the 
“chronic feeding toxicity—non-rodent” requirements (ibid). In addition to that, a 21-day 
dermal toxicity study on rabbits was listed as supporting data for the chronic feeding 
toxicity studies for rodents (ibid). (According to OECD guidelines, dermal toxicity tests 
are administered on the skin, not in food (http://www.oecd.org/chemicalsafety/risk-
assessment/1948333.pdf)). According to the EPA MRID numbers, the EPA’s latest IRIS 
statement summarized the same dog study and the original rat study as the 1986 and 1993 
REDs, with the addition of a higher dose Rat study (that was reviewed in 1991 to address 
gaps in the 1986 RED data), as key studies supporting current assumptions of safety and 
regulatory decisions 
(https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/iris/iris_documents/documents/subst/0057_summary.pdf; 
EPA, June 1986).  (According to the EPA, “[a]n MRID is unique eight-digit number 
assigned to each study submitted to EPA”) (https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-
registration/study-formatting-and-supplemental-information). The incidences of tumors 
in the mice and rat studies were determined as either insignificant or were considered to 
be not conclusively connected to the effects of the treatment (EPA, Sept. 1993; EPA, 
June 1986; see Appendix D to view the follow-up memo) The additional beagle study 
data that was requested in the 1986 RED was apparently satisfied, instead, with an 
addendum from Monsanto to the EPA rationalizing why the pituitary weight changes 
were not related to the treatment (Dykstra, Jan. 12, 1987). The 1993 RED deleted the 
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brief discussion regarding the pituitary changes and replaced it with a statement that the 
study “showed no effects based on all parameters examined” and the NOEL was raised 
from 20 to 500 mg/kg/day (EPA, Sept. 1993) (see Appendix 5 for EPA memos related to 
this study). The overall outcomes summarized in the chronic toxicology section of the 
1993 RED highlighted data that the EPA considered demonstrative of minimal short or 
long-term toxicity risk to humans (ibid).  
However, in 2008, Gilles-Eric Séralini and Nora Benachour submitted the results 
of an in vitro study on glyphosate Roundup formulations and AMPA which used three 
different types of human cell types—placental, embryonic and umbilical cord. In 2009, 
Benachour and Séralini took part in a study analyzing the effects of Roundup 
formulations on liver cells (Gasnier, et al., June 17, 2009). The results of these tests 
according to Benachour and Séralini (2009), “clearly confirms that the adjuvants in 
Roundup formulations are not inert” and that they are endocrine disruptors and 
potentially carcinogenic (p.97). But in vitro studies are controversial too and industry 
scientists and researchers, according to an article on Monsanto’s website, have countered 
that testing cells in a petri dish inadequately represents the impact substances have on 
cells within a complex biological system 
(http://www.monsanto.com/products/documents/glyphosate-background-
materials/bkg_richard_response_2005.pdf).  
Prior to Séralini’s study, the U.S. and OECD member countries emphasized the 
assumption that “[a] properly conducted 90-day subchronic test should provide a 
satisfactory estimation of a no [observed] effect level” (NOEL) (OECDb, Sept. 21, 1998, 
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p.1). According to the 13-week rat study submitted by Monsanto, the NOEL’s for NK603 
consumption focus on the effects of CP4 EPSPS protein levels that concluded there were 
no adverse effects observed at the highest dosage levels (572 mg/kg) (Hammond, Dudek, 
Lemen and Nemeth, Feb. 12, 2004). However, according to the studies Monsanto 
submitted for EPA pesticide tolerance level approval for glyphosate on corn (and other 
crops), the sub-chronic (90-day) toxicity NOEL of glyphosate for mice at 90 days was 
recorded at 10,000 mg/kg, while the chronic (2-year) toxicity NOEL was recorded at 750 
mg/kg for mice and 362 mg/kg for rats (EPA, Dec. 24, 1996). However, in assessing the 
safety of glyphosate, the 2016 FAO/WHO report stated that “[t]he overall weight of 
evidence indicates that administration of glyphosate and its formulation products at doses 
as high as 2000 mg/kg bw by the oral route…was not associated with genotoxic effects in 
an overwhelming majority of studies conducted in mammal” (http://www.fao.org/3/a-
i5693e.pdf, p. 21; http://www.monsanto.com/glyphosate/documents/no-evidence-of-
carcinogenicity.pdf). 
Reflecting on the divergent interpretations, of the mouse study (described above), 
between Monsanto and the initial EPA toxicological review panel regarding false 
positives, the European Environmental Agency (EEA) recently published an updated text 
that analyzes individual cases of regulatory “false positives” over the last 100 years in 
which a precautionary policy stance was favored over risk. The EEA concluded that of 
the 88 cases studied, only four turned out to be actual false positives. Of the other 84 
cases, approximately one-third were considered “real risks”, approximately one-third 
were considered scientifically ambiguous, i.e. “the jury is still out”, and the other third 
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were a combination of “unregulated alarms”, “too narrow a definition of risk”, and “risk-
risk tradeoffs” (http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/late-lessons-2, p. 17). Jamieson, 
Oreskes and Oppenheimer (Jan. 2005) state that “there is an almost universal horror of 
false positives. Thus, standard statistical methodologies permit an investigator to miss 
real effects in order to avoid claiming an effect that does not actually exist” (p.55).   
Caution as it is used here, however, is relative to what is being protected. 
Jamieson, Oreskes and Oppenheimer (Jan. 2005) go on to explain: “In reality, this may 
have as much to do with our statistical practices…as it does with whether the effect is 
actually present. Yet the failure to scientifically demonstrate an effect is often interpreted 
as showing that the effect does not exist” (p.56).  Needleman and Gee (2013), concur, 
stating that “'[n]o evidence of harm is thereby mischaracterised as 'evidence of no harm'” 
when faced with a lack of adequate, valid or convincing data for conclusive scientific 
interpretations (p. 50). 
Conflicts of Interest and Public Trust  
In the 1980’s, Ashford (1984) discussed that there were significant flaws in how 
the EPA selected its Scientific Advisory Panels/Boards, stating that the selection process 
allowed for an unbalanced, industry-weighted scientific review of widely-used (but 
potentially toxic) chemicals that put the EPA at risk of inadequately protecting the public 
and environment from chemical hazards by relying on industry-supplied data and 
industry-favored assessment. A June 2001 GAO report, which focused on analyzing 
criminal financial conflict of interest statute and the Office of Government Ethics conflict 
of interest regulations, stated that the EPA had yet to develop a system to request and 
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collect essential information to determine the independence, balance of viewpoints and 
conflicts of interest of their Board Reviewers. In addition, the GAO report noted that 
public access to appropriate and sufficient information regarding the panelists’ 
background and “points of view represented on the panels” was inconsistent (p. 21). This 
report reviewed four Science Advisory Board panels (between 1997 and 1999) that were 
selected to review the “EPA’s Guidelines for Assessing the Health Risks of Carcinogens” 
(p. 34). The EPA stated that it sought to create a “broad middle” perspective in which the 
majority of panelists were university researchers serving as a bridge between industry and 
environmental protection interests, but the GAO pointed out that the EPA’s initial 
inadequate collection of financial and professional interest information illustrated how 
the perspective of this balance could shift when the GAO incorporated critical 
information necessary for a more complete background for each panelist. The GAO 
report stated that the EPA “would be better able to assess panelists’ impartiality and 
ensure that panels are properly balanced if it had an understanding of the work performed 
by the panelists for law firms and industry, particularly for chemical companies” (p. 10). 
The GAO listed the panelists in four separate tables, according to the review panel in 
which they were participating, categorized according to whether they were explicitly 
affiliated with a university, industry, or the EPA. Figure 1 compiles the GAO tables. The 
GAO then provided additional information that, according to the GAO and EPA, would 
have altered the composition of the “broad middle” and industry categories. According to 
the report, the EPA agreed with the GAO assessment—that consistent and thorough 
financial (and professional affiliation) background information collection, retention and 
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dissemination would help better ensure a more balanced and transparent scientific review 
process.  
 
Figure 1. EPA Scientific Review Panel: Explicit Affiliations Prior to GAO Adjustments.  
The EU has also been subject to recent scrutiny regarding conflicts of interest in 
the EFSA.  In 2010, Nikiforos Diamandouros—former European Ombudsman—followed 
up on a complaint regarding a former Head of EFSA's Genetically Modified Organisms 
Unit (Suzy Renckens) who left the EFSA in 2008 and less than two months later took up 
the position of Head of Biotech Regulatory Affairs for Europe, Africa and the Middle 
East for Syngenta 
(http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/recommendation.faces/en/11089/html.book
mark). Diamandouros recommended that the EFSA address its lax conflict of interest 
policy (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_EO-11-20_en.htm). In 2010, the EFSA 
demonstrated that it had not addressed the Ombudsman’s concerns as the Chairwoman of 
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EFSA’s Management Board, Diáná Bánáti, was asked to resign after her concurrent 
membership on the board of an international biotechnology lobby group (ILSI) was made 
public. Bánáti is now the Executive Scientific Director of ILSI. On the other hand, the 
executive director of EFSA, in 2010, raised concern with a member of the European 
parliament’s budget committee’s involvement with a prominent environmental NGO 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2012-
0106&language=EN&mode=XML; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18007004 
After the publication and retraction of Séralini, et al’s (2012) study (on the 
chronic toxicity of NK603, a Roundup formulation and glyphosate) and the subsequent 
volume of conflicting media attention given to the outcomes of the study and speculation 
regarding the reasons for its retraction, the EC funded two projects, G-TWYST (GM 
Plants Two-Year Safety Testing) and GRACE (GMO Risk Assessment and 
Communication of Evidence) and France funded GMO90+. Each of the projects offer 
websites that openly describe the purpose, parameters, design and funders. Both G-
TWYST and GRACE provided opportunity for public input during the planning stage, 
suggesting a certain level of access and influence in the project. The GMO90+ project 
complements G-TWYST in that it will use the same food (NK603) and same rat strain. 
GMO90+ will conduct 90-day and six month studies in an effort to discover “predictive 
biomarkers” that could help make 90-day studies more accurate and effective 
(http://www.rechercheriskogm.fr/en/actualites#106). The study, according to their 
website, is in progress. G-TWYST is the E.C. replication of Séralini’s study but with a 
larger number of rats. It is designed to “[clarify]…uncertainties raised through the 
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outcomes and reports from [Séralini, et al’s, 2012 study]” and help further determine 
whether long-term feeding studies are necessary for risk assessment and policymaking—
the study, scheduled to begin August, 2015, apparently has not begun yet (http://www.g-
twyst.eu/news). The GRACE design is two-fold. One half of the project was to analyze 
systematic reviews and evidence maps as possible strategies to “identify, analyze and 
communicate primary research data on potential impacts of GM crops and their products 
on human and animal health, the environment and socio-economic indicators in a 
transparent, reproducible and unbiased manner” (www.grace-fp7.eu). The other half of 
the GRACE project was a 90-day rat study with MON810, using its closest conventional 
counterpart as a control. The results of the systemic/map study indicated that such 
reviews and approaches could provide useful data for risk assessors/managers in regards 
to gaining a better understanding of the impacts of genetic modifications. According to 
GRACE results, the rat study confirmed previous studies that concluded that the 90-day 
test on MON810 did not produce significant differences between control and test groups 
(ibid). The Austrian Federal Ministry of Health, however, wrote a letter to GRACE that 
highlighted several points in both parts of the projects that conflicted with their 
interpretation of how the study should have been designed, conducted and interpreted. 
GRACE responded, offering an explanation for each point (http://www.grace-
fp7.eu/en/home).  
In searching for public opinion regarding POEA’s, a Google search using the key 
words “Roundup POEAs public opinion” and “Roundup inert news”  offers a multitude 
of articles and websites with titles such as “Weed-Whacking Herbicide Proves Deadly to 
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Human Cells (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/weed-whacking-herbicide-p/); 
“Here’s Why ‘Inert’ Ingredients May Be the Most Harmful of All” 
(http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2016/05/31/roundup-inert-
ingredients.aspx); “The Great Glyphosate Debate” 
(http://northernwoodlands.org/articles/article/the-great-glyphosate-debate) and others. In 
addition, a group of over 100 scientists recently petitioned Green Peace to stop opposing 
genetically engineered crops, stating in their letter that,  
[s]cientific and regulatory agencies around the world have repeatedly and 
consistently found crops and foods improved through biotechnology to be as safe 
as, if not safer than those derived from any other method of production. There has 
never been a single confirmed case of negative health outcome for humans or 
animals from their consumption. Their environmental impacts have been shown 
repeatedly to be less damaging to the environment, and a boon to global 
biodiversity. (http://supportprecisionagriculture.org/nobel-laureate-gmo-
letter_rjr.html; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-
science/wp/2016/06/29/more-than-100-nobel-laureates-take-on-greenpeace-over-
gmo-stance/) 
The letter also referenced the need to feed a growing global population and 
elaborated on the potential benefits of “Golden Rice” as a means to alleviate vitamin A 
deficiency in developing countries. Green Peace responded:  
Golden rice has failed as a solution and isn’t currently available for sale, even 
after more than 20 years of research…Rather than invest in this overpriced public 
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relations exercise, we need to address malnutrition through a more diverse diet, 
equitable access to food and eco-agriculture. 
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-
science/wp/2016/06/29/more-than-100-nobel-laureates-take-on-greenpeace-over-
gmo-stance/) 
Integrative Research  
A multitude of research studies have analyzed and assessed the interactions of 
glyphosate and transgenic crops independently. But fewer studies have integrated 
glyphosate, glyphosate formulations, such as Roundup, and herbicide tolerant crops, such 
as NK603. According to Séralini’s, et al (2012) article, the purpose of their study was to 
expand on the 90-day (sub-chronic toxicity) study that Monsanto (referred to in their 
article as “the petitioner”) had conducted by not only extending the length of the study to 
two years but also exploring more parameters. The reason to conduct a long-term study, 
according to Séralini, et al (2012) was because Monsanto’s conclusion, that there was no 
significant difference between the control and test outcomes, conflicted with subsequent 
independent studies that suggested otherwise. In a follow-up article, Séralini clarified that 
their study adhered to the 1981 OECD 452 guidelines, which, according to the authors, 
were the guidelines “in application when the study started in 2008” (Séralini, et al(b), 
2012, p. 477). OECD guideline 408 is what Monsanto used to design its 90-day (sub-
chronic toxicity test) study from which Séralini and his team replicated and/or expanded 
on (in terms of matching rat type and number, feed type, dosage levels and parameters 
measured) (Séralini, et al, 2012).  
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In addition to rodent/animal toxicology studies, academic and U.S. agency 
researchers with the USDA have conducted significant studies on conventional and 
transgene crops and the impact of glyphosate on plant and soil microbiology (e.g. 
Kremer, Means and Kim, 2005; Barrow, Lucero, Osuna, Reyes and Aaltonen, Aug. 1, 
2007). Dr. Huber (personal communications, May 23-June 7, 2016) had been working 
with a team of senior plant and animal scientists who discovered a potentially new, 
potentially devastating plant pathogen that appeared directly linked with transgenic crops 
and the impact of glyphosate interactions within plants and soil. Initial results of their 
studies suggested that this new pathogen not only negatively affected plants (e.g. 
potentially causing or contributing to Sudden Death Syndrome in soy and Goss’ wilt in 
corn) but also mammals (e.g. potentially causing or contributing to miscarriages and 
spontaneous abortions in cows and pigs) (ibid).   
Huber was seeking precautionary action from U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Tom 
Vilsak, asking the USDA to hold off on its approval of GM-alfalfa. Huber was also 
seeking support for further research into these initial findings (which suggested a 
potential negative impact from glyphosate mineral chelation on GMO and non-GMO 
plant nutrient uptake which, in turn, contributes to weakening its immune system and 
making the plant more susceptible to disease, thus creating an inviting environment for 
bacterial and viral growth and the introduction and spread of a newly discovered 
pathogen). In addition to this, what also alarmed Huber was the potential widespread 
hazardous impact that this pathogen could have on agricultural crops, animals and 
humans, when one considers the extent to which glyphosate is used for transgenic and 
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conventional crops. In his letter to U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, Huber 
(Jan. 17, 2011), explains that although the consequences of this newly discovered plant 
pathogen (linked to glyphosate/Roundup) “could result in a collapse of US soy and corn 
export markets and significant disruption of domestic food and feed supplies”, inaction 
regarding further research to appropriately address the issue could potentially create “a 
general collapse of our critical agricultural infrastructure”.  Huber’s request to USDA 
Secretary Vilsak for interagency support to conduct further research has been, according 
to Huber (personal communication, June 5, 2016) “essentially ignored”. Huber stated, 
however, that the research has continued—without federal support—and they have 
completed preliminary analyses which confirm the existence and negative impact of this 
new pathogen on plants and mammals (personal communication, May 23, 2016). In 
addition to individually approaching USDA Secretary Vilsak by letter, Huber mentioned 
that “[a] group of us scientist have met with the various agency heads (Vilsack has never 
been available, but assistants have) to share our findings and 135 or so peer-reviewed 
scientific papers, but to no avail (comments like "When you get more information, please 
contact us.")” (ibid). 
Another highly credible scientist, Dr. Robert Kremer, had also been researching 
soil and plant pathogens and discovered similar outcomes in terms of glyphosate playing 
a role in creating an environment conducive to hazardous bacterial and pathogen 
accumulation. Through direct email communication, Dr. Robert J. Kremer (personal 
communication, June 2-6, 2016) provided the following material regarding his work and 
experience working with the USDA as it pertains to the questions I posed to him (See 
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Appendix 8). Dr. Kremer spent the latter half of his career (approximately seventeen 
years) researching soil microbiology and the role that glyphosate plays in microbial soil 
and plant interactions. Kremer noted that when he began this research, the first transgenic 
crop (soy) was just entering the market and even though researchers already knew that 
glyphosate predisposed susceptible plants to heavy colonization and infection of roots 
after application (due mainly because glyphosate is systemically transferred throughout 
the plant and that the mode of action leads to inhibition of the plant’s defense 
mechanisms), no one had reported the possibility of similar occurrence in the resistant 
transgenic soybean varieties (Kremer, personal communication, June 2, 2016). In other 
words, according to Kremer, the researchers collaborating in the USDA and the 
University of Missouri project were the first to study this topic. When funding was cut for 
the collaborative project and Kremer continued this research under the umbrella of his 
existing USDA project, Kremer noted that he and a fellow microbiologist colleague 
“were the only researchers in the agency working on the glyphosate-transgenic crop 
effects on biology; however, several other researchers were working on the transgenic 
crops from a production standpoint” (June 2, 2016).  
According to Kremer, an initial study (Kremer, Means and Kim, 2005) suggested, 
and subsequent field trial studies confirmed, that unintended effects of transgenic 
modifications seem to contribute to the plant roots releasing an excess of carbohydrates 
and amino acids which is “related to the abundant colonization and infection of the roots 
by soilborne fungi (Fusarium spp.)”. Glyphosate seems to be related to this process as it 
travels through the plant to its roots, where it is released into the soil. Because it binds 
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tightly with the soil, it does not travel far from the plant roots. Contrary to INCHEM’s 
1994 glyphosate assessment concluding that the results of “field studies…support the 
view that glyphosate does not affect soil microorganisms in the long term” 
(http://www.inchem.org/documents/ehc/ehc/ehc159.htm), Kremer’s (personal 
communication, June 3, 2016) research demonstrated that whether a plant is designed to 
withstand the effects of glyphosate or not, the unintended effect created by the presence 
of glyphosate, as indicated by the consistent increase in harmful bacteria colonization, 
increases the potential to weaken not only the roots, but the plant as a whole.  
Another retired USDA microbiologist, Dr. Mary Lucero described a moment of 
her own scientific revolution as she began working on soil microbiomes with the USDA 
and realized that what had previously been her theoretical foundation of reality regarding 
how plants thrive in a given environment was turned upside down as she physically 
worked with plant and soil microbiomes. What she realized is that her previous 
theoretical assumption that plants grown in vitro required a sterile environment to avoid 
disease was essentially backwards as she realized that plants and soil contain and depend 
on millions of microbes. Not all microbes are beneficial, of course, but Lucero’s research 
uncovered the vast potential that beneficial microbes could have on plant and soil vitality 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UDLdTXe2koo; Lucero, et al, 2014; Lucero, 
Barrow, Osuna and Reyes, Mar. 16, 2008; Lucero, Barrow, Osuna and Reyes, Apr. 
2006).  
In 2012, a group of USDA researchers, according to Kremer, conducted a review 
(that included much of his research) which concluded that the “evidence of the impacts of 
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glyphosate is limited or not supported” (personal communication, Kremer, June 2, 2016). 
In a follow-up email, Kremer elaborated that the scientists who reviewed his work are 
“traditionalists”, some of whom, from his perspective, “seek to explain results based on 
classical mechanisms” rather than broaden their theoretical boundaries (personal 
communication, Kremer, June 3, 2016). In other words, Kremer suggested that “[some] 
still dismiss the ability of an applied chemical pesticide to cause “unexpected effects”, 
such as glyphosate promoting proliferation of certain microorganisms in the root zone” 
(ibid).   
As Lucero’s research evolved and began demonstrating consistent results, and as 
she began to share those results, she noted a significant shift in agency support—invisible 
boundaries that she had not realized she was working within until her research uncovered 
groundbreaking data demonstrating how to reduce or eliminate synthetic pesticides and 
extensive irrigation by balancing soil microbiomes. She explained that the USDA had 
supported her research while her data was still suggestive but when she began to confirm 
her initial findings with consistent numbers that demonstrated the validity of her 
hypothesis, within weeks she was told by a national [USDA] program leader that her 
work, because it did not support agricultural chemical companies, would never be 
supported by the USDA (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UDLdTXe2koo, 4.35). 
Dr. Kremer and Dr. Lucero spoke favorably of the USDA, emphasizing that for 
the majority of their careers they felt well-respected by their superiors and by the 
Department in general and were given a fair amount of flexibility and authority over their 
research projects. However, a basic, mainstream search online for Huber’s, Kremer’s and 
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Lucero’s work (discussed above) provides an abundance of anti-GMO chatter regarding a 
few interviews or statements that the researchers had made that could be easily 
paraphrased in support of an anti-GMO cause, but in regards to professional and 
regulatory discussion regarding their work, the landscape is relatively barren compared to 
the time and space given to justifying glyphosate and GE crop safety.  
The experiences of the scientists mentioned above are noteworthy, particularly in 
context with a statement made by the Office of Management and Budget (2002) 
regarding a “basic standard of quality for the use of science in agency decisionmaking”: 
Under 42 U.S.C. 300g—1(b)(3)(A), an agency is directed, “to the degree that an 
Agency action is based on science,” to use “(i) the best available, peer reviewed 
science and supporting studies conducted in accordance with sound and objective 
scientific practices; and or best available methods (if the reliability of the methods 
and the nature of the decision justifies use of the data). (p. 8457) 
Cultural Perceptions  
Contrary to U.S. pro-agricultural biotechnology policies, the European Union has 
integrated the Precautionary Principle into their legislative decision-making process, 
which requires, as the title suggests, a level of caution in assessment and decision-making 
processes. The Precautionary Principle, which is written into EU Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and referenced throughout EU legislation, is defined 
as:  
The precautionary principle enables rapid response in the face of a possible 
danger to human, animal or plant health, or to protect the environment. In 
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particular, where scientific data do not permit a complete evaluation of the risk, 
recourse to this principle may, for example, be used to stop distribution or order 
withdrawal from the market of products likely to be hazardous. (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= URISERV % 3Al32042)  
Although some proponents of agricultural biotechnology suggest that the 
European Union’s precautionary stance is based on conjectural risk, meaning that there is 
no convincing evidence of current, tangible risk that would justify precautionary action—
that such precaution is based on a type of imaginary fear—many European government 
representatives are not convinced that the scientific evidence presented by industry or 
industry-backed organizations/institutions is complete or convincingly valid (EC, 2011). 
The U.S. has filed legal complaints, within the context of international trade agreements, 
against the E.U. for what the U.S. considers unsubstantiated bans and restrictions on E.U. 
GMO imports. WTO disputes between the U.S. and the E.U. over E.U. member country 
moratoriums on (and independent member country resistance to) GMO imports from the 
U.S., Canada and Argentina have resulted in the U.S. (along with Canada and Argentina) 
filing complaints against the E.U. The EU defended its actions by claiming potential 
health and environmental hazards of GMO’s warranted a precautionary approach. But the 
WTO panel reviewing the case determined that the EU had acted “inconsistently with its 
obligations” to WTO agreements and that the EU’s actions “should take into account risk 
assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organisations and be made 
on the basis of scientific principles” (http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/eu-
ministers-give-green-light-to-national-gmo-crop-cultivation-bans). 
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Multiple public polls conducted between 2003 and 2015 from the Pew Research 
Center consistently indicate that a majority of adults both in the U.S. and Europe 
considered genetically modified food unsafe (http://www.pewresearch.org/topics/health/). 
Multiple newspaper articles highlight persistent tension between public concern for food 
safety and industry and government assurance that the current food system is safe and all 
sides are using scientific knowledge, to an extent, to justify the basis of their claims. The 
following references are simply a few examples of the some of the mainstream public 
opinions, discussions and statements surrounding this conflict: 
(http://www.nytimes.com/topic/subject/genetically-modified-food; 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/fears-not-facts-support-gmo-free-food/?_r=0; 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/01/opinion/tell-consumers-what-they-are-eating.html;  
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/opinion/sunday/with-gmo-policies-europe-turns-
against-science.html; http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/09/opinion/gmo-foods-and-the-
trust-issue.html; http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/30/world/between-famine-and-
politics-zambians-starve.html?pagewanted=all; etc.).  
Conclusion  
The 2016 U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine study 
emphasized that the issue of biotechnology, quoting the former (1999) Secretary of 
Agriculture Dan Glickman, “boils down to a matter of trust. Trust in the science behind 
the process, but particularly trust in the regulatory process that ensures thorough review” 
(National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 2016). The policy 
development for NK603 and Roundup is complex. It depends, in large part upon the 
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validity of the scientific methods that support the determination of whether a product is 
safe or not. How science is determined as valid is determined by the integration of a 
multitude of economic, socio-cultural and political factors that influence how knowledge 
is created, transformed and disseminated between researchers, industry, governments and 
the public. The conflict surrounding Eric Gilles-Séralini’s et al (2012), research provides 
a window to the broader issues at stake with GMO policy development and pesticide 
regulation. The research presented here demonstrates that (in addition to stakeholder 
interests) transparency, trust, and balance of power are integral underlying factors driving 
conflicting ideologies and scientific interpretations of whether herbicide tolerant GMO’s 
and their accompanying pesticides, are safe, or not. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
How do science and industry influence state-level policy and regulatory decision-
making processes regarding the safety and/or promotion of a specific genetically 
modified corn (NK603) and the herbicide (Roundup) with which it is designed to work? 
How and what knowledge is generated and how is it transformed between scientists, 
industry and government to create policies and regulations for production and 
consumption of NK603 corn? What are the possible benefits/consequences of current 
safety protocols and how are those protocols met or challenged by Séralini’s research 
team’s study?  
To answer these questions, I have analyzed major components of the agricultural 
biotechnology knowledge system including: significant legislative and regulatory policies 
and processes within the U.S. and the E.U., influential organizations and industries, a 
thorough review of a multitude of relevant industry and academic studies, interviewed 
two highly competent scientists from the public research field, and perused newspaper 
articles, websites and independent polls that provided a feel for overall public perceptions 
of agricultural biotechnology. The following discussion is arranged similarly to the 
preceding chapter, presenting my analysis of the research within the major themes that 
resonated throughout my research.  
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Theme 1: Developing Standards 
Cultural Transitions  
The research and discoveries of Cohen and Boyer were not only groundbreaking 
for the field of bioengineering, gene transfer technology and science in general, but they 
also introduced new potential environmental solutions as well as potential solutions for 
agriculture and healthcare industries, although public perceptions, scientific 
interpretations and government representatives were (and still are) divided on whether 
bio-agriculture represents positive benefits, devastating risks or something in-between. 
While increased crop yields were one marketing point, perhaps more significant for 
herbicide tolerant crops was the perception that glyphosate was a safer alternative to 
previously used herbicides. Thus, even though an increasing number of weeds have 
become resistant to glyphosate (which require increasing application rates as well as the 
number of times applied in a season), its use is justified as a better solution than using 
alternative, more hazardous pesticides. In order to create a viable market for genetically 
engineered foods, however, gaining public trust in agricultural biotechnology became an 
international priority for OECD member country representatives.  
As Wald (1996) predicted, agricultural biotechnology has met challenges in how 
the public and researchers perceive the need for and safety of biotechnology, as is 
evidenced in the newspaper headlines and GMO-related websites, researcher studies and 
letters. The tension between resistance to and acceptance of new technology—especially 
technology that challenges cultural traditions—could be viewed as just part of the 
growing pains of a scientific revolution maturing into its own paradigm. But, U.S. 
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agricultural biotechnology is based on the success of “traditional” agriculture. The U.S, 
utilizing its skill and capacity to grow food has increasingly produced crop surpluses and 
has not, as a general populace, experienced the pang of hunger since the Dust Bowl era. 
Without the crisis of a broadly felt need to change how our food is made, there is 
decreased incentive to accept the risks of biotechnology. One could view this from a 
social construction perspective, in terms of cultural norms and boundaries of reality, in 
that without an applicable and wholly integrated societal need (real or perceived) for that 
technology, social processes will erect barriers to its implementation if other, more 
familiar methods are perceived as capable of meeting those needs. In other words, if the 
OECD wanted to pursue agricultural biotechnology as the next scientific revolution, it 
would have to discover or create a need sufficient to overcome societal resistance. In the 
meantime, industry and government had been working on regulatory procedures (e.g. 
substantial equivalence) that would make a smoother, faster transition from development 
to marketplace. 
In order to fulfill the economic and political potential of agricultural 
biotechnology, both government and industry would need to establish a basis of safety. 
Establishing a basis of safety required that products meet a multitude of government 
approved safety criteria. Much of the criteria, test guidelines, regulatory processes and 
research data that led to the approval of NK603 was produced through international 
government and industry collaboration. The U.S. agenda to promote and become leaders 
of biotechnology and the public policy and regulatory development developed to follow 
that path that was conducive to reducing unnecessary regulatory barriers to agricultural 
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biotechnology innovation. Establishing a basis of need required a unique set of attributes 
distinct from and superior over existing products or technology. Perhaps by marketing for 
convenience, nutritional benefits, safety assurance and environmental benefits, increased 
production and decreased global hunger, Salomon Wald envisioned the basis for which 
agricultural biotechnology could potentially overcome public resistance.  
The E.U. has found itself in a difficult situation in terms of making decisions that 
run contrary to certain socio-cultural aspects of member nations and economic sectors of 
the economy. As the U.S. is a major exporter and E.U. is a significant importer, E.U. bans 
and trade restrictions on GMOs, from this perspective, could be perceived as a threat to 
industry legal rights and regulatory freedom (as established by WTO and U.S. national 
policies) as well as marketing advantages of the exporter’s national economy and its 
political power and status as an innovative leader. The WTO’s determination that the 
E.U. cannot use the Precautionary Principal based on claims of safety , in a sense, 
indicates that the subject, as far as international trade relations is concerned, is now 
closed, regardless of how science and knowledge has evolved outside of the context of 
“risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organizations” 
(http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/eu-ministers-give-green-light-to-
national-gmo-crop-cultivation-bans). This is just one example of how (and which) data is 
used has the potential to impact international trade and human health. The WTO review 
panel decision has also created a legal barrier that inhibits expression of underlying 
cultural differences and alternative obligations (e.g. E.U.’s commitment to biological 
diversity as a signatory of the Cartagena Protocol). Without comparable agricultural 
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biotech-industry influence at the regulatory and policy making level that the U.S. has 
experienced, the E.U. political process seems more weighted in favor of public opinion, 
needs and interests, which run counter to certain harmonized trade rules. However, 
socially constructed values of how safety is perceived have been streamlined with WTO 
trade, OECD harmonization and U.S. regulatory processes. Perceptions of safety that run 
counter to those streamlined processes threaten the system in terms of delaying and/or 
inhibiting trade as well as diminishing the foundation that certain key products are a safe, 
viable commodity. To avoid continued conflict with the established rules and 
assumptions of safety, certain amendments in E.U. legislation have shown a shift in 
emphasis from protecting human health and, in some amendments, protecting cultural 
values, to incorporating an increasing focus on creating a “harmonized” system for 
domestic and international trade. The shift, noted in the language of certain amendments 
in European Commission regulations, indicates a level of transition from a more public 
health to private protection, which suggests that the conflict is not as simple as “us” 
versus “them”, but integrated within the E.U. as well. Also integrated within the E.U. is 
tension between appealing to the standards of harmonized global trade and appealing to 
the unique needs and interests of its individual member states—needs and interests that 
are not adequately addressed in the WTO but persistent within E.U. society. Where some 
agricultural biotechnology supporters within the E.U. perceive the E.U.’s precautionary 
stance as a weakness that is hindering market and economic participation and success, 
others within the E.U. solicit alternative interests that frame the E.U. position as 
independently paced within its own cultural interests. 
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Defining Roles in the U.S. 
Without an intervening step from seed development to field trial, the USDA -
APHIS was able to pattern genetically engineered crop regulation in accordance to their 
pre-existing regulatory authority over conventional crops—in terms of plant protection. 
By the time Monsanto petitioned APHIS for NK603’s non-regulated status, APHIS’ role 
focused on the environmental impact of how plants would interact (particularly if they 
would alter the DNA of non-target plants and become a containment threat or if the 
bacterial and/or viral transgene components would negatively impact beneficial bugs) if 
they were released into the environment. Industry assurance and USDA-APHIS general 
acceptance that microorganisms do not pose a hazard to human health, whether they 
occur naturally within the plant or are placed there through r-DNA techniques, became a 
type of security/safety assurance upon which future regulatory decisions were, in part, 
based. Assessing how pesticides potentially contribute to bacterial growth that is 
hazardous to plants, however, was not explicitly within the authority of the USDA’s role 
in the Coordinated Framework.  
With the implementation of the EPA, the U.S. government took active steps to 
protect the public against future health and environmental hazards by enabling the new 
agency to assess and regulate industry chemical products—which required an increased 
dependency on scientifically supported evidence of safety. From the start, the EPA was 
established within the context of conflict between competing social and economic 
divergent interests. In order to “sustain a well-articulated attack” Nixon’s Advisory 
Council gave the EPA the responsibility to not only establish standards that effectively 
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protected public and environmental health but also the authority to enforce those 
standards.  But in establishing EPA parameters of the level of safety required for 
regulating pesticides, FIFRA Act qualified the phrase “unreasonable risk”, which could 
be perceived as subjective and prone to divergent perceptions and is a key area of conflict 
in determining what is considered necessary to protect public and environmental health 
and what is considered necessary in promoting economic progress.  
By the 1970’s, U.S. legislators were wrestling with a new paradigm of thinking 
that challenged the boundaries of basic assumptions about growing food and food safety. 
There are two significant pieces of legislation that illustrate how science, technology and 
industry became priority factors in further advancing national goals, The National 
Science and Technology Policy Organization and Priorities Act of 1976 and the 
Stevenson Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980. With the introduction of these 
two acts, innovation, from the perspective of U.S. legislation, is used in conjunction with 
technology and industry. For agriculture, the perspective that biotechnology was the next 
phase of agricultural evolution highlighted the potential for humans to improve the world 
around them through innovation. But from a critical theory perspective, these two Acts 
began, in an official capacity, to transition the innovation of the U.S. agriculture system 
from a civil society endeavor to a corporate industry endeavor that diminished the role 
and influence of the public (and increased the role of capital-strong business) in how the 
U.S. food supply was grown. Perhaps it was assumed that if appropriate criteria were met 
that the science would speak for itself. With the Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, the U.S. government has attempted to stake 
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a claim in bio-agricultural technology development as a means to secure rights to use 
products in exchange for federal funding through technology transfer agreements. The 
academic point of access, however, is limited not only to the extent that academic 
innovation applies to national and geo-political goals, but also in the influential role that 
industry maintains with legal rights to intellectual property and patents. This role allows 
industry to direct the scope, focus and how/whether the outcomes are disseminated, 
which, in turn, limits scientific exploration and knowledge development and thus 
constructs domains of perceived safety by maintaining a more predictable body of 
“available” evidence. Reflecting on Payne and Samhat (2004) when they stated that 
“[o]ur knowledge of material “facts,” for example, cannot be disconnected from the 
social understandings or interpretations of those facts…” (p. 14). One can see that social 
construction and critical theory apply in how this new knowledge system enables industry 
to establish boundaries of knowledge development for not only public and independent 
researchers but also the public. 
As an advocate for environmental protection, the systemic impact of the EPA’s 
decisions could create economic barriers for other federal departments and/or commercial 
industries, which puts the EPA in a difficult and sometimes unpopular position of 
regulating politically and economically significant components of industry. To the EPA’s 
credit, they have developed a comprehensive set of criteria that is meant to address the 
systemic impact that glyphosate might have on the environment or public health. (To the 
registrant’s/petitioner’s (Monsanto’s) credit, the studies that Monsanto submitted met 
most of the EPA public health and environmental impact data requirements, assuming the 
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studies were conducted and interpreted with competence and integrity.) Set in the context 
of the enormous task that only makes up part of the EPA’s total obligation, it seems that 
the EPA was trying to do what it could with what it had at the time and making the best 
of it. Without having to produce the data, the EPA could then focus on evaluating the 
data and setting standards. In addition to assisting the EPA with obtaining the necessary 
data in a timelier and less costly manner (in terms of federal spending), requiring industry 
to provide the safety data provided the necessary validation to produce an abundance of 
data that supported their products. When the GAO reviewed the EPA in 1986, and 
suggested they use industry-led studies to help alleviate the work load and expedite the 
assessment process, the lack of discussion, in this review, regarding conflict of interest 
suggests a high level of trust that industry registrants would provide unbiased data. Since 
U.S. public food policy relies on science-based risk assessment, it is critical that the 
standards for validating, assessing and using scientific knowledge are unbiased. Working 
with industry stakeholders helped to meet the needs of commercial interests and helped 
relieve government agencies of the time and resources necessary to conduct safety 
studies.  
The Economic Research Service of the USDA’s statement that, “[a]gricultural 
biotechnology is rewriting the rules in several key areas—agricultural policy, industry 
structure, production and marketing, consumer preference, and world food demand—and 
public policy is struggling to keep up” could simply be taken as a message that the 
innovations of agricultural biotechnology were developing quickly and utilizing or 
changing the existing infrastructure to meet its needs, or, the perceived needs of the 
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global food supply, and government agencies were not leading this initiative. Add to this 
statement: “Critical to the efficient and equitable advance of agricultural biotechnology is 
determining the unique role of public research and when and how the public sector 
should interact with the private sector”, in addition to CBI agreements and the OMB 
“Guidelines” and the tone shifts from surface-level free-market capitalism to the 
underlying roles of public researchers, industry, government and the public (USDA, 
Office of Communications, Mar. 2003, p. 8). Add the experiences of former USDA 
researchers, Dr. Kremer and Dr. Lucero, and the tone shifts further, providing an example 
of not only how public research is playing, or not playing, a role in the public’s 
(informed) capacity to interact with the private sector, but also how agency information is 
prioritized to protect major policy decisions and industry interests.  
To reiterate Diamond and McDonald’s (1996) analysis of multi-track diplomacy, 
“[p]eoples, cultures, religious, ethnic or political identity groups, and private citizens 
have no formal standing in the present global system” (p. 26). This could also be 
extended to the influence of independent scientists and researchers when their work does 
not support the current geo-economic system. In addition to the indications (implied or 
directly stated) that some research is considered unnecessary or invalid, researchers have 
expressed that there is a distinct separation between their work and the capacity to 
influence how it is perceived, translated and applied in the making of public policy and 
regulatory standards.  Knowledge development, in this sense, is compartmentalized—
scientists produce and interpret specific outcomes within the context of a specific study 
(e.g. data and analysis from a toxicity study) and policymakers further interpret and 
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generalize those outcomes to apply within a broader, societal context. It seems there is a 
valuable resource that is neglected if scientists who know the subject, data and 
interpretations (e.g. Kremer, Lucero, and particularly Huber, who is a researcher as well 
as a member of a federal committee that is expected to contribute scientific input that 
could influence public policy) are not further involved in helping to develop appropriate 
generalizations and societal applications.  
Clarifying agency roles became a central issue as agencies struggled to determine 
how agricultural biotechnology fit in with the existing standards and whether there 
needed to be new regulations established to ensure public and environmental health. With 
the introduction and promotion of agricultural biotechnology, the federal government had 
an obligation to develop an appropriate system of oversight. Coordinating and regulating 
a new science and technology—especially one so controversial—within and between a 
multitude of government agencies, departments, administrations and committees proved 
to be quite challenging. Overseeing the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology, the OSTP (June 26, 1986) operated from a position that regulation needed 
to be flexible in order to address potential risks associated with biotechnology 
(particularly related to food and agriculture) as those risks became better understood. In 
the attempt to promote further research into the potential impact of transgenic crops, the 
EPA’s proposal to evaluate transgenic crops (under the Toxic Substances Control Act) 
suggested that transgenic crops were not substantially equivalent. The subsequent 
rejection of that proposal is suggestive that the flexibility necessary to adjust regulations 
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according to newly developed science or scientific discoveries, would be limited to the 
extent of product, rather than process.  
Without an intervening step from seed development to field trial, the USDA -
APHIS was able to pattern genetically engineered crop regulation in accordance to their 
pre-existing regulatory authority over conventional crops—in terms of plant protection. 
By the time Monsanto petitioned AHIS for NK603’s non-regulated status, APHIS’ role 
focused on the environmental impact of how plants would interact (particularly if they 
would alter the DNA of non-target plants and become a containment threat or if the 
bacterial and/or viral transgene components would negatively impact beneficial bugs) if 
they were released into the environment. Industry assurance and USDA-APHIS general 
acceptance that microorganisms do not pose a hazard to human health, whether they 
occur naturally within the plant or are placed there through r-DNA techniques, became a 
type of security/safety assurance upon which future regulatory decisions were, in part, 
based. Overall, although the USDA has played a key role in enabling the prolific growth 
and expansion of genetically engineered crops, including NK603. The development of 
federal policies that inhibit “process-oriented” regulation positioned the USDA in a fairly 
insignificant role in terms of assessing and regulating genetically engineered crops for 
toxicological impact on humans, animals and even plants. 
Federal assumptions of a flexible system that would allow regulatory changes as 
science evolved and new knowledge surfaces is limited to the sources of science from 
which the new knowledge derives. The flexibility required to regulate from a “we’ll cross 
that bridge when we come to it” stance works to protect the public only when the risks 
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for the public are appropriately and thoroughly explored and assessed. Such flexibility 
requires integrating a multitude of stakeholder voices and expertise, otherwise the bridge 
disappears in the absence of, or neglected, observation of available data.   
Defining Roles in the E.U.   
Although the regulatory legislation for Roundup formulations still adheres to a 
separation of the active from inert ingredients, the E.U., unlike the U.S., recently 
amended glyphosate regulation by explicitly banning the inert ingredient, POE 
tallowamine, from being used in conjunction with glyphosate. What this illustrates is that 
although harmonizing standards (discussed below) enabled transboundary integration of 
transgenic crops and agricultural chemicals, setting those standards in writing, did not 
necessarily mean that all parties agreed on them to the same extent. In terms of risk 
assessment, the E.U. has developed a more extensive regulatory approval process than 
the U.S., which involves approving GMO products on a case-by-case basis. There is a 
distinct contrast in the approval process and level of active political acceptance of 
GMO’s between the E.U. and that of the U.S. For example, where the U.S. assumed that 
substantial equivalence meant that transgenic crops did not require further toxicity 
research, the E.U. did not hold the same position, thus requiring Monsanto to submit 
toxicity studies with their application for E.U. NK603 approval.  
In creating government regulations, whether it’s to help meet the needs of 
community, protect the interests of a nation or streamline interactions between a 
community of nations, amendments to previous legislations illustrates how politics strive 
to encompass and regulate the web of social-political-economic scenarios. Legislative 
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action to resolve evolving and/or new problems lends to a perpetual growth to the volume 
and complexity of the regulatory framework as new contexts (e.g. shifts in societal 
interests, needs, values, etc.) arise that require new, or amendments to existing, 
regulation.  
Harmonizing Glyphosate  
The E.U.’s regulation EC 1272/2008, as a whole, is an attempt to address the 
needs of societal health while optimizing local to global market opportunities through 
trade continuity. The provision to accommodate third country regulatory requirements 
grants permission to E.U. decision-makers to use existing data and to over-ride 
alternative data sets if they are based on criteria that is divergent from the third country 
standard (in this case, it would be the U.S. standard of assessing only the active 
ingredient). Amending EC 1272/2008 with EC 1907/2006 by removing the provision for 
developing “alternative methods for the assessment of hazards of substances” makes the 
2008 version cohere more effectively to the trade continuity objectives on which E.U., 
U.S. OECD and WTO regulatory decisions are based. What this means for the glyphosate 
safety assessments that help shape policy and regulation in the U.S. and European Union 
is a continued adherence to industry-led research design that promotes a narrowly defined 
(as opposed to holistic) analysis that has been demonstrated to produce industry-favored 
outcomes. 
Harmonizing NK603 (GMO’s)  
Integrating federal initiatives with industry-led research promoted harmonization 
in terms of boundaries of validity for research, development and marketing. In terms of 
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societal structure, government and government organizations (i.e. OECD) are considered 
“voices of authority”. When those voices of authority determined that r-DNA technology 
and the resulting products were patentable and subject to private legal rights, such 
knowledge and technology became the privilege of those who controlled the rights. In 
addition, when the voices of authority determined that agricultural biotechnology was 
substantially equivalent to its conventional counterparts (as long as the transferred gene 
was considered safe), the resulting messages of GMO safety and significant integration 
into the U.S. (and global) food system could be viewed, from a social construction 
perspective, as actions that contribute to mainstreaming societal perceptions of product 
acceptance (i.e. “normalizing” the product) by limiting official recognition of conflicting 
evidence. Socially constructing a product as “normal” could contribute to a more 
compliant society in terms of accepting new technologies. However, as new conflicting 
science emerges (and society is exposed to new realities via unofficial venues) despite 
these normalizing efforts, we begin to see disharmony through increasing societal 
resistance (particularly in E.U. where societal resistance seems to influence government 
action) in regards to the established standards. On a similar note, as with harmonizing 
glyphosate, collaborating with multiple stakeholders to develop standard toxicity test 
criteria that multiple parties agreed upon promoted a level of shared assumption that if 
those standards were followed there would be a higher level of safety in developing and 
marketing products approved when they met those standards (and the results met with 
established criteria for safe human consumption). As was indicated by E.U.’s recent ban 
on POEAs, however, it is clear that the standards for safety need to be revised. If we look 
168 
 
at harmonization from a critical theory perspective, societies are challenged between 
promoting standards that define “sound science” (and, therefore, standards for safety) and 
promoting exploration that could further develop our understanding of the barriers and 
benefits of our constructed realities. Let me reiterate a quote from chapter one that states 
that technical rationality  “on the one hand…was a critical arbiter and espoused the ideal 
of impartial analysis of truth and on the other hand it became the instrument of 
perpetrating domination of nature and humans by technicalising administrative, political, 
and bureaucratic processes” (http://www.unipune.ac.in/snc/cssh/ipq/english/IPQ/21-
25%20volumes/25%2002/PDF/25-2-7.pdf).   
Theme 2: Data Access Restrictions 
The Bayh-Dole Act shifted the perspective of knowledge as a shared public 
domain to one of privatized limited access. It allows academia (and other private and 
public organizations, corporations and institutions) the capacity to capitalize on specific 
research outcomes. In a sense, academic knowledge becomes a commodity in a system 
that compels universities to compete with industry. But, in shifting the purpose and 
motivation of academic exploration and discovery, is there an implicit concern regarding 
the potential impact that economic incentive and patent protection/barriers could have on 
the integrity, creative exploration and potential breadth and depth of research?  
Beginning in the 1980’s, the flourish of agricultural biotechnology development, 
along with the Bayh-Dole Act, offered a potential new reward system for academic 
researchers (and the institutions for which they worked) that included not only the 
potential for professional accolades and peer recognition for advancing innovative 
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technologies that were valued by the federal government, but also the potential financial 
payoff that patenting knowledge processes or innovations could potentially generate from 
products valued by the commercial market. In other words, there is quite a bit of potential 
in discovering, developing and marketing a product, but generating the public funds to 
realize that potential proved to be a challenge that many universities could not overcome. 
Public and independent researchers found themselves not only financially 
challenged in funding new research, but in terms of studying existing products (e.g. 
components in Roundup), key ingredients and formula recipes are legally made 
inaccessible to those who do not own the patent rights. Financial and information 
privileges could be viewed in terms of critical theory in which those who have the 
financial capacity quite often are the ones who control the information, particularly in 
terms of biotechnology development. Recall Congressional discussions in the 1970’s that 
transitioned biotechnology research from a public to private endeavor (because the U.S. 
government could not sustain the financial burden of such research) and Miller’s 
statement regarding how, since the 1970’s, the biotechnology industry dictated federal 
agency decisions and actions. The Regulatory agencies, such as the EPA may have access 
to such information in order to assess product safety, however, all but the active 
ingredient is often censored when disseminated to the public (e.g. product labels and 
agency memorandums), making independent research quite challenging. Recall the EPA 
memo stating that two inert ingredients were exempted from required tolerance levels. 
The identity of those two inert ingredients was blacked out, presumably for proprietary 
reasons. Without public accessibility to the identity of those two inert ingredients, the 
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possibility exists that one of those ingredients was POEA or a version of it. Intellectual 
property rights make verification difficult, which, in turn potentially casts doubt on the 
EPA’s long-standing assumption that all inert ingredients with unregulated status have 
been proven safe.  
Protecting Innovation: Benefits and Barriers  
Intellectual property rights and the patent system have been critical factors in 
shaping and developing how agricultural biotechnological data is created and who creates 
it. Recall that when the Supreme Court was deliberating over whether to permit 
Chakrabarty to patent his lab-created bacteria, former Justices Brennan, White, Marshall 
and Powell raised concern regarding monopolizing life forms. Not only was their concern 
never directly addressed in that case, but since then the U.S. has slackened anti-trust laws, 
enabling biotech industries to further secure these rights by consolidating seed 
production. Considering the cost and time it already takes to develop bio-agricultural 
products and secure them within an increasing field of overlapping patents, streamlining 
biotechnological product development by collaborating with the competition makes 
prudent financial sense. But there remains the question of whether consolidation, on the 
other hand, stifles innovation by restricting innovative diversity. This is where 
independent and publicly supported research (of which the majority of biotechnology was 
in the 1970’s) enables, rather than inhibits, exploratory discussion because the research is 
set in the context of public ownership rather than protected proprietary domain and the 
goals are towards developing for public benefit rather than private security. 
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As the numbers of patents increase, however, transparency decreases as a 
protective measure against competition. Overall, in the U.S., a decrease in public R&D 
and increase in private R&D for what is promoted as a critical source of multiple forms 
of national security shifts knowledge generation and dissemination from publicly 
accessible data to privatized data that is protected by intellectual property laws and patent 
rules. In other words, the safety and viability of a key tool used to help secure major U.S. 
interests became significantly dependent upon private sector knowledge.  
In an effort to alleviate some of the imbalance caused by company control over 
intellectual property, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was enacted, but the Act does not 
address the need to increase public research access to existing industry data/property. 
Although Monsanto, with its statement regarding increasing researcher access to their 
products “with as few constraints as possible” is meant to show good faith efforts at 
transparency, the qualifying term “as few…as possible” leaves room for debate regarding 
access, research design, outcome interpretation and dissemination. This debate was 
evidenced in Pollack’s (Feb. 19, 2009) article, suggesting that academic or extension 
researchers who want to study current biotech products independent of the industry who 
owns it/them have been inhibited—not only potentially from sharing the information they 
have gleaned, but also from accessing the research material in the first place because it is 
proprietary and subject, mainly, to the rules of the company that owns the product. 
Barriers were not limited to academic and extension researchers, in addition, the 26 
scientists, who were pulled together to work on a project for the USDA and EPA, that 
complained about the explicit research limitations of technology and stewardship 
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agreements suggests that even government sponsored can be restricted by intellectual 
property rights. What this indicates is not only a potential for unchecked hazards, but also 
an opportunity for both the USDA and the EPA to improve transparency policies between 
industry and public researchers by further developing and utilizing policies that support 
research integrity and scientific rigor from the scientists hired to conduct research on 
behalf of the federal government. Limiting the capacity for independent or publicly 
sponsored researchers to access primary research material limits the capacity to create an 
informed public. Although Monsanto’s response is encouraging, the legal authority of 
intellectual property rights, while understandable from an industry perspective (e.g. 
protecting one’s investment), could technically maintain the right to limit research and 
potential critical discoveries important to public and environmental health.  
From a patent perspective, the root of it is economics—creating the necessary 
safety and efficacy data for a single biotech product can take over a decade and require an 
enormous amount of financial and expert input. As noted in the timeline for agricultural 
biotechnology product development since the 1980’s, competition in the commercial 
setting means that timing is critical in researching innovative products and shared 
information can be detrimental to future patent security and financial profit. Allowing 
industry more leeway to conduct, and protect the rights to, research alleviates much of 
that cost from the U.S. government and, in political terms, promotes a win-win situation 
in which industry gets financial reward and the U.S. government progresses towards its 
goal of securing perceived national interests.   
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While the statements that Monsanto (and other industry interests) make regarding 
the beneficial role that patents play in providing financial incentive for innovation are 
convincing, to an extent, what becomes factored into and enmeshed with innovation is an 
economic component that has the potential to gain priority and/or redefine the purpose of 
the innovation. Assuring ownership of one’s innovative discovery offers patent holders a 
limited time to balance the books and potentially make a profit. It makes sense, from an 
economic perspective. However, within this system, knowledge generation becomes a 
closed-system with limited input from external sources. Framed in this way, Plato’s 
“necessity is the mother of invention” suggests that initial motivation to invent might be 
to fill a societal need that could be satisfied by the invention but, to a certain extent, 
motivation inevitably transforms into a personal financial need satisfied with secure 
private ownership and rights to the solution. Along with this transformation arises the 
potential for tension between society and inventor when societal needs change and make 
previous innovation less viable. 
With the increased production and dependency on agricultural biotechnology, 
scientists within U.S. federal research programs have stated that they have experienced a 
more restricted environment in which federal goals for scientific advancement seem to 
align more with maintaining the integrity of the current (industry supportive) system than 
accepting and confronting the potential risks involved with exploring beyond current 
assumptions of glyphosate and transgenic crop safety. This is a strong statement that 
needs careful consideration because it implies a level of irresponsibility that is not limited 
to one agency, department, authority or administration. Huber’s long-term membership 
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with the USDA-APS National Threat Pathogens precludes a certain responsibility to 
share preliminary information if such information has the potential to avert or mitigate a 
national disaster or serious health risk related to the program mission. The USDA’s 
response, or rather lack of response, potentially suggests that the federal government does 
not consider Huber’s data as evidence of potential crisis, or at least not a significant 
potential as to risk a major source of financial and political security—but how was 
Huber’s data weighed, in terms of validity?  
Kremer’s statement regarding the USDA’s cautious attitude (regarding what 
information its researchers were disseminating to the public) could be viewed as striving 
to maintain accuracy in how data is translated; but requiring that its scientists refrain from 
sharing their research until it has been “approved and published” eliminates public 
discussion and potential exchange of ideas regarding current, in-progress research. This 
policy essentially shields the public from current projects until they are complete. 
Transparency, through this lens, is available as an end product—the process is not the 
business of the public. Similarly, the EFSA’s (2015) “Conclusion on Peer Review of the 
Pesticide Risk Assessment of the Active Substance Glyphosate”, suggests an apparent 
distinction between publicly accessible peer review and government peer review. 
According to the Office of Management and Budget’s (2002) “Guidelines for 
Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information 
Disseminated by Federal Agencies”, the balance of transparency extends only as far as 
confidentiality agreements allow, necessarily limiting public access in favor of industry 
protection.  CBI effectively veils a company’s secret formula and protects their 
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investment from competition, thus following the logic of patenting and promoting 
intellectual property rights. But from an independent scientist or consumer perspective, 
veiling certain ingredients as CBI makes it difficult to compare specific products with 
active ingredient studies verses studies with surfactants and studies that analyze both 
active ingredients along with specific surfactants. But if Newton’s “shoulders of 
giants”—the cumulative knowledge and experiences of our predecessors—are veiled or 
inaccessible to those outside of the dominant bio-ag-tech innovation circle, a large pool 
of independent innovators is operating from a disadvantaged position that also, in turn, 
limits timely independent input into the biotech knowledge production system from 
which policymakers gather their policy-supporting data.  
Transitions: Public to Private Research  
It became clear with the implementation of the Act that although the federal 
government still recognized the value of public knowledge creation, industry was given a 
leading role in advancing and securing national priorities such as agricultural production. 
Reflecting on Diamond and McDonald’s (1996) analysis, the consequence of such geo-
economics is an increasing protective barrier between public policy and public influence. 
From the Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy meeting in 1983, one can 
see a national transition from public to private research and development designed to 
bridge academia, government and industry.  
In order to bridge public and private needs and interests, the EPA (and to a lesser 
extent, the FDA and USDA) has striven to obtain a holistic understanding of how a 
product will impact society by requiring a wide array of pre-market data (on certain 
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ingredients) demonstrating product safety. Requiring such additional research can be 
quite expensive and to alleviate some of the costs the federal government offers grant 
opportunities to private and public agricultural R&D efforts as a means to promote food 
security, generate economic growth and increase competitive advantage in the global 
market. The regulatory trends for bio-agriculture have focused on promoting a national 
agenda by streamlining a particular type of innovation that, economically speaking, 
seemed more feasible to advance as a private commodity than a public endeavor. 
Providing such support, the government, in addition to private (and public) entities can 
often have a significant amount of time and financial commitment into a singular product 
or process (which can make criticism and change difficult to accept when one is so 
deeply invested).  
Unpublished Data  
Agricultural biotechnology policy development within the U.S. and the E.U. has 
depended, in large part, on the data and safety assessments of unpublished industry 
studies. This means that the raw data was not publicly accessible, therefore making the 
assessment process non-transparent, thus also making a significant part of policy 
development non-transparent. Public participation was limited to second hand discussions 
about the studies and their subsequent assessments. The study conducted by IARC 
challenged assumptions of validity by specifically using publicly accessible research, 
which subsequently omitted the use of the unpublished industry studies upon which 
current U.S. regulations for glyphosate/Roundup are mainly based. Reflecting on Kremer, 
Huber and Lucero’s research and the evidence of increasing public and the independent 
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studies described in Domingo and Bordonaba’s (Feb. 5, 2011) literature review, it has 
become evident that since 1994, the number of independent, integrated and long-term 
studies has increased, lending to a more comprehensive knowledge base on glyphosate 
and transgenic crops that is not reflected in U.S. federal regulation. IARC, in utilizing this 
expanded knowledge base, is promoting the continuation of scientific discovery, 
highlighting where the system is flawed as a potential tool to help correct the criteria of 
what is considered valid input and potentially improve the quality of the output, and thus 
potentially advance the integrity of the system as a whole.  
General Barriers  
Trying to access government peer reviewed studies proved to be challenging. The 
EPA’s Tier One assessment report had listed several studies that were not found on the 
EPA’s website. If it was submitted to the EPA, it is reasonable to expect, at minimum, a 
reference citation detailing who submitted the study, what the title/purpose of the study 
was and when it was submitted. A significant level of transparency is lost when the 
supporting evidence is not accessible for public review. Another barrier I experienced in 
my research was in trying to access government information on the recent German (BfR) 
glyphosate report. Although broken links are not uncommon with online material the 
consistency of dead-ends for links that I experienced in trying to find information 
regarding the BfR report has challenged my trust regarding the EFSA’s commitment to 
promoting transparency. This contrasts with IARC’s report, which is easily accessible 
and demonstrates effective transparency by listing its authors and their professional 
affiliations as well as including in their assessment only publicly accessible and valid 
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(peer reviewed) data. Even the BfR’s use of “so-called ‘peer review procedure’” suggests 
a potential discrepancy in perceived scientific rigor between the BfR and standardized 
E.U. procedure. The peer reviewers’ identities are not explicitly stated in either the BfR 
or the EFSA summaries, therefore, it is not clear how the experts are related to the subject 
of study (e.g. field of expertise, conflicts of interest) what their criteria was on which 
their conclusions were based. Without knowing who conducted the review, a significant 
level of transparency is lost.  
Theme 3: Data Gaps 
Regulating only the active ingredient (glyphosate) meant that pesticide residue 
testing was conducted on only the active ingredient. Between the USDA’s Pesticide Data 
Program and the FDA’s Total Diet Study, one might assume that (considering glyphosate 
is one of the leading pesticides used in the world) foods derived from glyphosate-tolerant 
crops would be checked periodically. However, since glyphosate was categorized as 
lacking evidence of carcinogenicity the Agencies have not considered it a priority 
pesticide to test. But there is growing evidence to support early warnings that the data 
selection process of the current regulatory system is contributing to hazardous data gaps, 
particularly if one considers the FDA’s statement that it was weighing the cost of 
implementing glyphosate testing with the “extent of the use of genetically engineered 
crops for human foods”. However, the last complete RED for glyphosate (in 1993) was 
determined without exposure assessment data from the PDP.  The FDA is also 
responsible, in part, for monitoring pesticide residues to ensure that tolerance levels are 
not exceeded on food. But in regards to testing glyphosate, the FDA’s statement that they 
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were weighing the costs and benefits in terms the “extent of the use of genetically 
engineered crops for human foods”, does not explicitly include conventional crops that 
use glyphosate as a growth regulator. In addition, the strength of the USDA’s claim that 
its pesticide residue testing program is “the most comprehensive…database in the U.S.” 
diminishes if one considers that a leading agricultural commodity (corn) essentially has 
not been analyzed for the herbicide most commonly used on that commodity. Since 1993, 
the EPA, FDA and USDA have rarely tested for glyphosate residue, which, in turn, 
means that NK603 and glyphosate and its formulations have largely been used without 
federal oversight. E.U. resistance to GMO integration continues with reference to the 
gaps in the currently accepted scientific data, which suggests that the evidence of safety 
is not conclusive.  
The EPA, policy makers and industry also claimed that glyphosate is a non-
endocrine disruptor. But the commercial variations of Roundup do not only contain 
glyphosate, but inert ingredients as well—POEA’s being one of them. While the EPA’s 
most recent assessment of glyphosate emphasizes the need for more data on glyphosate 
formulations, based on the EPA’s “uncertainty about its risk to aquatic animals” (EPA, 
June 17, 2009), the absence of explicit reference to the need for toxicity research that 
demonstrates safety in terms of human health is a point of concern. It also highlights a 
gap in the EPA’s four-part integrated risk assessment created by testing only the active 
ingredient when the formulation is known to be more toxic. But the independent studies 
that the EPA reviewed and conducted, and which concluded that glyphosate formulations 
were toxic in several contexts could have been perceived as evidence simply that the 
180 
 
adjuvants were more toxic than the active ingredient and thus did not change the EPA’s 
recent re-registration of glyphosate. Requesting more data on POEAs and glyphosate 
formulations is a step towards a better understanding how the parts work as a whole (if 
the data they assess opens the system to available alternatives to currently assumed 
outcomes). But without incorporating a comprehensive data set that opens assessment to 
alternatives to the previously accepted studies, conclusions of safety seem premature and 
unfounded. 
Séralini was the first to conduct a toxicity study NK603 (ten years after it was 
approved by the USDA) that was longer than 90 days for chronic toxicity and one of the 
few to study the toxicity of glyphosate formulations in a rodent study (there were already 
several aquatic fish and amphibian tests that concluded glyphosate formulations were 
toxic). In recognizing gaps in what an acute and 90-day toxicity studies and active-
ingredient-only studies can provide regarding long-term health effects, Séralini was 
advancing one of the goals of scientific inquiry and experimentation by conducting 
research to try to fill in those gaps. On the surface, it appears that part of what is driving 
this conflict is a divergence in how the results of these studies are interpreted, but 
underlying this seems to be conflicting perceptions of the existence of a gap.  
The 1982 OECD report noted that there needed to be a concerted effort to better 
understand basic plant science if agricultural biotechnology prospects were to be realized. 
The EPA’s 1984 proposal that microbial research might demonstrate new substances 
derived from r-DNA manipulation seemed to mesh with the OECD suggestion, but the 
U.S. OSTP denial of the EPA’s proposal and subsequent establishment of standards of 
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equivalence diminished the perception that we had more to learn on the subject. By 1986, 
the OECD had determined that concerns about unexpected pathogens and infectious 
diseases were unfounded based on the scientific evidence at the time which resulted in 
relaxing regulatory standards. 
Just recently, however, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and 
Medicine (2016) recognized a general need to further develop our scientific capacity to 
identify and address unintended changes resulting from GE and conventional crops but 
they emphasized “new crop varieties”, thus, essentially implying that existing crop 
varieties were exempt from further study. This is another point of concern, considering 
that, according to researchers such as Kremer and Huber, we currently haven’t fully 
developed the capacity to effectively and conclusively identify the extent to which 
unintended changes occur or appropriately address these unintended changes within the 
regulatory system. It seems that the stated intentions to maintain a flexible U.S. 
regulatory system, capable of adapting to newly identified risks, has become rigid and 
inhibitory of change in regards to existing products. If one reflects on Week’s (1994) 
precautionary statement regarding the potential consequences of a nation relying on the 
success of a limited number major exports, and include that this success is supported by a 
limited set of research standards and outcomes, U.S. national security has become 
dependent upon what appears to be increasingly inadequate science. 
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Theme 4: Perceptions of Safety and Validity 
Transitions: Basic to Applied Research  
U.S. policy specifically suggested that toxicity studies were not required because 
of the assurance that gene transfer techniques were not only precise, predictable and safe 
but also resulted in an end product virtually the same as its parent.  
As the emphasis of innovation shifted from meeting specific societal needs to 
maintaining viable economic (and political) outlets (as evidenced in the language of the 
Stevenson Wydler Technology Innovation Act and the National Science and Technology 
Policy Organization and Priorities Act), the economic success of the innovation depends 
on the capacity of innovator and innovated product to evolve (or at least be perceived to 
evolve) with needs of society. In order to meet evolving crop protection needs and 
maintain market viability (some of which were largely created from the initial innovation, 
e.g. the increase in glyphosate-resistant weeds) bio-tech seed developers might evolve a 
product, i.e. change their pesticide formulations. Conversely, as a patent right expires, 
bio-tech seed developers, as in the case of Monsanto and NK603 (transitioning from 
Roundup Ready I to Roundup Ready II) might illustrate the transition from meeting 
societal needs to innovating in order to meet individual economic needs, although the 
new product includes new attributes that are marketed as desirable—they do not 
necessarily fill a need. Underlying this discussion is the issue of innovation that is needed 
to address problems created by previous innovation. From this perspective, the quality of 
innovation is diminished if, in time it creates a new societal problem or exacerbates an 
existing one. Innovation motivated by investment does not necessarily factor in societal 
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need as much as it factors in the perception of need that will likely be necessary to 
effectively market the product. Applied knowledge refocuses scientific exploration to a 
narrower problem-solution orientation and R&D moves that exploration into 
development of specific products. R&D is a valued contribution to the U.S. economy that 
produces bountiful innovations for our society, but it is important to remember the 
limitations of applied research and R&D when the goal is toward a specific (potential) 
commodity.  
Kahan’s, et al (2013) study provides an example of how social construction 
operates to shape our realities. There is an underlying question regarding the cultural 
influence on the scientists themselves in how they interpret and present their research. 
For example, as part of an ethical practice in transparency, researchers are encouraged to 
state their biases and potential conflicts of interests as a means of not only qualifying 
their personal frames of reference, but also as a starting point in recognizing and, to a 
degree, validating, opposing or alternative perspectives. But when academic scientists are 
funded by, or have professional ties to, private interests, there are often underlying 
commitments and expectations between funders and grant recipients. When grant 
recipients do not openly admit those affiliations (and the potential risks inherent) and 
offer personal strategies to counter those risks, then, as Kahan’s study suggests, it is not 
unreasonable to ask whether membership, recognition and validation within the private 
funder’s culture motivates scientists to select and interpret data to better meet the needs 
of the funder. While academic researchers, scientists and government employees who 
volunteer their time on an industry board or are hired by industry interests does not 
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automatically assume that their research is invalid or that their ethical standards have 
been compromised, it does, however, leave an opportunity open for conflict of interest to 
develop if one considers the power of social construction in developing us v them, 
insider/outsider perspectives that influence the boundaries of worldviews. In less 
theoretical terms, a window of opportunity arises if the researcher’s employment 
(financial) and/or professional status is suddenly elevated or placed at risk if their work 
meets or contradicts the goals of the industry within which they work. With this in mind, 
even if a researcher, employed or otherwise associated with a certain party, maintains 
ethical standards in which his/her work is conducted with scientific integrity and rigor, 
and presents that work in the context of a party that has a financially vested interest in the 
outcome, they could still face perceived bias from a party negatively impacted by those 
outcomes.  
Since the 1970’s when the future of agricultural biotechnology was first 
tentatively envisioned throughout the Asilomar conference, to today, independent 
scientists have expressed concern regarding how biotechnology science and the 
knowledge stemming from it might be used in the context of public protection, public 
education, and commercial application. Government has expressed this concern as well, 
as detailed in the OMB’s Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, 
Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; but 
is the context the same? The implementation and permeation of intellectual property 
rights has shifted the context from the open dialogue of the Asilomar conference to 
protective censoring. Berg (Sept. 18, 2008) suggested that, for this reason, another 
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Asilomar Conference is not foreseeable, however, in the spirit of transparency, such a 
conference between (former) public and independent researchers might still be possible 
in terms of discussing national goals, “alternative” research and how to integrate relevant, 
but currently unused research into the agricultural system (see Recommendations for 
further discussion). 
Weight of Evidence  
It seems that some of the current research that can begin to fill the gaps discussed 
in Theme 3: Data Gaps is being systematically rejected, perhaps through the flexible use 
of “weight of evidence”. Weight of evidence has been used, for example, within the EPA, 
the EFSA, and the FAO/WHO JMPR reports, but as discussed, there is not an established 
criteria regarding what research is included, which thus implies that the criteria for 
determining the data sets (i.e. the knowledge basis) for safety assessments is not 
necessarily harmonized within and between agencies, health organizations and 
policymakers. It might seem prudent to establish a clear definition of an approach that is 
used to help health officials and policy makers determine safety parameters in order to 
understand how/if the contributions of scientists like Huber, Kremer and Lucero are 
“weighed” into the assessment process. Considering the research of Balls, et al (Dec. 
2005) and the OECD (Apr. 13, 2012) statements, the criteria for determining the data sets 
(i.e. the knowledge basis) for safety assessments is not necessarily harmonized within and 
between agencies, health organizations and policymakers. But considering Sowell’s 
(2007) note, there needs to be a flexible component, within the harmonization process, 
that allows for contradictory evidence to be recognized, validated and appropriately 
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utilized within the standards of Science, rather than scientific standards developed for the 
sake of streamlining commercial development and trade. In other words, what seems to 
be lacking in the current geo-political system is acknowledgement and understanding of 
the benefits and consequences of public policy that is shaped and supported by Science 
and science that is shaped and supported by public policy. 
Considering the lessons learned from restrictions and bans stemming from the 
PCB industries’ inability to prove safety (of which Monsanto was a part), it makes sense 
that the agricultural biotechnology industry would ensure, scientifically, that their product 
was safe (but this is based upon my own speculations of unarticulated cause and effect). 
Developing an extensive base of supporting scientific data provides more than a means to 
justify one’s claims, it also provides one a basis to deny the validity of research that 
challenges those claims.  Industry had supplied the majority of the studies on glyphosate 
and genetically modified crops (recall Portier’s et al, (Mar. 3, 2016) comparative analysis 
between IARC’s and the EFSA’s glyphosate assessments) and the evidence considered in 
recent policy-making remained weighted in favor of industry. Thus, by producing enough 
supporting (and government-validated) data, regulatory policies could be influenced in 
one’s favor. 
Parts vs Whole: CP4 Enzyme and NK603  
Similar to the EPA’s decision to separate the formulated components of pesticides 
into regulated (active ingredient) and non-regulated (inert ingredients) components, the 
FDA and USDA separated the transgenic process (non-regulated) from the transgenic 
product (regulated). Genetically engineered food is regulated the same as conventionally 
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grown foods as long as there is data to demonstrate that the parts (the transferred DNA) 
do not pose a hazard and the end product is shown to be “substantially equivalent to its 
conventional counterpart”, thus suggesting that no further research was necessary. 
Although the U.S. and the OECD claimed substantial equivalence, the product 
verses process is useful in describing key differences between U.S. risk-based policy that 
promotes regulatory decision-making in terms of end-product attributes and E.U. 
precautionary policy that promotes decision-making based on not only how the process 
impacts the attributes of the end product, but also its potential impact on a broader socio-
cultural level. 
Parts vs Whole: Glyphosate, Inerts, Roundup  
The EPA, under increasing pressure from the GAO to make their safety 
assessment process more efficient as the number of chemicals entering the market 
increasingly outpaced the number of chemicals assessed, separated and independently 
assessed the components of pesticides as active ingredients and inert. The EPA’s system 
of breaking the formulation into components seems to contradict the goals for a whole-
systems integrated approach. Although the EPA had set tolerance levels for glyphosate, 
many adjuvants, such as POEA, were exempted from standard tolerance level/regulatory 
requirements, which suggests that those adjuvants are non-toxic. This enabled the EPA to 
establish a base of ingredients that, if they meet safety criteria, did not need to be 
regulated (and thus, did not have to be tested with each new registration or re-
registration). From this perspective, it follows that testing glyphosate pesticide 
formulations might be considered unnecessary if the adjuvants used have already been 
188 
 
approved for non-regulated use.  The shift from the EPA’s 1995 determination that 
POEA be categorized in List 4b--current use pattern…will not adversely affect public 
health and the environment, back to List 3 (unknown toxicity) for a substance apparently 
not regulated but commonly used with the world’s most prevalent herbicide could initiate 
concern regarding in its potential to negatively impact public health. But early warnings 
from researchers such as Folmar, Sanders and Julin (1979) within EPA memos indicate 
that the EPA was aware of the potential hazard of POEAs and Roundup formulations 
even prior to the initial glyphosate RED in 1986. Although awareness of the co-formulant 
hazard would not impact the re-registration of the active ingredient, it calls into question 
the validity of the EPA chemical assessments in regards to how the other inert ingredients 
were assessed and the integrity of the system of separating the formulation into parts 
without assessing the formulation as a whole. Other research followed that supported 
Folmar, Sander and Julin’s research (e.g. McLane, Howe et al, etc.) and further 
concluded that POEA’s not only have carcinogenic potential on their own but that they 
also exponentially increase the potential carcinogenicity of the active ingredients with 
which they work.  
The BfR’s lengthy recommendation that the recent review of IARC’s report on 
glyphosate suggested that the assessment would be more appropriately discussed and 
resolved between all of the stakeholders rather than through a single RMS. This is a 
potential indication that perhaps more than science is required to make recommendations 
or determinations. 
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Data Details and Interpretations  
But a closer look at the studies reveals inconsistencies. For example, it would 
seem that in an effort to maintain consistency, a rodent study would not be acceptable as 
support for the requirements of a non-rodent study, and an Acute dermal study would not 
be accepted as support for a chronic feeding study. Reflecting on the scrutiny with which 
critics (including policy makers) of Séralini’s el al (2012) study analyzed the study’s 
adherence to OECD guidelines, it seems relevant to question why the same scrutiny was 
not given for the re-registration of glyphosate. Another detail that seems inconsistent 
involves the glyphosate studies from Monsanto (Hammond, Dudek, Lemen and Nemeth 
Feb. 12, 2004) that illustrated a significantly higher NOEL in the 90-day study than the 2-
year study. Genetically modified crops differ from their companion pesticides in that they 
are not tested according to NOEL (except for measuring pesticide residue)—they are not 
tested for toxicity at all in the U.S. In the E.U., a 90-day rat study sufficed for assurance 
that NK603 was as safe as its conventional counterpart. This is a little like comparing 
apples to oranges, but there is a nugget of logic that supports the idea that if a chronic test 
for a chemical could produce such a drastic change in the NOEL, then perhaps it is 
possible that a chronic test for a novel food could potentially indicate toxicity, especially 
considering the widespread integration of corn throughout the global food system and the 
intention of the OECD to replace conventional crops with GE herbicide-resistant crops. 
Couple that with Kremer and Huber’s (among others’) research and OECD guidelines 
that link the length of time required to test a product to (in part) how much the 
commodity or substance (to be tested) is expected to be produced, it seems relevant to 
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propose appropriate, comprehensive testing (short and long-term) of transgenic crops as 
well (EPA, July 2000).   
With the EPA’s final interpretation of the mouse study (from the 1986 RED for 
glyphosate) and subsequent determination that glyphosate be assigned as a Group “E” 
pesticide (strong evidence of non-carcinogenicity) the U.S. government was able to make 
a declarative shift from possibly carcinogenic to “no evidence of carcinogenicity” which 
made it possible not only for instant market application but also the capacity to increase 
application rates to address weed glyphosate-tolerance problems.  But the question raised 
in the 1986 RED regarding the beagle study results that showed changes in the pituitaries, 
and the 1993 RED description of the study that eliminated any mention of the issue and 
did not include the requested additional information (from the 1986 RED) that was 
needed to clarify understanding of those pituitary changes, there is a lingering question of 
what criteria was used in the panel’s final determination and how the gaps in the data 
were perceived to be filled.   
While the EPA had a multitude of safety data on glyphosate, it had passed 
through two re-registrations (1986 and 1993) without understanding its mode of action. 
Without a definitive understanding of the mode of action, one is left to guess at how a 
chemical works—not only within the plant, but also within the surrounding environment 
and in the human body. 
Recall that in a supplemental 13-week study that Monsanto submitted, there were 
20 rats/sex/group but only 10 rats/sex/group were analyzed, which is the minimum 
requirement for subchronic toxicity, according to OECD standards. Since there was no 
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explanation in the study as to why half of the test subjects were tested, it leaves room for 
speculation regarding the integrity of such a decision and the validity of the results. 
Conflicts of Interest and Public Trust  
Ashford’s (1984) report regarding industry-weighted data creation and assessment 
could increase the potential for biased reporting in favor of industry products, leading to 
potential health hazards if certain safety criteria were not met. Such influence in what and 
how information is created and presented could be viewed in terms of critical theory. 
This is significant to note  for two reasons: 1.) all of the chronic and carcinogenicity 
studies that the EPA had/has been using for their chronic toxicological assessment and 
certification of glyphosate (four described in the content and two listed in the reference 
section) were submitted by Monsanto, and 2.) the EPA determines, for the USDA, which 
pesticides to analyze in its Pesticide Data Program (PDP) (i.e. with glyphosate designated 
to List E, glyphosate was not a priority chemical to track). Similarly, the FDA’s 
conclusion regarding the safety of NK603 was based on industry data and data 
interpretation as evidence of NK603’s substantial equivalence to its conventional 
counterpart. Additionally, nutritional equivalency is assumed but not required to be tested 
in order to obtain regulatory approval for transgenic crops, therefore, the FDA’s main 
responsibility rests with post-production risks to human health.  
On the surface, if one simply looks at the interpreted results of the glyphosate 
studies after the final scientific advisory panel’s decision, it follows that the EPA would 
grant re-registration of glyphosate but it fails to thoroughly address the initial red flags 
raised by the first two reviews and the underlying potential for biased data and 
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assessment from sources experiencing a conflict of interest. It is not an excuse for their 
actions, but it establishes a context for understanding how certain decisions and actions 
were made, or, not made.  
The EC GRACE project and coordinating G-TWYST were implemented as a 
means to explore translation and communication strategies that could be used to 
accurately inform the general public about primary data and data interpretations, as well 
as further investigate whether MON810 (the only GMO maize crop cultivated in the 
E.U.), the subject in the GRACE study, and NK603 (the subject of the Séralini v 
Monsanto conflict and the subject of the G-TWYST project) were more hazardous than 
previously assessed. The Austrian Federal Ministry of Health’s response to the GRACE 
project conclusions invites further discussion regarding how science is conducted and 
how it is interpreted. I am not qualified to judge the validity of either’s claims, but 
discrepancy regarding the scientific process exists between valid, authoritative parties 
and this discrepancy is likely representative of a larger issue than just the points raised in 
the letters between the Minister of Health and GRACE representatives. 
Integrative Research 
Although glyphosate’s capacity to bind tightly to the soil has been a positive 
marketing point for supporters of glyphosate-tolerant crops who emphasize that this 
feature limits the occurrence of run-off and subsequent water contamination, since at 
least the 1990’s, public and independent researchers have expressed concern regarding 
the efficacy of glyphosate hazard assessments in their capacity to address systemic 
impact on public health. Kremer and Huber are among several researchers who are 
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discovering unexpected events of transgenic plants and glyphosate (and glyphosate 
formulations) that negatively impact soil, plant, mammal and potentially human health.  
As discussed earlier, the scientific test guidelines of the OECD (Apr. 13, 2012) 
had been developed and implemented, as international standards for assessing toxicity, 
through a joint effort between not only its member nations (U.S. and E.U. included) but 
also industry representatives. Defining the parameters of acceptable evidence of objective 
proof, the U.S. position on agricultural biotechnology safety is supported by its 
perception that industry studies, which have demonstrated a certain level of adherence to 
OECD guidelines, have proven sufficient for U.S. regulatory glyphosate and transgenic 
crop approvals. However, if certain assumptions about science—assumptions of GRAS, 
substantial equivalence, or that certain chemicals or biological/microbiological processes 
behave in predictable ways—preclude the perceived need for additional research, there is 
a possibility that some scientific research (e.g. Séralini, Huber, Kremer, Lucero, etc.) 
could be perceived unnecessary or even invalid if it operated outside of the boundaries of 
the established standards and/or expectations. 
When Dr. Kremer’s work was reviewed by his colleagues and subsequently 
dismissed as limited or unsupported in its claim that glyphosate indirectly promotes a 
toxic pathogen within the soil and plant microbiomes, his response (that the scientists 
who reviewed his work were “traditionalists”), one might argue that this could simply be 
a case of a miffed scientist bad-mouthing his critics, Kremer’s message warrants serious 
consideration based on the credibility his research was afforded prior to establishing 
stronger claims that contradict the standard claims that glyphosate is safe and r-DNA 
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techniques are predictable. What also warrants discussion is how these perceptions of 
scientific validity fall in with the concept of scientific revolution.  
The push and pull of expanding traditional theory and expounding new ideas can 
lead to new scientific territory and thus, new discovery, but it can also create resistance 
and conflicting perceptions of validity from those who adhere to what is familiar. Recall 
Week’s (1994) note about the benefits and consequences of diversity. The benefits being 
an environment conducive to exploration, discovery and broader, deeper understanding 
(by inviting a multitude of perspectives and expertise to contribute to the process), and 
the consequences producing outcomes that potentially take one beyond the boundaries of 
expectation into unfamiliar, perhaps uncomfortable or difficult realities. The challenge 
then becomes determining when, and the extent to which, the focus of one’s expectations 
promotes and sustains viable research and when it suppresses the vitality and validity of 
the scientific process. Séralini, et al’s (2012) article was technically valid in terms of 
established criteria for research article submission; however, the validity of the outcomes 
was limited to rigid adherence to established standards that promoted a specific set of 
sound scientific methods that were created as a streamlining aid. Such standards, 
however, do not preclude the validity of other methods. Such standards simply promote 
methods that ease verification for mass research, production and trade. Methods that 
stretch beyond the boundaries of such standards prompt resistance, as indicated by the 
resistance to Séralini et al’s (2012) study, perhaps because they cannot be streamlined 
and, therefore, require an alternative set of validation standards. Making exceptions to 
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established “rules” is bound to raise objections and doubt, which in turn illuminate 
assumptions of what makes for sound science. 
What is also interesting is this push and pull within the context agricultural 
biotechnology, considering the U.S. government’s initiatives to make it the new scientific 
revolution. If Kremer’s work could be construed as thinking “outside of the box” (e.g. 
herbicides impacting plant and soil microbiology and the process of transgenic 
modifications having unintended effects) yet his research was well-designed, 
appropriately conducted, agency approved and produced consistent results that bring new 
breadth and depth to our understanding of current agricultural practices, it seems that his 
work would be invaluable towards advancing national goals of being leaders in scientific 
revolution. But the reality seems to reflect that the system is stuck between policies and 
authoritative perceptions that resist such change and verbiage that promotes it. 
Lucero’s research could be considered a paradigmatic shift from current scientific 
trends to something new. This paradigmatic shift could be considered, according to 
Kuhnian theory, the core of a scientific revolution because it challenges the previously 
accepted and mainstreamed theory and methodology of how microbes impact soil/plant 
health within the lab and in the field. Dr. Kremer’s work and the research of Dr. Huber 
and his colleagues could be considered as pushing the boundaries of paradigmatic shift in 
that their research challenges current ideologies about the predictability of plant-herbicide 
interactions (illustrated in the 1986 OECD report) that suggest that scientific studies are 
not required to investigate or analyze systemic microbial root zone impact. Kremer’s and 
Huber’s (and colleagues’) research are just two examples that introduce a new level of 
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scientific development in regards to researching systemic interactions and impact 
between chemical applications and plant/soil health. Their research could be the 
beginning of a new level of toxicity identification and health hazard analysis.  
Highlighting the experiences of these three scientists is important because for the 
majority of their careers, their work was federally approved and conducted for the 
purpose of advancing and protecting the viability of U.S. agriculture. Furthermore, Dr. 
Huber’s positions and memberships within the U.S. government (see Chapter 3 for 
details) not only demonstrate a level of personal and professional commitment to national 
security but also an expectation from the national government that Dr. Huber would alert 
appropriate authorities in the event of a threat to the U.S. agricultural system. The 
testimony of these researchers is representative of a larger-scale response pattern. The 
USDA reactions to their request for support and recognition that their research is valid 
and aligned with federal goals was supported to the extent that their research “did not 
offend anyone”, but providing conclusive evidence to the contrary resulted in the agency 
effectively veiling their contributions to “sound science” and silencing their voices as 
representatives of the federal government, thus essentially making their research invisible 
within the pool of “available scientific data” from which policy decisions are based.  
The type of microbiology that the OECD (in 1986) suggested needed more 
development was microbiology oriented towards advancing the field of biotechnology. 
According to Kremer and Lucero their research was approved and supported by the 
USDA until their research outcomes countered, or rather had the potential to counter 
agricultural biotechnology (including agro-chemical industries) initiatives. According to 
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Huber, his cautionary request of the USDA was largely ignored (personal 
communication, June 5, 2016; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UDLdTXe2koo). 
Thus, it seems that public support for research in plant science and microbial physiology 
is limited to the extent that the research outcomes align with national and/or OECD goals. 
Between valuing microbiology for its potential contributions to further advancing r-DNA 
techniques and determining a level of safety from pathogenic risk, based on the 
assumption that if a substance is safe in one context it should be safe in another, the three 
microbiologists’ (Kremer, Lucero and Huber) discoveries were ill-contributing to the 
advancement of the innovative forward momentum of the agricultural biotechnology 
movement. Reflecting on Samsel and Senef’s (Apr. 18, 2013) article, the authors 
challenged industry-promoted assumptions about glyphosate’s mode of action (that it 
disrupts the plant’s capacity to access and utilize essential amino acids but does not exist 
in mammals and therefore does not pose as a risk to human health), by suggesting that 
glyphosate’s impact on the shikimate pathway was not limited to plants, but also was 
linked with systemic hazards via mammalian gut microbiome (which utilizes the 
shikimate pathway).  
The work of the researchers discussed above (and the work of other anonymous 
researchers) countered the biotechnology initiative in a fundamental way and to promote 
their work at the regulatory level could potentially upset the balance of a very large 
economy-driven system. Considering the widespread global applications of glyphosate 
formulations, major market economies and trade relations would be significantly 
impacted by precautionary measures based on alternative safety assessments. However, 
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as discussed in chapter 4, Dr. Huber pointed out that if precautionary measures are not 
taken, these markets will be negatively impacted anyway and public and environmental 
health will be increasingly threatened.   
Although these scientists have found it challenging to conduct and share their 
research at the federal level, they have been actively engaged at the public level, sharing 
their research and providing an opportunity for knowledge exchange. But the societal 
impact of their research remains within the public tier while the government policy tier 
continues to use outdated standards that hinder the progression of scientific revolution as 
a national priority, thus suggesting that perhaps the priority is not Science, but a science 
that produces limited, predictable policy-related outcomes. “Sound science”, as is often 
used in political discussions regarding the validity of scientific research-supported policy, 
refers essentially to a partial science. In other words, the data available to the system 
seems to be validated if the outcome meets a particular need. This can be concluded by 
reflecting on, for example, EFSA and USDA claims that new evidence does not override 
the previous conclusions of safety. This type of system is not well-suited to change 
because the scientific methodologies and inputs are standardized, which has been shown 
in the multitude of industry-supported studies to produce predictable results. For 
example, during the beginning stages of agricultural biotechnology policymaking and 
regulatory development, U.S. government promoted industries to provide the data 
required for safety assessments. At the same time, federal funding for public research was 
being downscaled, thus limiting the amount of publicly available research. Patent rights 
protected industry, to a great extent, from independent research, thus limiting 
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independent studies from the available pool from which policies and regulations were 
drawn from. Therefore, government agency and health organization use of “weight of 
evidence” allowed for an industry-weighted data pool in determining food and chemical 
safety. E.C. policy shifts that allowed certain chemicals to be evaluated according to U.S. 
standard protocol allowed this system to influence E.C. determinations of safety as well. 
The regulatory and policy-related barriers to external (non-standardized) scientific 
input creates a loop that resists change and thus, continues to support those who designed 
and depend on the system for validation and credibility of a specific process and 
outcome. Change in this system is limited in order to maintain a specific economic and 
ideological perception of productive and desirable output. The recent negative attention 
drawn not only to glyphosate and its accompanying adjuvants (e.g. POEA’s) and the 
discovery of unexpected effects of transgenic technology highlights the limited scope and 
function of this system. Expanding the scope and function of this system to incorporate 
alternative outcomes, however, threatens to dismantle the validity of the partial science, 
which in turn threatens to crumble the foundation upon which several current food and 
agricultural regulatory policies rest and a significant portion of agro-chemical and biotech 
seed industry depends.  
Public and independent researcher’s such as Huber, Kremer and Lucero are 
integral not only in working with new crop varieties, but also in filling in the gaps with 
the current U.S. agricultural system. They are also valuable contributors towards a 
scientific revolution in terms of discovering, exploring and validating new paradigms. 
But they’re contributions to furthering the breadth and depth of our understanding of 
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plant and soil health, glyphosate and agricultural biotechnology remains noticeably quiet 
in publicly accessible government publications. Their research papers are available but it 
seems that the only discussion available online is from radical anti-GMO groups, which 
is where I learned of these three researchers. Initial U.S. and OECD policies and 
regulations that were based on assessments of safety and subsequent determinations of 
GRAS and substantial equivalence were qualified with statements such as “…future 
scientific development will lead to further refinement” and “regulatory regimens could be 
modified to reflect a more complete understanding of the potential risks involved” 
(OSTP, June 26, 1986, p.4; see Ch. 4, Developing Standards: defining roles).  
As independent and public research began to populate the pool of glyphosate, 
POEA, Roundup, NK603 and other transgenic crop studies, the weight of evidence has 
begun to shift and the initial determinations of safety is no longer firmly tilted in favor of 
glyphosate, Roundup and herbicide tolerant crop safety, which raises the question of how 
knowledge is developed, validated and disseminated in regards to economic and political 
security. This point was raised by Dr. Huber in his letter to Tom Vilsak, in which he 
expressed grave concern about the potential economic (and political) consequences, as 
well as the social consequences of preventative action verses inaction in reference to a 
hazardous plant pathogen linked to glyphosate/Roundup and transgenic crops. Perhaps a 
look at the OSTP “Guidelines” might offer some kind of explanation for Vilsak’s 
response (or, lack of) response. The OSTP “Guidelines” offer federal agencies a means to 
shield from the public certain research that might be considered “influential” (i.e. 
containing information that “could have or does have a substantial impact on important 
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public policies or important private sector decisions”. This type of research requires 
“additional quality checks beyond peer review” that determine whether federal agency 
research could be disseminated to the public. The additional quality checks referred to in-
house peer review and the Guidelines provide a list of criteria to determine the credibility 
of in-house reviewers (see Data Restrictions). However, glyphosate, Roundup, NK603 
and a multitude of other transgenic crops had already been approved by unpublished, 
non-peer-reviewed research. Thus, the scientific data available to the system to support 
initial (and subsequent) regulations and policies is not based on these guidelines. Perhaps 
the basis for policies and regulations, if not based upon appropriately peer-reviewed data, 
is based upon whether the research and data encompass the goal of the National Science 
and Technology Policy Organization and Priorities Act of 1976 and the Stevenson 
Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980’s—data that promotes the ideologies of 
national security and global leadership through advancements in biotechnology. Kremer’s 
discussion regarding how USDA-ARS research projects were determined according to 
national goals and Lucero’s comment about how her research would never be supported 
because it did not promote the bio-agriculture chemical companies, suggests that perhaps 
the results of Kremer’s, Lucero’s and Huber’s (et al) research did not fall in line with 
national objectives, and therefore, did not qualify as valid input and therefore was not 
qualified to influence policy or regulatory change. From a social construction 
perspective, this rejection creates an insider/outsider environment that excludes the data 
that might expand the boundaries of U.S. reality. Maintaining this separation, government 
policies and regulations remain supported by the limited scientific processes and the 
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resulting evidence that, in turn, define perceptions of safety which then determine the 
need for further research. Within this logic, scientific revolution is repressed within the 
“official” system, but, as Huber, Kremer and Lucero illustrate, intellectual property and 
patent rights are limited in their capacity to restrict scientific development. Regardless of 
government validation (i.e. validation through policy utilization), public and independent 
scientists continue to evolve perceptions of reality and periodically challenge the 
standardized perceptions of validity. The barriers, however, between public/independent 
scientists and government decision-makers restrict interpretation of the research to the 
decision-makers and, for now, limit the realities constructed from that research to the 
socially constructed boundaries of policymakers and industry representatives. 
Cultural Perceptions  
The “great debate” between the European Union and the U.S. revolves around 
local to international economic, political and cultural issues. Persistent questions 
regarding the validity of scientific methods, data and data interpretations seem to have 
formed the basis of uncertainty for all sides of the conflict. Underlying these, however, 
are the distinctions between socially defined concepts of security. Recall Week’s (1994) 
suggestion regarding how conflicts are likely to arise when one party’s needs are 
perceived as incompatible with another’s. Add Diamond and McDonald’s (1996) concept 
of power politics and one can see how parties enmeshed in a relationship based on 
supporting each other’s economies (through the promotion and movement of key 
commodities) might become entrenched in conflict if the values of those commodities 
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diverge to the point where the parties’ security (cultural and/or economic and political) 
feels threatened.  
Underlying these differences in commodity values, divergent perceptions between 
scientific interpretations play a significant role in the ongoing conflict surrounding 
genetic engineering and they ring of clashing socially constructed boundaries of reality 
and scientific revolution. In other words, within the boundaries of what is known to us 
(whether it is our own research, our own values, our own experiences) perceptions of risk 
stemming from those “knowns” derive from something familiar and are driven by a 
“future” that is supported by one’s particular experience with the past.  Discussing what 
is known to “us” and what is known to “them” in conjunction with the futures envisioned 
from each perspective has the potential to further define barriers between “us” and 
“them”, thus exacerbating conflict. But, it also has great potential to stretch personal 
boundaries of reality, enabling one to reflect upon one’s own risk in terms of another’s 
endeavor.  
The points Salomon Wald suggested in 1996 are still used by proponents of 
agricultural biotechnology. This is evidenced in the Nobel Laureates’ letter to Green 
Peace and implies a superior alternative to traditional agricultural practices—alternatives 
that are healthier for people and the environment (but which do not address underlying 
social, political and economic contexts that contribute to environmental damage, 
nutritional deficiencies and global hunger, or the time, effort and financial investment 
spent addressing these issues). While Green Peace’s response raises valid points 
regarding nutrition, food equality and the current status of one transgenic product, the 
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language takes on an “either-or”, “win-lose” “good-bad” tone that devalues the positive 
efforts, accomplishments and intentions of the opposing party. 
The recognition, time and resources allocated towards “biotechnological 
innovation” that started in the 1970’s has followed a narrowly defined path towards what 
the U.S. federal government perceives as national security, food security and scientific 
progress.  Compared to the U.S., the E.U. has not aggressively promoted agricultural 
biotechnology within its member states but has held a more cautious approach to 
introducing transgenic products within its borders.  
Considering the extensive negative feedback that Séralini and his research team 
received after submitting evidence to the contrary (i.e. evidence of potentially hazardous 
toxicity where other research indicated otherwise) of industry and policy assumption, one 
might understand better how the potential to protect one’s reputation, by erring on the 
side of, ironically, caution, might seem a feasible option. But in taking the risk associated 
with challenging assumptions of safety (e.g. assumptions about acute and chronic tests in 
determining the potential for long-term effect, the use of animals in toxicity studies to 
assess human health impact, separating parts from the whole product, etc.), Séralini 
succeeded, at the least, in raising public awareness regarding whether the current research 
standards and interpretations are appropriate and adequate to make broad assumptions of 
safety. But the public was not the only group influenced by Séralini’s claims. The EC 
decision to replicate Séralini’s study (but using more rats) demonstrates that perhaps 
there might be something to Séralini’s claim, regardless of whether the study has begun 
or not.  
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The 94 scientists (Portier, et al) who wrote a letter/article comparing the EFSA 
report and the IARC report and the 100+ scientists who petitioned Green Peace to stop 
opposing GMO’s further illustrates such discrepancy in what is considered valid. Key 
differences between the petitions from each group illustrate the diverse context within 
which the overall conflict is situated. Portier’s claim for validity was based on 
transparency (e.g. publicly available data) and scientific rigor (e.g. published, peer-
reviewed data) and the claim for validity for the 100+ Nobel laureates was based on input 
from “[s]cientific and regulatory agencies”, suggesting a level of authoritative voice 
supporting the viability of transgenic crops as a whole. 
Conclusion  
The 2016 U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine study 
emphasized that the issue of biotechnology, quoting the former (1999) Secretary of 
Agriculture Dan Glickman, “boils down to a matter of trust. Trust in the science behind 
the process, but particularly trust in the regulatory process that ensures thorough review” 
(National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 2016). The policy 
development for NK603 and Roundup is complex. It depends, in large part upon the 
validity of the scientific methods that support the determination of whether a product is 
safe or not. How science is determined as valid is determined by the integration of a 
multitude of economic, socio-cultural and political factors that influence how knowledge 
is created, transformed and disseminated between researchers, industry, governments and 
the public. The conflict surrounding Eric Gilles-Séralini’s et al (2012), research provides 
a window to the broader issues of at stake with GMO policy development and pesticide 
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regulation. The research presented here demonstrates that in addition to stakeholder 
interests, transparency, trust, and balance of power are integral underlying factors driving 
conflicting ideologies and scientific interpretations of whether herbicide tolerant GMO’s 
and their accompanying pesticides, are safe, or not. 
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Chapter 6: Comparative Analysis 
Lead Arsenate, DDT and Leaded Gasoline 
Introduction 
Since the time of the ancient Greeks and Romans, humans have used lead for a 
variety of purposes such as cosmetics, paint, wine making, plumbing, tools and 
manufacturing. Lead was abundant and was more malleable and less corrosive than iron, 
making it an attractive substitute for many societal applications. However, it has also 
been known, since the ancient Greek and Roman period that lead is hazardous to human 
health, causing symptoms and complications as aggressive behavior, reduced IQ and 
other developmental skills, infertility, muscle weakening and fatigue, hearing loss, etc. 
The Romans were aware that lead could cause serious health problems, even 
madness and death. However, they were so fond of its diverse uses that they 
minimized the hazards it posed. Romans of yesteryear, like Americans of today, 
equated limited exposure to lead with limited risk. What they did not realize was 
that their everyday low-level exposure to the metal rendered them vulnerable to 
chronic lead poisoning, even while it spared them the full horrors of acute lead 
poisoning. (Lewis, May 1985) 
By 1621, the U.S. began mining, smelting and producing leaded products, 
finding, by the late 1800’s a new use for it as an agricultural pesticide. The Paris 
Exposition, in 1889, seemed to jumpstart the interest in and use of chemical applications 
in American agricultural practices as new pesticide application technology demonstrated 
easier, faster ways of combating agricultural pests (Schooley, et al, 2008). Demonstrating 
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the versatility of lead, its uses expanded from the agriculture to the automotive industry. 
Prior to the 1920’s, Ford Motor company dominated the automobile market with basic, 
affordable cars such as the Model T that had become “the standard for the industry” 
(Rosner and Markowitz, 1985, p. 344). General Motors shifted their marketing focus 
from basic and affordable to “comfort, convenience, power and style” (quoted in Rosner 
and Markowitz, 1985, p. 344). Developing a more powerful engine was one of the key 
factors in how leaded gasoline became the foundation of this cultural transition (ibid). 
Eventually, the use of lead arsenate shifted to DDT and the use of leaded gasoline 
shifted to unleaded alternatives. The introduction of lead arsenate, DDT and leaded 
gasoline, along with the research used and policies developed to support their use and 
eventual phase out, highlight certain patterns of knowledge transformation that are 
similar to those of agricultural biotechnology. The following comparative analysis is a 
basic look into potential patterns, i.e. it is suggestive of pattern, but not conclusive. The 
purpose of including it in this research is to broaden the context from the recent 
development of agricultural biotechnology to previous technologies that, at the time of 
their introduction, offered innovative solutions to real or perceived problems.  
This chapter is organized in a similar manner as chapters four and five in that the 
same themes, as well as some of the same sub-themes, are used to compare with the 
current topic. The research is presented first, and apart from, the analysis, and is indicated 
by heading. Because it is a basic comparative analysis, the research presented offers more 
of a summary outline than a comprehensive data-set and the analysis offers a simplified 
comparison rather than an in-depth, point-for-point analysis.   
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Research 
Theme 1: Developing Standards 
Cultural Transitions  
Lead arsenate and DDT. According to some, “[c]hemical control of insects is 
considered one of the most beneficial developments of civilization” (Codling, Oct. 3, 
2011).  At the time, Paris green, a copper arsenate-based pesticide (first used against the 
Colorado potato beetle), was widely used against the gypsy and coddling moths that were 
a major problem particularly for fruit crops and is known as the “first example of large-
scale effective chemical control of an insect pest” (Codling, Oct. 3, 2011). But Paris 
green was also phytotoxic and thus hard on the plants. This was also about the time when 
the USDA began to develop its pest management program, land grant universities and 
extension programs, beginning the first government-sponsored integrated pest 
management programs to help farmers more effectively deal with destructive crop pests. 
The USDA developed and promoted pest management strategies that used a combination 
of chemical applications with innovative, non-chemical methods but chemical use for 
commercial applications outpaced the latter because it was faster, easier and relatively 
inexpensive (Schooley, et al, 2008). A new, more viable chemical than Paris green was 
introduced in 1892—lead arsenate.  Because of its increased solubility, longer-lasting 
persistence as a residue (i.e. it did not wash away easily and, therefore, protected the 
plant longer) and decreased phytotoxicity it was quickly adopted worldwide as a viable, 
affordable, easy-to-use substitute to its “contemporaneous alternatives” (Peryea, Aug. 20-
26, 1998, p. 3). 
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However, residues “in amounts equivalent to half a medicinal dose on an 
individual pear” spurred the Boston Health Department, in 1919, to refuse a shipment of 
fruit from western producers and in 1926, Great Britain stated it would not accept 
shipments of American fruit unless it met maximum residue limits for arsenic of 0.01 
grain/pound of food (ibid, p. 369). Through a cooperative effort between multiple federal 
bureaus, an effective washing solution and method of application was developed and 
patented. By 1925, a certification procedure was developed through a cooperative effort 
between industry (funding government approved field analysts to certify fruit) and the 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics (to grade certified batches and seize produce that 
exceeded residue limits (ibid). According to Frisbie, (Apr. 1936), the FDA developed a 
faster, more accurate method of testing residues in 1933 and that same year the federal 
government passed regulation limiting residues on fruit to 0.025 grains of lead per/pound 
of fruit (Schooley et al, 2008; Frisbie, Apr. 1936) 
A new pesticide, DDT, was introduced in 1947. It had been used widely during 
WWII as a highly effective means to reduce mosquito-borne illness. It was also residual 
(considered a positive attribute at the time as it remained on the plants longer, thus 
decreasing the number of repeated applications) and it was highly effective not only as 
mosquito control, but also as an agricultural pesticide and was soon widely adopted 
(Schooley et al 2008). 
Leaded gasoline. The development of leaded gasoline derived from the 
petrochemical and automotive industries in the early 1920’s as one of several solutions to 
engine knock. Leaded gasoline was marketed as a means to make engines run more 
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efficiently and at much higher speeds than its alcohol fuel. Some studies suggested 
(according to the authors) that alcohol fuel was a cleaner but just as efficient fuel, making 
its performance superior to gasoline, albeit more expensive, alcohol fuel was heavily 
promoted just prior to its discovery (Rosner and Markowitz, 1985).  
However, just prior to the introduction of leaded gasoline engines, in 1921, 
Thomas Midgley, a General Motors Research Laboratory chemist and DuPont had been 
promoting alcohol fuel as having all of the positive attributes that they would later claim 
leaded gasoline had—except for the cost (Rosner and Markowitz, 1985; Needleman and 
Gee, 2013). But in 1922, Midgley helped develop leaded gasoline for which DuPont 
supplied a study for General Motors indicating that when/if petroleum supplies 
diminished, alcohol could be easily substituted.  
Defining roles—leaded gasoline  
Standard Oil Company, General Motors and DuPont Chemical Company (the 
latter two also formed the Ethyl Corporation) as well as some federal agencies/bureaus 
promoted leaded gasoline as a progressive industry strategy that was indispensable to the 
national economy and the future of the nation, which could, therefore, ill-afford to create 
needless regulatory barriers (ibid).  As leaded gasoline became streamlined into the 
automotive market, consumption rates rose and the number of cars operating on leaded 
fuel increased. Responding to the Surgeon General’s request that the US Public Health 
Service’s Division of Chemistry and Pharmacology look into claims that lead particles 
could accumulate in the air along busy roads, the Division’s director reasoned that 
because the length of time required to conduct such a study could take up to a year, it was 
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“recommended instead that the Public Health Service depend upon industry itself to 
provide them with the relevant data” (Rosner and Markowitz, p.2). In the meantime, in 
1927, the Surgeon General issued a standard, voluntary tetraethyl lead guideline of 3 
cc/g, which matched the standards already in place in tetraethyl leaded gasoline refineries 
at the time. By the 1960’s, the Surgeon General had increased the (voluntary) standard 
from 3 cc/g to 4 cc/g. However, General Motors sold their share in the Ethyl Corporation 
in 1962 and soon began to phase out their dependence on leaded fuel, refocusing their 
production on developing catalytic converters and by the 1970’s the benefits of alcohol 
fuel were “discovered” again. 
Theme 2: Perceptions of Safety and Validity 
Cultural Perceptions 
Lead arsenate and DDT.  The more lead arsenate was used, the more resistant 
pests became which resulted in higher application rates and, consequently, higher 
concentrations of lead and arsenic on produce and in the soil (Peryea, Aug. 20-26, 1998).  
Walter Frisbie, who had been the Chief of the Division of State Cooperation for the FDA 
and USDA wrote in 1936 that the USDA had recognized, over the previous 20 years, that 
the increasing use of lead arsenate, in combination with oil “binders” (which improved 
and prolonged the effectiveness of each application), were creating a public (national and 
international) health hazard.  
The combination of LA and oil additives made a more residual pesticide, which 
was appealing for farmers but it was also difficult to wash off of produce prior to 
consumption (Frisbie, Apr. 1936). In 1935 there were 338 seizures of shipments that were 
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not in compliance. Frisbie (ibid) noted that the increasing number of seizures indicated 
that industry was not taking the regulations seriously.  In addition, according to Frisbie 
(ibid), the FDA was discouraged, noting that some state officials showed “reluctance…to 
require the observance of a tolerance for the intrastate distribution and sale of sprayed 
fruits and vegetables” until each state enforced the federal standards for residue limits of 
lead and arsenate, “the public will never be entirely protected” (ibid, p. 371). Between 
1919 and 1947, U.S. farmers and federal researchers sought new, safer and more viable 
solutions but in the meantime, according to Schooley, et al (2008), despite its known 
hazardous toxicity the rates of U.S. consumption of lead arsenate rose from 
approximately 29 million pounds in 1929 to approximately 86 million pounds by 1944 
and fell to just under 4 million pounds by 1973.  
Use of LA began to fall during WWII, when lead became an important military 
resource, thus decreasing its public availability and cost effectiveness (Peryea, Aug. 20-
26, 1998). Schooley et al (2008) noted that a national phase-out of the agricultural use of 
leaded arsenate in the U.S. began around 1950. However, even though subsequent studies 
demonstrated that lead arsenate was oncogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic and fetotoxic and 
acutely toxic, it was still approved by the EPA, as late as 1986, as a growth regulator in 
grapefruit and wood production (EPA, Dec. 1986) and was not banned nationwide until 
1988. In 2005, the EPA listed lead and arsenic as the “top two substances on 
the…biannual list of hazardous substances…; they’ve held that ranking for the preceding 
ten years” (ibid, p. 33). 
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Although DDT is still considered one of the most effective mosquito controls and 
is still used in areas prone to malaria outbreaks, it’s use in U.S. agriculture was short 
lived as Rachel Carson’s landmark research and subsequent book “Silent Spring” 
revealed the toxic systemic impact that DDT has on the surrounding ecosystem. But 
agricultural chemical industry interests, according to the author, dismissed her as being 
hysterical, emotional, and a scientific amateur 
(http://www.environmentandsociety.org/exhibitions/silent-spring/personal-attacks-rachel-
carson). As will be discussed further below, although a handful of toxicology studies on 
the effects of DDT on animals and humans had been published by 1947, the 1960’s 
marked a distinct shift in the development of science. However, it was really the 
“technical developments in analytical chemistry during the 1950s” from which Carson’s 
1962 conclusions are based (Bouman, Bornman, van den Berg and Kylin, 2013, p. 242). 
By 1972, DDT was banned in the U.S (https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/ddt-ban-takes-
effect). In 1975, the EPA published “DDT: A Review of Scientific and Economic 
Aspects of the Decision to Ban Its use as a Pesticide” in which the majority of toxicology 
studies cited were from the 1960’s. Subsequent research, from the 1960’s and since DDT 
has been banned as a U.S. agricultural pesticide, has revealed that DDT is linked to a 
multitude of serious health issues ranging from “breast cancer, diabetes, decreased semen 
quality, spontaneous abortion, and impaired neurodevelopment in children” making its 
continued use a controversial dilemma (quoted in Bouwman, Bornman, van den Berg and 
Kylin, 2013). It is still used today, however, in the absence of a more effective means of 
controlling mosquito populations and, thus better controlling mosquito-borne diseases. 
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Leaded gasoline. According to Rosner and Markowitz (1985), the campaign that 
began in 1922 to promote leaded gasoline as the answer to quieter, more powerful 
engines effectively diminished the attributes of the cleaner, less toxic, equally efficient 
alcohol fuel that the general public could even make. Midgley subsequently claimed 
(despite warnings from independent and government researchers about the potential 
public health threat) that leaded gasoline was “the only material available which can 
bring about these [antiknock] results…and unless a grave and inescapable hazard exists 
in the manufacture of tetraethyl lead, its abandonment cannot be justified” (quoted in 
Rosner and Markowitz, 1985).   
Weight of Evidence 
Leaded gasoline. During the initial stages of integrating leaded gasoline into the 
American market, a multitude of questions were being considered regarding how to 
assess the potential health hazards associated with its use (ibid). According to Rosner and 
Markowitz (1985), questions such as:  
What should constitute adequate proof of safety or harm? What business, 
professional, or government agencies should be responsible for evaluating 
possibly dangerous substances?...Does industry have to prove a new substance 
safe or do public health experts have to prove it dangerous? In the face of 
scientific uncertainty concerning the safety or dangers posed by leaded gasoline, 
and the perceived need for this substance by the automobile industry, the broader 
question became: What was the level of acceptable risk that society should be 
willing to assume for industrial progress? (p. 344) 
216 
 
Hayhurst supported the Bureau of Mine’s report in an American Journal of Public Health 
editorial in which he claimed a general scientific consensus, based on 27 months of 
public use with no evidence of “mishaps and poisonings”, that there was no public health 
risk from leaded gas. 
 However, according to Stone (2002), public interest in alternative fuel began to 
shift by the 1950’s with increasing awareness of urban congestion. Stone (2002) 
emphasized that this awareness contributed to the development of a mass transit program 
that would increase transportation efficiency. It could also potentially be contributed to 
the one of the reasons that lead arsenate was phased out—WWII resource demands may 
have increased the cost and the transition simply took longer than simply switching from 
one product to another (i.e. replacing engines was a bit more costly, times-taking and 
resource dependent). Further shifts in public interests, toward fuel efficiency, were 
spurred by the 1972 Oil Embargo as fuel shortages created a sense of crisis within the 
U.S.  
Conflict of Interest and Public Trust 
Leaded gasoline. The Bureau of Mines report (discussed above) suggested that 
there was no public health risk associated with the use of leaded gas in automobiles. 
However, scientists and researchers (Cecil K. Drinker, Dr. David Edsall, Alice Hamilton 
and Yandell Henderson) criticized the study as inadequate and challenged the credibility 
of the outcomes, emphasizing the industry’s capacity to influence the data and the 
subsequent doubt regarding the integrity of the federal Bureau of Mines in protecting 
public health (Rosner and Markowitz, 1985). According to Needleman and Gee (2013), 
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Dr. Hayhurst (industrial hygienist for the Ohio Department of Health), had expressed in a 
letter to the Public Health Service that although he shared some of their concerns 
regarding the health hazards inherent in lead exposure, he justified countering proposals 
to ban its use, stating: “I am afraid human progress cannot go on under such 
restrictions…if we are to survive among the nations” and the argument stop its public use 
(as one of the Public Health Scientists had suggested) because it is hazardous to human 
health “might also be applied to the thousand and one other poisons and hazards which 
characterize our modern civilization” (quoted in Needleham and Gee 2013, p. 53). It 
should be noted, however, that Dr. Hayhurst not only worked for the Ohio Department of 
Health, but was also an Ethyl Corporation consultant whose “correspondence [with] the 
Public Health Service [indicated] that Hayhurst was supplying advocates of tetraethyl 
lead with information regarding the tactics to be used by their opponents” (Rosner and 
Markowitz, p.4). 
Robert Kehoe, a University of Cincinnati toxicologist, spoke in favor of the 
Bureau’s conclusion and shortly thereafter was offered to direct DuPont and General 
Motors’ C.F. Kettering laboratory and soon after that “became a corporate officer at GM 
and a consultant to DuPont” (Needleman and Gee, 2013).  
Data Interpretations  
Leaded gasoline. In 1965, geologist Clair Patterson challenged Kehoe’s claim 
regarding “normal” lead levels in the body by demonstrating how dramatic global 
increase (over 600 times) in lead levels since pre-industrial times has significantly 
increased the “normal” level of lead and suggested that “typical” level would be a more 
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appropriate term. Patterson published his findings in Archives of Environmental Health 
and was criticized by toxicologists for crossing the boundary between his geological 
expertise and societal health implications (i.e. science and public policy/social 
application) (Needleman and Gee, 2013). However, in 1966, the Surgeon General and 
certain members of the Senate began explicitly questioning the impact that low level, 
long-term exposure to lead was having on women and children and inquired about 
potential alternatives if leaded gas was found to be toxic (Needleman and Gee, 2013). 
Theme 3: Data Gaps 
Lead Arsenate and DDT  
Searching “lead arsenate” between the years 1900 – 2016 on ProQuest’s Toxline 
for scientific research resulted in 57 articles, the earliest of which was published in 1949 
and the majority of which were published after 1970. A search on ProQuest’s Biology 
Database for “lead arsenate”, for the years between 1900 and 1970, produced two results, 
both of which were studies of how lead arsenate affected insects. Similarly, prior to 
Rachel Carson’s work, DDT had been studied mainly for its effectiveness as an 
insecticide (similar to the majority of early glyphosate studies).  
Leaded Gasoline  
According to Needleham and Gee, 2013, the Surgeon General had asked Midgely, 
in 1922, if the impact on public health from the introduction and use leaded gasoline had 
been considered. Midgely’s response was “very serious consideration…although no 
actual experimental data has been taken” (ibid, p. 50). According to the authors, 
regardless of behind the scenes tactics that may have impacted how industry responded to 
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opposing arguments, scientific evidence to the contrary of the Bureau of Mines findings, 
at the time, was not conclusive in regards to linking exposure to lead from leaded gas 
with hazardous chronic toxicity and many health officials supported its continued use 
until it was undeniably proven to be hazardous (Rosner and Markowitz, 2013; Lewis, 
May 1985). The Surgeon General, after holding a stakeholder conference to discuss the 
risks and benefits of leaded gas, assigned an investigatory panel to determine the extent 
to which lead might be hazardous if it were widely disseminated throughout society 
(Rosner and Markowitz, 2013). However, the panel was given a seven-month timeframe 
in which to conduct their study, thus the outcome, according to the author, was not 
conclusive and could only definitively determine that there were "no good grounds for 
prohibiting the use of ethyl gasoline...as a motor fuel, provided that its distribution and 
use are controlled by proper regulations" (Lewis, May 1985, p.4).  
Theme 4: Data Access Restrictions 
Protecting Innovation: Benefits and Barriers  
Leaded gasoline. Although health officials (including the Surgeon General) and 
scientists warned against the health risks linked to the introduction and projected 
widespread use of lead and leaded fuel,  
[d]uring the 1920s, the petrochemical and automobile industries emerged as the 
corporate backbone of the United States. Because the acceptance or rejection of 
leaded gasoline had profound implications for these industries…[p]ublic health 
professionals found themselves under intense pressure to sanction and minimize 
the hazards associated with the manufacture and use of this new potentially toxic 
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substance and the pages of the American Journal of Public Health were 
compromised during the months and years when the fate of leaded gasoline was 
being decided… Rosner and Markowitz, 1985, p.1 
Transitions: Public to Private Research  
Leaded gasoline. But, for the following several decades since the Surgeon 
General’s determination that the results of its initial 7-month investigatory panel’s results 
were “preliminary”, safety studies were essentially solely conducted by industry and 
industry- backed researchers (Needleman and Gee, 2013; Lewis, May 1985; Rosner and 
Markowitz, 1985). According to a case study on industry reactions to early scientific 
warnings, the:  
relevant studies…on the health effects of lead in petrol… were conducted and 
funded exclusively by the Ethyl Corporation and General Motors for over 40 
years, and General Motors controlled the publication of results and imposed tight 
reporting constraints on the regulating US Bureau of Mines. [C]ritical 
independent scientists had their funding withdrawn and their jobs and lives 
threatened. (Needleman and Gee, 2013, p. 71) 
Unpublished Data 
Leaded gasoline. Funding the U.S. Bureau of Mines to the conduct safety study, 
General Motors Research Corporation/Ethyl Corporation responded to the request for 
safety data, requiring (contractually) that preliminary results of the U.S. Bureau of 
Mines’ study not be shared with the public and that the study outcomes be discussed and 
approved prior to publication (Rosner and Markowitz, 2013).  
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Concluding Remark  
The lack of published scientific data, in terms of toxicity studies or human health 
impact for both lead arsenate and DDT, prior to the 1950’s, made it a challenge to 
conduct a brief review that could be used to compare with the knowledge development 
and policy processes of Roundup/glyphosate and NK603/GMO’s. However, the data I 
did obtain, illustrated certain key points that served as a general basis for analysis. 
Reflecting on the history of lead use in global society, Needleman and Gee (2013) 
discussed Benjamin Franklin’s observations in 1918 (four years prior to the initial 
marketing campaign for leaded gasoline) of the widespread uses of lead throughout 
society and the consistent patterns of subsequent negative health symptoms that 
accompanied lead exposure; the authors included a quote from Franklin who concluded 
that “this mischievous effect from lead is at least 60 years old; and you will observe with 
concern how long a useful truth may be known and exist, before it is generally received 
and practiced on” (p. 49). 
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Analysis  
Theme 1: Developing Standards 
Cultural Transitions 
Lead arsenate and DDT. It could be argued that finding ways to reduce or 
eliminate pest problems in agriculture dates back to the beginnings of cultivated farming. 
Societal dependence upon the success of its agricultural system meant that the persistence 
and resilience of various agricultural pests was perceived as a threat to that system and 
thus necessitated continuous efforts to find solutions that would diminish this threat as a 
means to strengthen crop viability. Improving crop production was balanced in terms of 
the cost of input and the increase in profit, thus, securing one’s time and financial 
investment was a key factor in determining the viability of a pesticide. The use of lead 
arsenate grew out of these efforts as a perceived better alternative to a previous solution 
in terms of addressing the pest problem and increasing crop viability. Contrary to a key 
marketing point for glyphosate, consumer health was not the priority issue with selecting 
lead over copper, but rather the attributes that made one more effective than the other in 
terms of its intended use. With new, easier application technology, applying chemical 
pesticides was a more convenient method than the manual, less expensive (and less toxic) 
non-chemical techniques offered by the newly-formed USDA. Convenience, in this 
sense, took priority over economics and health. But lead arsenate was appealing not only 
for its convenience, but also for its resilience (due, in part, to its accompanying oil 
binders), which contributed to its perceived affordability.  
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Lead arsenate’s residual nature was marketed as a benefit and crop spraying was 
marketed as indispensable in terms of crop protection, but over several decades of use, 
there was growing public concern about how difficult it was to wash the residue off and, 
subsequently, how much residue the public was ingesting and otherwise exposed. The 
focus then transitioned from its benefits, to finding solutions to the problems created by 
those benefits. Residue levels became an important factor in transboundary commerce 
and this prompted the government to find alternative solutions (e.g. the FDA developed a 
washing system to reduce pesticide residue when crops came out of the fields) to help 
resolve the health hazards inherent with residual levels of lead on post-market products. 
In addition, the federal government issued regulatory parameters for interstate commerce, 
but, as the FDA noted, intra-state commerce did not always comply with federal 
standards. Public health was not a direct influential factor within the commercial market 
system, but increased public awareness and subsequent public resistance to products 
sprayed with lead arsenate could be perceived as an influential economic factor. 
Increased consumer resistance combined with the increased cost of lead (as a 
consequence of limited war-time resources) and the need for increasing amounts of lead 
concentration (as a consequence of pest resistance) began to make lead a less 
economically viable solution. There is a similar thread with glyphosate as pests are 
becoming resistant to it, thus requiring increasing amounts of chemical application to 
maintain effective pest control. Eventually, another solution developed that promoted a 
shift to a different pesticide. DDT did not have the long-history of health hazard that 
accompanied lead use but it was still resilient and it was considered a broader (thus more 
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convenient) insecticide than lead. In addition, the resource demands of WWII increased 
the cost of lead arsenate, making a transition to DDT not only more convenient and 
assumedly safer, but also more affordable.  
Leaded gasoline. Addressing pest problems in agriculture has been a persistent 
thread throughout the text. The strategies employed (since the late 1800’s to today) by 
U.S. farmers has been influenced by the innovative products (e.g. mechanical pesticide 
application technologies and toxic substances) that are designed to alleviate those 
problems. The use of leaded gasoline was more of a strategy to increase convenience by 
employing technology to make transportation more efficient (in terms of a smooth 
running engine), faster and more powerful. Safety was, in part, considered in terms of 
cost/benefit between public health and financial and political investment.  
Herbicide tolerant crops have been promoted as an efficient, cost-effective weed 
management solution that could increase production while decreasing pesticide use, 
which enable legislative actions that justified minimizing regulatory barriers and was 
later used in promoting and developing biotechnology. Leaded gasoline was also 
promoted as an environmental and socio-economic solution—making engines faster and 
more efficient and therefore increasing the nation’s capacity to travel faster while 
conserving fuel. 
Defining Roles 
Leaded gasoline. Maintaining boundaries between science and the broader social 
context was a critical issue among toxicologists who criticized Clair Patterson for 
applying his geological expertise to the broader social context. Using critical theory to 
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analyze how knowledge generation is separated from knowledge application, we can see 
that these boundaries exist in the current conflict, mainly between researchers and 
policymakers, thus creating a communicative barrier between those who create the data 
and those who use that data to impact society. In addition, we also can see that the 
barriers that inhibit researchers from directly influencing policy decisions did not exist 
for the leaded gas industry just as it did not exist for the agricultural biotechnology 
industry.  Interpretation of the data, thus, becomes a key issue in how the data is used for 
supporting policy and regulation. 
The subsequent decades after leaded gasoline became mainstreamed, the majority 
of safety studies on leaded gas were conducted by the petroleum industry. Similarly, the 
two decades that glyphosate was registered (from 1974 to the 1990’s) and approximately 
the first decade that NK603 was approved, the majority of toxicity studies were 
conducted by the agricultural biotech industry, which over time has produced an 
abundance of data that suggests the safety of transgenic technology and its accompanying 
chemical pesticide applications. 
Theme 2: Perceptions of Safety and Validity 
Cultural Perceptions 
Lead arsenate and DDT. Similar to the theory that herbicide applications will 
not impact the internal microbiological processes of a plant, it was generally assumed that 
applied insecticides were only resilient on the crops in the field and could be washed 
away prior to consumption. However, as later research began to reveal that the resilient 
nature not only made it difficult to remove prior to consumption, it also persisted in the 
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soil, the economic viability of using lead arsenate began to transition, within the public 
and commercial market, to a liability. Although, during the widespread commercial and 
private use of lead arsenate of the first half of the 20
th
 century, there was limited scientific 
research regarding the health hazards of lead, public observation and historical anecdotal 
evidence of negative health effects contributed to public resistance. From a social 
construction, critical theory and scientific revolution perspective, the shared experiences, 
ideas, needs and interests of the public began to diverge from the marketable attributes 
promoted by the industry. This divergence helped shift the perception of what is 
considered a viable solution, which, in turn helped create an environment conducive to 
seeking a new solution. By this time, scientific research was just beginning to reveal the 
systemic biological processes that would enable the public to compare, contrast and 
integrate personal observation and shared anecdotes with the authoritative findings of 
Science.  
In addition to the increasing financial costs of using lead arsenate, the transition to 
DDT was also due, in part, to the increased resilience on the part of the pests, which had 
become resistant to lead arsenate applications. Increasing the application amounts of lead 
arsenate increased the hazard of public exposure and, regardless of federal efforts to 
reduce pesticide residue levels, without consistent adherence to federal residue level 
standards within each state, the public was still at risk. Eventually, lead use in agriculture 
was phased out but even with past knowledge of the health hazards associated with lead 
and with subsequent studies demonstrating its persistence as a soil contaminant and 
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toxicology studies demonstrating it acute and chronic toxicity, it wasn’t until less than 30 
years ago that lead was banned nationwide as an agricultural pesticide.  
Lead, like DDT, persevered for its useful attributes and the lack of (available) 
convenient, affordable, and safer alternatives. However, as science evolved and new 
knowledge raised awareness (and provided an authoritative cautionary voice) of the 
hazardous impact, DDT was spotlighted in the midst of new a federal initiative that 
emphasized environmental stewardship as a national priority. Perhaps it is coincidence, 
but DDT was banned (in the U.S.) only two years after the EPA was created. Global use 
of DDT, however, further demonstrates the give and take between risk and benefit. The 
case for DDT differs, however, then that of glyphosate or Roundup in that DDT use 
shows a dichotomous measurement between health risks (known and agreed upon health 
hazards of using the pesticide versus known health hazards of mosquito-borne diseases) 
in the face of a lack of alternative solutions to the second health hazard. The case for 
glyphosate/Roundup is more complex, involving divergent perceptions of health risk, 
crop production, convenience, and perceived benefit compared to alternative herbicides.  
Transitions: Basic to Applied Research 
Leaded gasoline. Both leaded gasoline promoters and agricultural biotechnology 
promoters have marketed their respective products as having unique and superior 
attributes as compared to their counterpart as a means to persuade consumers to shift 
consumption habits. There is also a common thread between the automotive 
convenience/power solutions and the potential for applied research in becoming part of 
the problem in terms of science revealing that those solutions have a hazardous impact on 
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human, animal and environmental health. This relates to Kuhn’s (1996) question: “What 
is a problem and what the solution” (p. 109)? 
Weight of Evidence 
Leaded gasoline. Similar to the GAO suggestion that in order to save time, the 
EPA should require industry to provide the required chemical safety data, the US Public 
Health Service’s Division of Chemistry and Pharmacology’s suggestion that in order to 
save time industry should provide the Division with the required safety data. Thus, much 
like U.S., E.U., WHO and FAO determinations of glyphosate safety were made amidst an 
industry-weighted data and/or review panels, the Bureau of Mines report was conducted 
and shaped by General Motors/Ethyl Corporation. However, the petroleum industry 
maintained that leaded gas was safe for the general public based on a lack of conclusive 
data indicating otherwise. This contrasts with the agricultural biotechnology industries 
capacity to claim the safety of transgenic crops and their accompanying pesticides, which 
was based on a multitude of safety studies. 
Conflict of Interest and Public Trust 
Leaded gasoline. Conflict of interest was a significant factor in the leaded 
gasoline era and is a current conflict surrounding transgenic crop and pesticide research 
and public policy/regulatory development. Much like Séralini, the WHO, and the ninety-
six scientists who vouched for the integrity of the WHO’s study and the industry-bias of 
the EFSA study, Drinker, Edsall, Hamilton and Henderson highlighted the industry bias 
in the Bureau of Mines study. The positions that Dr. Hayhurst, of the Ohio Department of 
Health, later held with the Ethyl Corporation is similar to the overlapping role that Diána 
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Bánáti played as EFSA’s former chairwoman of its management board and as board 
member of ILSI. Regardless of individual intentions, such conflicting roles invited public 
speculation and doubt regarding the integrity of both the Bureau of Mines study as well 
as the EFSA’s safety assessments and its capacity to ensure public safety. Robert Kehoe, 
the University of Cincinnati toxicologist who spoke in favor of the Bureau’s conclusion 
and shortly thereafter was offered to direct DuPont and General Motors’ C.F. Kettering 
laboratory is similar to the university professor who was hired by Monsanto and 
subsequently began promoting agricultural biotechnology. 
Data Interpretations 
Leaded gasoline. The length of study has been a common thread throughout my 
research. For example, Séralini’s concern, regarding the limited data and subsequent 
interpretation that acute and sub-chronic toxicity studies can offer in terms of long-term 
determinations of safety, resonates with the scientists who objected to the limited 
timeframe (seven months) for which to study lead particulate effects on high traffic 
roadways. The emphasis from both was that more time was needed to conduct a thorough 
analysis.  
In addition, the studies that supported continued promotion and public use of 
leaded gasoline, like the majority of studies used to support NK603 and Roundup, were 
industry studies (from the petroleum/automotive industry), which maintained that leaded 
gas was safe for the general public, just as the agricultural biotechnology industry 
maintains the safety of transgenic crops and their accompanying pesticides. Without 
evidence to the contrary regarding the hazards of airborne lead particulates, the Surgeon 
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General raised the lead limits in gasoline, similar to the EPA raising pesticide residue 
limits for various glyphosate crops. 
At the time Rachel Carson’s book was published, it was a fresh example of 
independent science that was also written and presented for public accessibility. Its 
popularity within the public sphere spotlighted, with conclusive scientific evidence, 
where the U.S. regulatory system was failing to protect the environment. It could be 
argued that the results of her research on the negative environmental impact of DDT 
influenced government response that ultimately led to its nation-wide ban. Séralini and 
his research team have also succeeded in gaining global publicity, but public policy 
change regarding agricultural biotechnology seems to be limited to the E.U. which is 
limited to maintaining the potential that his claim holds a level of validity (in terms of 
supporting a replication of his study through the G-TWYST project). In terms of 
assessing adjuvants and pesticide formulations, it is possible, but not directly evidenced 
that Séralini’s et al (2012) study had any influence on the events that led to EU’s ban on 
POEAs. Clair Patterson’s challenge, in regards to what “normal” lead levels mean, 
offered a new element to the debate about chronic impact and toxicity thresholds, while 
Dr. Huber’s and Dr. Kremer’s research challenges assumptions of traditional 
microbiology and the potential for unintended, hazardous effects from transgenic plants 
and glyphosate interactions with soil/plant microbiomes. Samsel and Senef brought voice 
to independent researchers who challenged the claim that the shikimate pathway does not 
exist in humans and animals. 
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The contrast between alcohol and leaded gasoline seems to parallel, to an extent, 
Lucero’s work with soil microbiomes as compared with chemical applications. In terms 
of discovering a process (in the case of alcohol fuel it was more the product) that was 
clean, efficient and renewable, alcohol and healthy microbiomes seem like a viable 
solution. However, just as alcohol was quickly disregarded in favor of petroleum 
products, Lucero’s work, having arrived amidst established commercial success of its 
chemical counterparts, has also been disregarded. 
Theme 3: Data Gaps 
Lead Arsenate and DDT  
The lack of independent studies for lead arsenate prior to 1949 illustrates how 
public policy was not dependent upon such research and public safety, therefore, was 
determined by a limited data pool. The type of research on DDT prior to the 1960’s 
illustrates that public safety was not priority, but rather commercial application research 
and development. It wasn’t until after Rachel Carson raised public awareness about the 
negative impact that the emphasis began to shift towards public health and environmental 
soundness. Similarly, Séralini’s (et al) study raised awareness of the data gap within the 
current system and paved the way for public demand for independent research. 
Leaded Gasoline  
When the Surgeon General asked the investigatory panel to study the effects of 
leaded gasoline on busy thoroughfares, the panel was given a relatively short time to 
conduct their study even though some scientists at the time expressed that the timeframe 
was not long enough to conclusively determine whether or not leaded air particles were a 
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health hazard. The length of required studies has also been a controversial topic for 
current toxicity studies, as 90-day sub-chronic studies are quite often considered by 
industry and policymakers as sufficient to determine even long-term safety, but 
independent researchers and multiple advocacy groups express the need for chronic (1-2 
year) studies. The result of the study, therefore, could not conclude that leaded air 
particulate concentrations were a hazard to human health which led to an assumption of 
safety that was reiterated for many years.  
The lack of evidence that substantiated claims of safety between the 1920’s to the 
1950’s began to shift as independent researchers began to develop new scientific theories 
and methods. The 1960’s marked a change in public and government acceptance of the 
industry’s status quo as a new scientific era as well as new technologies that enabled 
researchers to analyze air quality and toxicity levels began to emerge. Similarly, new 
scientific developments in microbiology are now enabling scientists to begin to fill in 
previous data gaps and to better understand the systemic interactions of microbiomes 
within people, plants and soils. However, unlike public policy that restricted lead use and 
banned DDT, the U.S. agricultural policy has remained supportive of agricultural 
biotechnology. 
Theme 4: Data Access Restrictions 
Protecting Innovation: Benefits and Barriers 
Leaded gasoline. The control over which General Motors/Ethyl Corporation 
maintained the study, outcomes, interpretation and dissemination is reminiscent of the 
USDA’s policies for their scientists’ communication with the public regarding their 
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research. The experience of independent scientists whose jobs were threatened if they 
opposed the validity of the Bureau of Mines study and subsequent studies over the next 
several decades is similar to the twenty-six scientists who felt it necessary to remain 
anonymous in order to protect their jobs when they complained about the inaccessibility 
of industry materials that were necessary to appropriately conduct their studies. 
Reflecting on these experiences, perhaps the relationship between science, industry and 
government is much the same as it was then as it is now. 
Concluding Remark  
What does this mean for agricultural biotechnology? It appears, through this 
research, that the historical problem of trying to find a solution to effectively deal with 
weeds, harmful insects, plant disease and drought in the last century or so has resulted in 
only temporary relief of those problems. As science progresses and those solutions are 
identified as problems, significant transformation for society occurs at a large scale when 
that science is able to positively influence the government-industry system of policy 
making and regulation. The crux of the crisis, it seems, is in developing, holistic and 
balanced scientific data, appropriate and flexible policy and regulations, and the public 
resources necessary to secure our food supply safely in which the solutions used to 
address agricultural production needs (e.g. increasing production/decreasing loss) do not 
result in increasing public, animal or environmental health hazards.  
If one considers the conflict surrounding perceptions of validity in agricultural 
biotechnology safety within context of a system, it is possible to begin to piece together 
how certain perceptions or actions influence others and feed the system or create barriers 
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that protect the system from other certain perceptions and actions. Using Figure 2 as an 
example, the majority of research currently used to support agricultural biotechnology 
policies and regulations is derived from industry research and development. The factors 
that contribute to this system can be linked to key events, positions, perceptions and 
interests and each of them contribute in ways that is beneficial to other parts of the 
system, which, in turn, helps to maintain the momentum and, consequently, the 
perception that the system as a whole, is working.  
Some perceptions and actions are less influential or may even get “kicked out” of 
the system because they don’t contribute in ways that are perceived to benefit key 
elements, or even perhaps, the system as a whole, which seems to be driven by 
streamlining economic advantage and maintaining a particular vision of political power. 
Consequently, these less influential or contradictory perceptions and actions take place, 
more or less, outside of the system and have minimal impact on current policy and 
regulatory decision-making. But it is here, at the fringes of mainstream science, policy 
and regulation, that society has a unique opportunity to view the benefits, hazards, flaws 
and gaps of the current system. Identifying these factors is a key step toward expanding 
our boundaries of reality, which, by participating in and advancing revolutionary science, 
has the potential to more appropriately recognize the benefits and address the hazards, 
flaws and gaps of the current system.  
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Figure 2. Current Agricultural Biotechnology Scientific Data Input and Output System. 
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Underlying the processes outlined in Figure 2, however, is another set of systems 
at work. For each position claimed and action conducted, there are underlying reasons for 
them and these reasons define one’s interests. These interests are driven by how one 
perceives the extent to which options are considered valid or viable. These options are 
defined by one’s boundaries of reality, which are, in turn, situated within the context of 
what one knows and trusts. At the core of one’s trust, is how one determines right from 
wrong, good from bad—one’s ethics. How one determines right/wrong or good/bad, 
stems from one’s values which evolve from one’s personal experiences. From this 
perspective, large-scale and complicated conflicts integrate, at every level, interpersonal 
processes, making small-scale, interpersonal and community-level conflict engagement a 
viable option to begin to address this conflict. 
Weakness  
What my research hasn’t shown very well, is whether Séralini’s et al (2012) study 
demonstrates a significant shift in public perceptions of the scientific validity of 
agricultural biotechnology toxicology testing. The data presented in my research provides 
evidence that Séralini’s study influenced certain actions of the European Commission, 
thus suggesting that the study also influenced public policy-supported assumptions, but 
my research would have had to have included, for example, survey or interview data that 
specifically related public perception (regarding the above stated matter) to Séralini’s 
work. The research presented here only offers vague inference that is not supported by 
specific data. In addition, the comparative analysis could have been more in-depth which 
would have better enabled me to make connections or differences between the subjects.  
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Recommendations 
The value of knowledge development and scientific exploration can be measured 
by the willingness to identify the gaps and discrepancies and explore beyond the 
boundaries of what is known. The scientific breakthroughs of the scientists highlighted in 
this research offer extraordinary innovative value and potential economic and agricultural 
security for the U.S. beyond the narrow scope of the current agricultural biotechnology 
system. However, current federal goals inhibit the advancement of alternative agricultural 
systems. In addition, the democratic process ceases to be democratic when policies are 
developed and maintained in contrast to the majority of the civic voice. The process has 
become a closed loop system that inhibits new input that challenges the validity of the 
current output. The forward movement, the progress, the evolution of the system has 
become, more or less, stuck in a repetitive cycle. Inviting new input—e.g. the 
independent research and public voice—offers the potential to expand, change and evolve 
as a whole social-economic-political system. At the very least, reflection and 
acknowledgement of current assumptions of “sound science” and how those assumptions 
impact policy decisions. Along with this, parties might reflect on the underlying motives 
and drivers that inhibit integration of alternative scientific approaches.  
My recommendation would be to increase opportunities for public civic 
discussions regarding underlying values and goals for the U.S. food system. Such 
discussions would necessitate raising public awareness of the current policies (and 
how/why they were developed) and the current independent and public research that 
supports and provides alternatives to current policies. I would also recommend public 
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civic discussions about the criteria of “sound science” and how those criteria are applied 
in the science used for public policy development and what it means for public safety. As 
stated in chapter two, “[r]epeated acts of political will and courage” from government 
level representatives will be needed to address the barriers that hinder public 
communication with policymakers and subsequent influence on how public policy is 
shaped (Diamond and McDonald, 19996, p. 30). However, considering the current 
national agenda, it is not reasonable to assume that Agency representatives or researchers 
would be able and/or willing to participate in such a dialogue if it means making certain 
“influential” information more transparent.  
Therefore, providing an opportunity for retired and/or former Agency researchers 
to share their research and experiences seems like a viable strategy to begin the dialogue 
process. This is, in fact, how I was initially introduced to Huber, Kremer and Lucero’s 
work. However, the venue in which these scientists met was sponsored by a group with 
an expressly biased perspective and anti-GMO activist intent. I would recommend a more 
neutral venue, facilitated, for example, by a conflict resolution practitioner with the 
competence to maintain a productive, positive and safe environment to explore the basis 
and boundaries of current agricultural biotechnology-related research. The purpose of 
such a venue would be to openly discuss the scientists’ research (inviting former public 
scientists from federal agencies, independent scientists as well as social scientists and 
policy analysts), the personal and professional context within which that research is/was 
situated, how their research, in their experience, was validated and how it is situated 
within the context of the current agricultural system. In a sense, what this dialogue is 
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envisioned as is a type of Asilomar Conference in which those who attend are expected to 
participate openly--sharing their experiences, research and knowledge in a transparent 
manner. In an effort to allow the scientists an opportunity to share and discuss their 
stories, the conference might be best conducted in two stages: an initial session that could 
be publicly attended as well as live-streamed to the public but limiting active 
participation to public scientists and policy analysts, and a second session that invites 
public discussion. Conducting a conference this way would promote a public learning 
opportunity that could help focus the subsequent discussions. Prior to such a conference, 
it might be useful to offer educational resources that provide a basis for understanding the 
topic (e.g. the distinction between agricultural terms such as conventional, hybridization, 
agricultural biotechnology, organic, etc.; a description of the available biotech crops and 
accompanying products; a brief synopsis of the scientists’ (those attending the 
conference) research; etc.). This information could be disseminated electronically, for 
example, via the conference website content and/or links. The goal of this type of 
conference would be to provide an opportunity to increase public understanding of the 
scientific data that is used (and not used) within the processes and outcomes of the 
current public policy and regulatory system. After such a conference, I would also 
recommend (to further promote civic engagement) that conflict resolution practitioners 
coordinate and facilitate smaller workshops that enable researchers and the public to 
address specific policy and regulatory-related issues by exploring the benefits and 
boundaries of existing and envisioned agricultural policies and practices and share the 
process and outcomes of those workshops with the broader public and appropriate 
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policymakers. Subsequent responses/actions from those policymakers would best 
demonstrate transparency if they are shared with the public as well. 
Precaution and risk have been used quite a bit to describe the differences between 
the E.U. and the U.S. The evidence of risk is growing and, like Dr. Huber cautioned, it is 
time to assess, through serious consideration of the available research (non-industry and 
non-industry-funded) and discussion with the scientists themselves, “what is the problem 
and what is the solution”. Open dialogue that not only recognizes and validates the voice 
and work of rigorous public/independent research but also the concerns, ideas and 
interests of the public is one step toward restoring the public voice within the political 
system. Organizing and focusing those voices provides productive opportunity for the 
public to become part of the process of scientific validation and, in turn, participate in the 
process of policy development by engaging policymakers with potential alternative 
solutions to help the nation reach its technology and innovation goals.  
Suggestions for Further Research 
Perhaps an ethnographic study of retired federal Agency researchers and their 
experiences with transparency, trust and validation within the Agency could lend more 
evidence in regards to whether the experiences of the three scientists that I highlighted in 
this research are unique or part of an Agency specific pattern. Such a study could 
potentially identify and discuss the relationship between public research, public 
researchers and policy development. Another study that could be potentially useful is one 
that looks into public access to policy development and civic engagement methods that 
might increase public influence in policymaking decisions.  
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From a science perspective, a more in-depth study into Dr. Mary Lucero’s 
research could further develop an understanding of the potential impact that her research 
(and similar projects by other scientists) could have on the U.S. (and global) agricultural 
system(s). Such a study could analyze whether there is a potential bridge between 
agricultural systems (e.g. organic and bio-agriculture). Another question for further 
research regarding the validity of current agricultural biotechnology products (and their 
accompanying pesticides), is to look into the potential systemic impact of the pathogens 
that Dr. Huber and Dr. Kremer (and others) have linked with glyphosate interactions, i.e. 
if these pathogens exist in the plant, could these be influencing the toxicity tests (control 
and test) as well?  
Conclusion 
This dissertation has examined how scientific knowledge has been created, 
transformed and disseminated within the context of researcher-industry-government-
public. I have used Séralini’s, et al (2012) study as a base from which this research has 
grown. I have explored how research protocols have developed, how transparency and 
public access to information promotes and/or restricts industry, government and public 
interests and how perceptions influence positions and party actions. Throughout the 
research, I have illustrated certain patterns that reveal the systematic processes involved 
in current agricultural biotechnology knowledge development and how that knowledge 
impacts the policy and regulatory development. My research and analysis of 
NK603/GMO’s and Roundup/glyphosate has demonstrated how science and industry 
influence state-level policy and regulatory development processes for agricultural 
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biotechnology. I have illustrated benefits and barriers of agricultural research and policy 
standards, demonstrating how they impact knowledge development, transformation and 
dissemination within the context of science, public policy, commercial application and 
civic participation. I think the strongest point that my research has made regarding 
Séralini’s et al (2012) study is that it influenced the European community to take another 
look at the assumptions of safety regarding Roundup and GMOs.  
The conflicts surrounding how science is conducted, interpreted and used for 
determining agricultural biotechnology safety are integrated in a socially constructed 
complex web that influence and are influenced by (but are not limited to) interests, 
values, trust, transparency, validation and perceptions of safety. Agricultural 
biotechnology research is grounded in the ideological perspective that humans have the 
potential to make things better—for themselves and others—whether by creating higher 
production rates, disease-resistant plants, increasing nutritional content in foods or 
developing a multitude of techniques to help reduce crop reliance on external inputs (e.g. 
fertilizer, pesticides, manual labor, etc.). The science that helped promote and support 
this perspective has been claimed by some as valid, safe and predictable and U.S. and 
international policies developed from this perspective have maintained a consistent 
pattern of promotion and approval of the science from which agricultural biotechnology 
can advance from its outcomes. But it has been shown that production rates have not 
significantly increased and pest resistance requires increased application rates. The 
technology itself, as well as its supporting products, contribute to hazardous pathogens, 
and chemical inputs have been increasing to compete with herbicide resistance. 
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Independent and public/government scientists themselves have experienced a barrier 
between their work and the capacity to influence how it is perceived, translated and 
applied in the making of public policy and regulatory standards.  Knowledge 
development, in this sense, is compartmentalized—scientists produce and interpret 
specific outcomes within the context of a specific study (e.g. data and analysis from a 
toxicity study) and policymakers further interpret and generalize those outcomes to apply 
within a broader, societal context.  
When the federal government has available, valid and consistent data that 
indicates unexpected hazardous events that negatively impact plant, animal and human 
health and those events are directly and indirectly linked to transgenic crops and 
glyphosate, at what point does a relatively stagnant technology (from a production 
standpoint) such as herbicide tolerant corn become a liability rather than an asset? It 
seems there is a valuable resource that is neglected if scientists, who know the subject, 
data and interpretations, are not involved, to some extent, in helping to develop 
appropriate generalizations and societal applications. It seems now is a critical time for 
such input as our agricultural system, according to the independent and public research, is 
potentially threatened by the solutions promoted and supported through public policy. 
The U.S. has an incredible, innovative resource that has the potential to make the U.S. 
leaders in developing a strong, adaptable and healthy agricultural system. However, that 
resource not only appears untapped, but also has been systematically ignored and/or 
rejected, thus sacrificing, to this point, not only the innovative ideas and potential 
applications of these scientists, but also the relationship, trust and security between 
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certain reputable innovators, policymakers and national representatives who enforce the 
current national agenda.  
However, in developing innovative products or socio-political action for which 
require a significant amount of time, effort and money has been invested, abandoning 
those investments is probably not a feasible option. The question then becomes, how do 
we achieve this and that, without abandoning the core values driving each solution? The 
work of Dr. Kremer and Dr. Huber is (similar to Rachel Carson’s), potentially, 
instrumental in contributing to a deeper understanding of the reasons why agricultural 
biotechnology has become part of the problem and thus part of the crisis. It would seem 
then, that the research represented by Lucero is the true paradigmatic shift that could 
potentially resolve this crisis. Perhaps a more in depth discussion regarding underlying 
values, interests, objectives and goals driving national policy development for the U.S. 
agricultural system could promote a baseline for further discussion about the knowledge 
used to develop national goals, the policies created to reach them, and the potential for 
alternative visions of how the U.S. agricultural system can viably support the national 
agenda.  
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Appendix A: Inductive Coding Model 
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Appendix B: Deductive Coding Model 
 
 
 
(Mayring, 2000, p. 5) 
  
275 
 
Appendix C: Interview Instrument  
Dr. Robert Kremer 
 
June 2, 2016 
 
1. I was wondering if I could get your input regarding how your research was 
received by the USDA.  
2. Also, if I am not overstepping my boundaries,  from your experiences and 
observations working with the USDA-ARS, what are key factors that influence 
how USDA decision-makers select and validate knowledge/data for regulatory 
and policy change?  
3. From your perspective, how does the current USDA system (of data selection, 
collection and use in regards to glyphosate/glyphosate formulations and 
transgenic crops) impact the USDA's capacity to function as a public agency?  
4. How do you envision this system changing? 
 
June 4, 2016 
 
5. Responding to participant’s comment: Finally, a rather bothersome occurrence 
was that a team of USDA-ARS researchers compiled a lengthy review paper on 
“Glyphosate Effects on Plant Mineral Nutrition, Crop Rhizosphere, Microbiota, 
and Plant Disease in Glyphosate-Resistant Crops” (Duke et al. 2012. Journal of 
Agricultural & Food Chemistry 60:10375−10397) that had a major objective of 
critically reviewing my past work to conclude that evidence of the impacts of 
glyphosate is limited or not supported. 
I understand why you are cautious about how your information is presented. Just 
curious…since you and only one other scientist (and the Brazilian) were working 
on the biology aspect…what were the scientists, who reviewed your work, 
researching? 
6. Responding to participant’s comment: “Additional problematic area is the 
perception that how results are reported must be “inoffensive” to everyone. 
Statements have to be carefully crafted not to offend particular interest groups 
such as any agrichemical industry, or the corn growers group, or the no-till 
farmers group, etc.”   
With this in mind, (pardon my straying into theoretical discussion) does this 
promote a less than accurate, or incomplete, understanding of the data, outcomes 
and interpretations? In other words, are favorable data/outcomes/ interpretations 
selected or more emphasized than unfavorable (when presenting with specific 
audiences/clients/ in mind)? Is the underlying driver—using the data to increase 
the breadth and depth of knowledge (with which to base informed 
decisions/actions) or justification? 
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Dr. Don Huber 
 
May 23, 2016 
1. There is a lot of chatter on the mainstream web about a letter that you had sent to 
the USDA's Tom Vilsack but I couldn't find any official documentation of it. 
Please let me know if I am overstepping my boundaries, but I was wondering if 
you really sent one or if the rumor-mill created it. If you did send it, would you be 
able to tell me what it was about and how Vilsack responded? 
2. Have you attempted to communicate your research findings, and subsequent 
public and political implications, regarding your recent research findings with the 
USDA (or any other government body) prior to that letter or since that letter? 
3. And, if I could press the boundaries a little further, based on your extensive 
experience as a publicly supported researcher, how do government regulatory 
policies for agricultural biotechnology reflect the general state of, and use of, 
agricultural science and the data generated from it? (How do your recent research 
discoveries relate to this?) 
4. How do you envision a significant positive transformation of the current policy-
making, regulatory, and/or agricultural system--i.e. what do you think it will take 
to shift the balance in the current system? 
 
May 24, 2016 
1. Also, in your 50+ years’ experience with agricultural systems, how does this 
current science-industry-policy-public health relationship compare to past 
agricultural systems? 
2. I was also wondering if you tried communicating your findings with the EPA, 
since they are responsible for regulating glyphosate, or the FDA, since they are 
responsible for post-market food safety, and, if so, what were their responses? 
 
June 4, 2016 
1. I can see your research also applying to standard toxicity tests (e.g. rodent studies) 
but I have been wondering how the research/design parameters and standards set 
up by the OECD impact a researcher's and/or policy maker's capacity  to identify 
the hazards that your (and your colleagues') research illustrates? 
2. Although the U.S. government has apparently ignored your research, how has 
your research been regarded by other country authorities? 
3. With the current conflict regarding risk v precaution, it would seem that your 
work would validate a certain level of precautionary action, but again, I wonder 
how the parameters that define "sound science"--in the political sense--would 
allow certain governing bodies to include or exclude research such as yours as 
part of risk assessment and potential justification for risk management? 
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Appendix D: EPA Toxicity Memos 
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENT AL PROTECTION AGENCY 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 
JAN I 2 1987 
MEMORANDUM: OFFICE OF 
PESTIC:IOES ANO TOXIC: SUBSTANCES 
SUBJECT: Glyphosater Roundup; EPA Reg. NO. 524-3081 
TO: 
THRU: 
FROM: 
Addendum to one year dog study with glyphosate1 PPi 
6F3380/6H5502; Glyphosate in/ on soybeans; revised 
Section F1 and amended label text 
Caswell No. 661 A 
Record �o. 186082/186083/186084 
Project No. 7-0230 
Accession No. 264334 
Robert Taylor 
Product Manager (25) 
Registration Division (TS-767) 
and 
Residue Chemistry Branch 
Hazard Evaluation Division (TS-769) 
Edwin Budd, Section Bead 
Review Section II 
Toxicology Branch 
Hazard Evaluation Division (TS-769) 
William Dykstra �� t:J-7� 1/1(3'7Toxicology Branch , . ..A� 
Hazard Evaluation Division (TS-769) �ur/T.,i' 
tf ,4' f 7
Requested Action: 
Review revised Section F, amended label text and addendum 
to one-year dog study with glyphosate. 
Background: 
l. PPl6F3380/6H5502
Monsanto submitted a Roundup herbicide petition that
requested Agency approval to apply Roundup preharvest to 
soybeans. This submitted petition included a request to amend 
the current 15 ppn glyphosate tolerance on soybean hay to 200 
ppn. 
At this time, Monsanto requests to amend the submitted 
(2/21/86) petition by deleting the 200 ppm glyphosate soybean 
hay tolerance request and modifying the submitted preharvest 
soybean label text to restrict against feeding or grazing 
soybean hay or forage from preharvest soybean treated areas. 
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2. One-year dog study
With respect to the one-year dog study with glyphosate,
it was prev�ously concluded in memo of 3/12/86 from w. Dykstra 
to R. Taylor that •the absolute and relative pituitary weights 
of the mid-and high-dose male dogs are suggestive of a possible 
compound-related effect. The registrant is requested to 
further address the pituitary findings and the relationship 
to treatment.• 
The registrant is responding to that memo with this 
addendum. 
Conclusions and Recommendations: 
1. In PP#6E3424, RCB states that •RcB can reach no final
conclusion regarding the likelihood that contaminants in the
technical product will or will not result in a residue problem
until issues involving identification/quantitation of
nitrosamine presented in Glyphosate registration Standard have
been resolved.• This same issue regarding nitrosamines in
technical glyphosate also applies to the current petition for
soybeans.
Toxicology Branch requires that the identification/quantitation 
of nitrosamine be determined for technical glyphosate before 
the requested tolerances are granted. 
The revised section F has no effect on the TMRC or percent 
ADI utilized.(review of 8/13/86 is attached). Toxicology 
Branch requests that RCS address the acceptability of the 
amended label. 
2. Toxicology Branch concludes that the apparent decreases
in the absolute and relative pituitary weights of the mid­
and high-dose male dogs are not compound-related. The NOEL
for the study is the high-dose of 500 mg/kg/day. The study
is acceptable as guideline data.
Review: 
1. PPff 6F3380/6H5502: Revised Section F
Proposed Tolerances 
Tolerances are established for combined residues of 
glyphosate and its metabolite aminornethylphosphonic acid on 
soybeans. 
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40 CFR 180.364 
Soybeans • • • • • •  
Soybeans, Forage. 
Soybeans, Hay • • •
21 CFR 561.253 
• 6 ppm
• • • • • • • 15 ppm
• • •  15 ppm
Soybean Hulls • • • • • • • • • • •  20 ppm
005651 
When used as directed on the requested preharvest 
application label, the soybean tolerances will need to be the 
following: 
40 CFR 180. 364 
Soybeans • • • •  20 ppm 
When used as directed on the requested preharvest application 
label, a food additive tolerance will need to be the following: 
21 CFR 561.253 
Soybean, Hulls • • • • • • • • 100 ppm
2. In memo of March 12, 1986, it was concluded that the
decrease in the absolute and relative pituitary weights of
the mid- and high-dose male dogs are suggestive of a possible
compound-related effect. In response to this conclusion, the
present addendum (Accession No. 264334) was submitted by the
registrant. In the memo of 3/12/86 of the one-year dog study,
the following data were presented:
Pituitar� in Males 
Weight (gram) 
Dogs Control Low Mid High 
1) o. 088 0.079 0.066 0.064 
2) 0.096 0.069 0.050 0.010 
3) 0.076 0.090 0.061 0.055 
4) 0.000 0.073 0.054 0.062 
5) 0.083 0.089 o. 071 0.074 
6) 0.079 0.077 0.067 0.080 
Mean 0.084 0.080 0.062 0.068 
S.E. 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
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Relative pituitary weight are shown below: 
Percent Relative to Terminal Body Weight 
Pituitary in Males 
Dogs Control Low Mid High 
1) 0.00073 0.00057 0.00061 0.00059 
2) 0.00106 0.00056 o. 00047 0.00064 
3) 0.00069 0.00066 0.00053 0.00061 
4) 0.00065 0.00063 0.00054 0.00061 
5) 0.00090 0.00099 0.00068 0.00069 
6) 0.00068 0.00066 0.00059 0.00060 
Mean 0.00079 0.00066 0.00057 0.00062 
In the registrant's letter of August 1, 1986 from 
F. A. Ruecker, the following in formation is presented. 
"After a review of the pituitary weight data for the 1-
year glyphosate oral toxicity study in dogs (EHL No. 830116) 
it is my opinion that there is no conclusive evidence that 
the decreased mean pituitary weight for high and mid dose 
males can be attributed to compound administration for the 
following reasons: 
1. The magnitude of the weight decrease is greater for the mid
dose when compared to high dose (0.0222 g. v.s. 0.0162 g.)
therefore there is no apparent dose relationship.
2. There is no apparent microscopic lesion present in the
pituitary which would be expected to be a correlate of
the decreased weight changes (atrophy or necrosis of
pituicytes).
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3. Since the pituitary exerts hormonal control over a
005651 
variety of endocrine organs, one might expect that any
lesions which would reduce pituitary ,weights could possibly
effect the hormonal output of the pituitary and thus have
effects on the organs under pituitary control (thyroid,
testes, adrenals, etc.). There were no weight changes or
microscopic lesions observed for any of these ograns.
4. There were no comparable pituitary weight differences for
females when compared to controls.
s. Finally, a review of 3 other EHL-conducted, l year, oral,
toxicity studies in dogs (81124, 82165, 84056) showed a
pituitary weight range for male controls from .064 to
.072 g., and inter-group mean pituitary weight range of
.062- 0.088 g., .059- 071 g. and .070-. 083 g., for each
of the studies, respectively. It should be noted
that the mean pituitary weights for control males (.084
g.) in the 830116 study are higher than have been observed
for control males in these other studies while the mean
weights for the mid and high dose males are closer to the
historical mean weight ranges for controls. Additionally
the mean pituitary-to-body weight ratio of .001% for each
group in the 830116 study is not different from that
observed in all groups in the other three studies. These
data strongly suggest that the apparent decrease in
pituitary weights for the mid and high dose males in the
830116 study may be actually an aberration due to an
unusually high mean weight for the control males."
Conclusion: 
Toxicology Branch concludes that the apparent decreases 
in absolute and relative pituitary weights of the mid- and 
high-dose male dogs are not compound-related. 
The NOEL for the study is the high-dose of 500 mg/kg/day. 
Classification: Guideline. 
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL. PROTECTION AGENCY 
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20460 
MEMORANDUM 
SUBJECT: 
TO: 
!"ROM: 
1'BRO': 
BACltGROOND 
Ol"l"IC:l!OF 
Pl:STIC:tor:s ANO TOXIC SU8STAhC£S 
Use of historical data in determining the weight 
of evidence from kidney tumor incidence in the 
Glyphoaate two-year feeding study1 and some 
remarks on false positives 
Reto Bng�er, �hief 
Scientific Mission Support Staff 
TOX/BED/OPP (TS-769C) 
Herbert Lacayo, Statistician 
Scientific Mission Support Staff 
TOX/HED/OPP (TS-769C) 
Bertram Litt, Statistics Team Leader 
Scientific Mission Support ltaff 
TOX/HED/OPP (TS-769C) 
. . 
The Glyphosate feeding Jtudy (EPA Reg.·t: 524-308; Caswell 
I: 661A, Accession I: 251007-014) on Charles River CD-1 mice 
generated renal tubular adenomas in aale mice at.the 5000 and 
30000 ppm dose levels. The registrant (Monsanto) claims that 
auch tumors are •unrelated to treatment.• C�ef.1). Xn support 
of that they provide historical data from Bio/dynamics and two 
other laboratories (rer.2). 
With respect to historical data we note the large number and 
variety of factors which influence the life history of rodents in 
chronic studies. Hence, it is genes.ally agreed that the moat 
relevant historical controls are experi•ents ·fro• the subject 
laboratory studied within a 3 to 4 xear •window• (ref.3). 
SUMMARY 
The main purpose of this aemo is to show one way historical 
data aay be used to evaluate the significance of tuaora in the 
glyphoaate feeding study. When these data are so used we can 
conclude that Glyphosate dosing has a statistically significant 
effect (at the p • .006 level) in the production of kidney 
tumors in male mice. The appropriate procedure is outlined in 
the next section entitled Use of Historical Data. The last 
Section, Remarks on False Positives, addresses some comments 
by Monsanto (Ref.1) on this-�ubject. That section outlines 
some of the weaknesses in Monsanto's position. 
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OSE OF HISTORICAL DATA 
The following information was derived from Reference 2. 
Data Source* 
Bio/dynamics 
I1U) Corp. 
(est.of tumor rate) 
.00368 
.00437 
Sigma 
(est.of standard deviation)
.00212 
.00109 
Combined .00399 .00094 
The value p • .00368, derived from Bio/dyna·mics data is a reasonable
choice to use as a historical control. The data are from the same 
laboratory that performed the Glyphosate study and are within 
the appropriate 3-4 year time •window• (ref.3). Further, the
standard deviation of the estimate is reasonably small. 
We will now examine the Monsanto contention that the kidney 
tumors are unrelated to treatment. (i.e. Glyphosate has no effect
on kidney tumors). !'irst, consider the tumo.r rate in the·_ Gly-
phosate Study: 4/198 • .020�:· --- . ; � 
In contrast, Bio/dynamics has the lower historical rate: 
3/815 • .003J8. 
·The relevant question is: What is the probability that the 198
CD-1 mice in the Glyphosate ·study will produce by pure chance 
4 or more mice with kidney tumors? Another way of stating this
is - ·11ow likely are we to have· a tumor rate of .0202. --- for· 
the Glyphosate study given that the historical rata is .00368? 
Que�tions of this.type aay be answered from manipulation 
of the relevant distribution which,.in this case is the Binomial:
P(r out of n mice have tumors) :1:)prq.:-r .. 
Where: n • the t of"aale aice in the study 
r • the I of male aice with kidney .tumors 
p • .00368, the historical probability that an individual
aale mouse will develop kidney t.umora. 
q • l - p 
*This does not include Hazleton Laboratories America, Inc. due
to the small sample size of that data set 
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Using the above distribution and e�emen�ary but tedious 
calculations, we generate the following table: 
i of mice 
with tumor 
r • o 
1 
2 
3 • 
Probability that r or more mice will have tumors 
in a study with 198 male.mice 
1 • 
.518177 
.165711 
.037443 
.006481 
This last table indicates that based on a qistorical·rate of 
p• .00368 that the probability of seeing 3 or· more mice with
kidney tumors is about .037; and the probability of seeing 4 
or more such mice (i.e. seeing what in fact happened) is about 
.0064. We note that even considering data from I.R.D., the p 
v�lue is about· .01. 
Under such circumstances a prudent person would reject 
the Monsanto assumption that Glyphosate dosing has no effect 
on kidney tumor production. _Another way of saying thLs is 
that if Glyphoaate were truly unrelated to kidney productiou 
we would expect to·see 4 or acre tumors in lesa than l out 
of 100 experiments af the t�pe sponsored by Monsanto.· Thus, 
Glyphoaate is suspect. �� 
REMARKS OR FALSE POSITIVES 
In ref. 1 Monsanto notes that • ••• if 20 types of lesions 
were evaluated at a probability level of .OS, the number 
expected to be positive would not be one in 20, but rather 
the probability would be 64 in 100, an unacceptably high 
value ••• • Monsanto is referring to the well-known fact 
that by examining enough data it is �ikely �hat one wi11 find 
an excea·s of some tumor type by chance alone; thus generating 
a false positive. •. 
The Monsanto argument required the following assumptions: 
1. A aouae may develop 20 .distinct and independent
(in the statistical sense) types of tumors.
2. The probability of each tumor type in a typical
mouse is .os.
It follows from the above that: 
P(a mouse has at least one tumor)• 1 -.9520
• .6415
Bence in 100 mice one wouid on the average see 64 with tumors. 
Monsanto proposes to avoid this •problem• of false positives.by 
analyzing the study• ••• at the .Ol probability level.• 
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We disagree with ·the �egist�ants position. First, even if 
one did analyze the study at the .• Ol level as they suggest it 
would still result (using the same mathematics as before) in 
seeing 18 mice out of 100 with tumors. And hence one stil1 has 
the problem of false positives from the registrant's viewpoint. 
But this causes something worse from a regulatory viewpoint. 
We have decreased the false positive rate (i.e., the probability 
of saying that a chemical causes tumors when in fact it does not) 
at the cost of increasing the false negative rate (i.e., the 
probability of saying that a chemical doesn't cause tumors when 
in fact it does). The Regi�trant wishes to avoid false positives 
while those concerned. vi th the public -heal th vi·ah ·-to -:avoid· -fa];se-·- -
negatives. Bence, for this reason alone Monsanto•• argument -is - -
unacceptable. 
We further disagr�e as follows: 
1. The two assumptions needed to support the Monsanto
argument are themselves in need of support (es5tecially
the re�uirement for statistical independence).
, 2. !'ala• positive results .. are less likely to occur .. with 
rare tumors tre.f. 5). · And the t�•ors in question are/. 
rare. 
Viewpoint is a key issue Our viewpoint is one of prot�cting 
the public health when we see suspicious data. it is not our 
job to protect registrants from false·positives. We sympathyze 
with the Registrants problem, but they will have to de•onstrate 
that this positive result is false. 
Finally, we mention that none of the tumors occurred in the 
control or low dose groups. Instead there was one at 5000 ppa 
and 3 at the 30000 ppa dose level. "J.'his together vi.th the 
previous coamenta aake it likely that there is a dose-tuaor 
relationship for Glyphosate. • � 
.. 
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UNITED ST ATES ENVIRONMENT Al. PROTECTION AGENCY 
W.i\.!=;HINGTON, O.C. 20460 
-­
,..., .�i. ;".· .... "". 
MEMORANDUM 
SUBJECT: Consensus Review of Glyphosate 
Caswell No. 661A 
Ol"l"ICIEOI" 
PUTICICIIES ANCI TOXIC: SUBSTAHC:IES 
TO: Robert Taylor 
Product Manager 
Herbicide - Pungicide Branch 
Registration Division 
on February 11, 1985, a group of Toxicology Branch personnel 
met to evaluate and discuss the data base on Glyphosate, and in 
particular the potential oncogenic response of Glyphosate. 
A. The following persons �
ere in attendanc��
�-Chief,. To�icology Branch . � � \.74 ' 
Theodore M. Farber, Ph.D. 
f± � -::L_ 
· 
LOuis Ka.sza, D.V.M., Ph.D.... 1,,,.,., 1 �1.1..A-t.;-Pathologist ·., "''1 r .. v
Bertram Litt, Statistician 
Herbert.Lacayo, Ph.D. 
statistician 
Reto Engler, Ph.D. 
William Dykstra, Ph.D. 
Reviewer 
Steve Saunders, Ph.D. 
Laurence Chitlik, D.A.B.T. 
} 
The signatures above indicate concurrence with this concensus report. 
B. The material available for review consisted of a package issued
on January 25, 1985 (attached) and a letter from Monsanto (dated
February s, 1985), rebutting the significance of renal mouse
tumors.
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c. Evaluation of the Facts:
1. Long-term/Pivotal Studies:
a) A 26-month rat study showed a NOEL at 30 mg/kg/day
which was the BDT. The oncogenic potential at this
level was negative, corroborated by an outside con­
sultant. Although some thyroid tumors were observed
in female rats in this study they were.generally
discounted in their significance, in and of themselves.
However, it should be noted that on a mg/kg/day basis
the exposure of rats was less than 1/100 of ·the exposure
of mice (4,500 mg/kg/day). Since a toxic, or MTD,
level was not reached in this study, the panel raised
the conjectural issue that at toxic ·levels at or close
to a MTD, tumors might have been induced.
b) The NOEL in a rat 3-generation reproduction study was
10 mg/kg/day. In separate teratogenicity studies
feto toxic effects were noted in rats and rabbits at
levels which caused significant maternal toxicity,
including deathi terata were not observed (ibid).
These·results were, however, not entered into the
discussion on Glyphosate.
2. Mutagenicity Assays:
Glyphosate was tested for mutagenic activity (1) Reverse
Mutation in!• typhimurium. and�· coli ·with and without
microsomal activation, (2) Ames Assay with and without
activation, (3) CHO cells with ·and without activation,
(4) DNA repair in rat hepatocytes, (5) Rec-assay in B
subtilis, and (6) Dominant lethal assay in mice. AlT
these tests were negative, tests 1-3 ·are fairly well
predictive of oncogenic response while 4-6 are less
appropriate. An in vivo bone marrow cytogenetics study
was also performed. �was negative,; but scientifically
not acceptable. In summary, several appropriate and
scientifically acceptable tests are supportive of
�-oncogenic potential of Glyphosate.
3. In the chronic mouse study carried out by Biodynamics (tBDN-
77-420) re�al tubule adenomas were observed in males.
Dose (ppm) 
No. Exposed 
Tum.ors 
0 
49 
0 
1000 
49 
0 
5000 
50 
l 
See review of W. Dykstra (dated 9/4/84).
30,000 
50 
3 
This is a rare tumor·�ven in Charles River CD-1 male mice. 
Biodynamics historic.al data (included in package) show that 
this tumor was observed only 3 times in 14 male control 
groups ranging in size between 51 and 60 mice. 
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The probability of observing this tumor 4 times or more 
in 198 mice (the to�al number of mice examined in the 
Glyphosate study) is p • 0.0064 when considering the 
historical control of the same laboratory. Even �on­
sidering other reported historical controls, the 
p-value is low, about O.Ol indicating that it is very
unlikely that the glyphosate test group is consistent
with any historical controls. (See review by Dr. Lacayo).
In addition, the response rate (see above) seems to be 
related to the dose. 
Therefore, it was the concen,us of the group that the renal 
tubular adenomas were related to compound administration, 
since their frequency was not consistent with the historical 
controls and there is a trend indicating dose dependency. 
The group noted that there were other non-oncogenic, i.e., 
toxicological changes apparant in the kidney and liver 
e.g., central lobular hepatocyte hypertrophy and necrosis
and chronic interstitial nephritis in males and proximal
tubule epithelial basophylia and hypertrophy in females.
The group discussed the possibility of kidney irritation
and formulation of crystals but noted that kidn•Y or
bladder precipitaters were not reported for this assay.
Therefore, a conclusion mitigating the renal tumors could
not be reached •. (See page 10 of contract�r review).' � . ! ' 
:;.i_ 
Other Considerations: 
'!'he review panel recognizes that the exposure of aice w•a at 
a very high level 4.5 g/kg/day. Precipitation of Glyphosate 
in the kidneys aight have o.ccurred but none was repor·ted. '!'he 
panel believes that additional sectioning of new blocks of 
male kidneys might help in the interpretation of the study 
results. The kidney tumors as reported, were un.ilateral (pers. 
communication by Dr. Dykstra, after the panel meeting), add­
itional histopathology could resolve the issue of whether this 
is a valid observation or due to not •finding• the tumors in 
the particular block analyzed. 
'!'he panel also believes that realistic exposure assessment; 
both for dietary and worker exposure are of singular impor­
tance. For example, the limit of detecting residue tolerances 
aay overestimate exposure. Particular emphasis also should 
be given to residues in water, since Glyphosate has been·used 
for aquatic weed control (BUP) and this use may become the · 
subject of a permanent registration. 
E. Classification of Glyphosate:
In accordance with EPA proposed guidelines (FR of Nov. 23,
1984) the panel has classified Glyphosate as a Category C
oncogen.
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ADDENDUM: 
The letter by Monsanto (Feb. 4, 1985) has been considered 
in these deliberations. Several of the issues raised are, in 
fact, addressed in the above deliberations, although not point 
by point. A point by po�nt rebuttal, including thos� points with 
little merit, will be done in addition to this evaluation. 
Attachments 
cc: B. Coberly
Caswell No. 661A
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 
3---ll �l 
00-5590
MEMORANDUM ov,an ov 
PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
SUBJECT: Glyphosate; EPA Registration No. 524-308; Roundup; 
Additional Histopathological Evaluations of Kidneys in
the Chronic Feeding Study oLGlyphosate in Mice. 
TO: 
THRU: 
FROM: 
Caswell No. 661A 
Accession No. 260023
Robert J. Taylor. 
Product Manager (25) 
Fungicide-Herbicide Branch 
Registration Division (TS-767C) 
Edwin Budd 
�
�
b
Head, Review Section II 
1,l> .. 11 Toxicology Branch ·, /..,. iv1J> klL
Hazard Evaluation Division, (TS-769C) . f'f 1f11JD""
William Dykstra t:,(4� £2. -,£� //?/�b
Toxicology Branch · . � 1 
Hazard Evaluation Division, (TS-769C) 
Requested Action: 
Review additional pathological and statistical information 
on kidney tumors with glyphosate. 
Background: 
Glyphosat� was considered oncogenic in male mice causing 
renal tubule adenomas, a rare t-.umor, in a dose-related manne ·• 
- �-
The incidence of this tumor was O, O, 1, and 3 in the control,
low-, nfd-, and high-dose groups, respectively. 
Additional evaluation of all original renal sections 
by Dr. Kuschne�· idantified a small renal tubule adenoma in one
control male (animal no. J,.028) which was not t'.liagnosed as such
in the original _pathology report. 
_ Subsequer,tly, Toxicology Branch recommended that additional 
renal sections be cut and evaluated from all control and glyph0sate
treated male mice in order to determine if additional tumors were 
present. �· 
�-. 
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The results of the additional pathological evaluation of 
re-cut kidney sections in nale mice demonstrated that no additional 
tumors were present. Additionally, the twnor in the control 
group (animal number 1028) which had been diagnosed from the 
reevaluation of the original slides by Dr. Kuschner was not 
present in the re-cut kidney sections. Therefore, the followir.� 
inci1ence was observed. 
Dose (ppm) .· 
Renal tumors 
No. examined 
0 
O, l* 
49 
1000 
0 
49 
-sooo 
1 
50 
30,000 
3 
50 
·*Animal (number 1028) which was diagnosed by Dr. Kuschner
as a renal tumor after. reevaluati�n of original slides but not of
resectioned kidney slides.
Conclusions:
The additional pathological and statistical e7aluations by
consultants conclude that the renal tumors in male mice were not
comround-related.
This:'.information will be submitted to thl�d Hoc committee
for evaluat;.ion to determine if concurrence is possible. 
Review:
j t;. 1. Letter of September 29, 1985, Robert A. Squire, D. V.M. ,·; t Ph.D., to Monsanto. 
Dr. Squire has not evaluated the slides of the glyphosate
study but rather the chronic toxicity data • 
. .. '")--.: 
.i The .following is the narrative from Dr. Squire's letter: 
t ·. • \ 
) ;' /'"\ · · "The ,p.athological endp:>int in question is the presence of ·. renal tubular adenomas in male mice. The final overall incidences
were l/49, 0/49, 1/50, and 3/50 for control, low, mid, and hi;h 
doses respectively. In my opinion, these l'epresent spontaneous 
occurrences rather than compound-related effects. This view is 
based primarily �pon the biological and pathological evidence 
available, but is also supported by the lack of statistical 
significance, either in comparing proportions of animals affected 
or linear trend analyses." 
"The following observations suggest to me that the findings 
in male mouse kidneys are incidental to treatment: 
2 
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• A. His tor lcal cont!'ol values in the three differunt 
laboratcrles indicate that, althc.ugh renal tubular neoplasms are 
relatively rare in mice, they do occur sporadic.ally and there is 
considerable variation 'from group to group. An analysis of these 
tumors should combine the adenomas and carcinomas since they 
represent a spectrum in development and the lesion classification 
is .uncertain. If one does this- with the Hazelton Laboratory 
data, there is an overall incidence of 3 .• 4 percent tubular 
neoplasm� which is essentially the- sar,u,- cs the high dose animals 
in your study. The inc idance of tubular carcinomas is not 1 isted 
for Biodynamics laboratory and IRDC shows very low incidences. 
However, it must be kept in mind that the historical control data 
are derived from studies in which there were the-customary one c�· 
perhaps two kidneys sections examined. If f.:>ur sections had h(h.>n 
taken from each kidn&y, ac in your study, it is likely that 
historical control- incidences would have been even higher.• 
y . t : ' • 
i,1.·; i \ •e. · Based upon Dr •. Kuschner•s h:tstopathological evaluation
� �- �. • of the kidney slides, no pren�oplastic or cytotoxic changes were 
...;,,�_.
;. 
:: ; · evident. � · I know o� no instan�e where a renal ·carci.nogen was 
; ·"given at ·a dose sufficient to. induce tumors without also inducing 
tubular toxicity and hyperplasia, not only in the tumor-bearing 
animals, but in many additional animals rec1::iving the same exposure 
levels. Carcinogenesis is multi-stage process beginning with 
hyperplasia, and when a popul,ation of animals is exposed to a 
tumorigenic dose, many develop early stages of neoplastlc 
progression even though only a few may reach the final stage, 
Le., tumors. The absence of preneoplastic changes virtually 
precludes this being a ·compound-related effect.• 
•L. 'The largest and most atypical tumor in the study, 
according to Dr. Kuschner, was an animal in the mid-dose group 
(13023). ·This would be highly unlikely if the tumots were coinpound­
related since one expects the most. advanced tumors to be in 
animals receiving the highest dose of carcinogen. Carcinogens 
increase not only the inc id enc bub the degr'ee of neoplastic 
progression. This is particula;; · ;. true hers since survival in 
;...-, the high dose males exceeded that of control animals." 
•rn suminary, I feel the weight of evidence strongly suggests
that the renal adenomas in male mice were natut:'ally-occut:'riny an<! 
not treatment related." 
2. Letter of October 3, 1985, from Marvin Kuschner t()
Monsanto. 
3 
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In this letl')f, r;·. ;.:.,•.c;·:.,'l $l!1t•.J'j t.�:;t hi r"i:; :;",i':· ··� ····•• 
Andre Varma, Chait:!.,n .-.c tL� r»'!,:'.ru,.r;;\r. i;ii r.,:�.-.�n,. t:; ,1:-,:! ,-.-·:·:·,·,:�.:.:.;>.! 
Medicine and a well· 1'.1,c: ... ·, r, ,:':r: �.,.r,; t-.,: ,�:P:Hi�n: d.:: .�,H,�. 
The.narrative of�::-.
Dr. ICuschner is presen.. �:1 
•statistical Analysis 
"A chi-square analysis .:::' ·!'.• �·-, ,}.1, • ��. "h'.'.lt .;,d! id, :,e:: . .:,\.:.'.h.1 
the necessary assumption of o', .. ,�·.,�·.;:·;-. t,·,,.. ft,(,,·,,,.;:- ·li:;-,;,.:• ;; 1,,;·: ·.��. L not valid with thuse small nWt,·,�-,., .. ·;:-,.:· �.:::l. ,·n.,r·� 
·,se 
compare the mice fed glyphosate ,, ·· '"' .-: ·>1,"' "' C·.:. J'.,,.,,_ 
but does not allow one to study ,'1•: i .. ·.·: i··:-., .: .. h,--, · 
relation. A prob it-type analysis ;· · 0• ',>:"'�>; c. 1 .•. 
responses. Furthermore, there is c. h •• ·.·· l • .1.:· :--·.·.-<J .. , 
one tumor in forty-nine (49) mice.• 
th the low
tsponse of
, • I h�ve doc ided to use a randomiz, ': .- ·. ,1st to study the 
dose-response. The experiment is treat,�.: ,, an occupancy problem. 
A total of five ( 5) tumors were observed .,·:,...,ng the male mice. I 
\ will asstune that the chance of the four g,oups of mice is 
proportional to the number of mice in the group under the null­
hypothesis of no effect of the glyphosate. Thus the chance· of 
a tumor in the control group and in tho 1000 ppm group is 1/49 
and 1/50 in the 5000 and 30,000 ppm groups." 
"Table 1 list all the 56 possible.distributions of the five 
tumors in the four groups of mice and the associated probabilities. 
The·chance of observing the "l O 1 3" configuration of tumors is 
0.020127. The chance of observing configurations as rare as
this one or with smaller probabilities, i.e., all configurations 
with p < 0.020127 is o •. 414134. The "l O 1 3" configuration is 
therefore, not a rare event." 
"I am using the following criteria to conclude that a 
configuration corresponds to a dose-response." 
1) No response-in the control group.
2) No.higher response rate at a low dose.
3) No lower res!_X>nse rate at a higher dose.
"Using these crite·:ia the following configurations are
considered to indicate an increasing dose-response to the· 
preparation:" 
0 0 1 4 
0 0 2 3 
0 1 2 2 
: . 0 1 l 3 
4 
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·The sum of the correspondlng'probabilities of these four
configurations ls 0.065720. The l O l 3 configuration is not 
considered to indicate a dose-response according to the criteria 
listed above. 'If its probability is ad�ed to the set, the tota, 
chance of dose-response pel:'mutatlons becomes O. 085847. • 
•eased on the andyses outlined above there-is no evidence of 
a atatistically significant trend in the proportion of mice with 
renal tumors as a response to the dose of glyphosate in their 
diet.• 
3. Letter of October 7, 1985, from Robert E. Olson, M.o.,
Ph.D. to·Honsanto. 
nt: . The narrative of the letter is presented below: 
i ·,·fl � . • In response to your letter of September i6th asking me to
!;!'.t evaluate the glyphosate mouse kidney adenoma study, I am pleased 
!,,;,,.,.,.:,·�·· to respond. Letme begin by saying that the evidence for 
......... , 
.,..,..J_ ..
.. 
•. 
) 
i ' '. ·' 
carcinogenicity of glyphosate in mice is unconvincing. A few of 
renal adenomas were found in male but not female mice given very 
large doses of the compound, i.e., 5,000 and 30,000 ppm in the 
diet, corresponding to 0.5 and 3.0 percent. of the diet. The 
distribution of tumors in the three groups of male mice studies 
were 1/49 in the control group 0/49 in the group fed 1,000 ppm, 
1/0 in the group fed 5,000 ppm, and 3/50 in the group fed 30,000 
ppm. There were no tumors in any of the female mice. These data 
suggest that the appE>arance of these tumors ls random and not 
dose-related." 
MI am further impressed by the fact that a restudy of kidneys 
from mice in the study by Dr. Kuschner, a world-famous pathologist,· 
has confirmed the original findings and found no new tumors, 
despite the fact that three additional sections per kidney, per 
mouse, spaced at 150 microns intervals were evaluated. This 
indicates that the density of t��ors in both experimental and 
control groups is very low and supports the view that these are 
spontaneously developing tumors at a very low frequency." 
· "When one examines other control groups, one finds that the
renal adenoma is not a rare tumor in untreated raice of the same 
CD-1 strain and that-�n seven studieP by Biodynaraics over the
past several years, renal adenomas have been observed in the 
control groups in two of these studies--Study A (1/54 or 1.9
percent) and E (2/60 or 3.3 percent). The control group incidence
in comparable studie� by International Research and Development 
was Oto 1.4 percent, and at Hazeltine, the control mice exhibited
this tlU'llor at rates of 7.1 percent (1/14)."
5 
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•in summary, it is my view that these findings go not support
the view· that glyphosate is oncogenic .in mice. These results 
would not be accepted by any peer-review journal as evidence of 
carcinogenicity. To me, it represents a negative result, which 
would not be regarded by any scientific group or reputable agency 
as evidence. of care inogenici ty." , 
· 
. , . · . 
4. 'Letter of October 17, 1985, from Klaus L. S.temmer-, M.D. 
to Monsanto. 
•1n your letter of September 17, 1985, you requested an
evaluation of the material, submitted with the letter, of the 
mouse kidney tumor data found in the chronic feeding study of 
glyphosate. In addition, I received·the· kidney sections of the 
male and female mice of t:;his experiment.• 
,/:'' · -,;,. • I re:viewed the kidney slides of the male mice and confirmed 
!//\...,:: ."\the' findings of renal tubular neoplasms in the following five ( 5) . t; • '-:.' ,� ....... animals: 1028, 3023, 4029, 4032, and 4041. These tumors were 
,·.,::�· '·. ·• cytologic�lly well diffe.rentiated. I could riot verify any pre-
;·t'.'./'( .. ... malignant features in the renal tubular epithelium '?f any or the ·t· �. ·'· experimental mice. Intercurrent renal diseases, which we·re 
; 4 i �'. ... , noticed, did not support any cytotoxic effect of the test material •• t :
· ; ' · t Also, no histologic changes were present si:ggesting that the test · · ' · material might enhance carcinogenesis." 
.. ' ' . .  , •The final report furnished by Bio/dynamics Inc. on July 21, .� 1983, does not enumerate any pathologic alterations in the kidneys 
of the male mice that could be interpreted as. enhancement. of the 
· development of neoplasms (pages P 1 to P 17 of report). I am 
· . certain that the pathologists examined the kidneys for lesions of
'• that nature since they did and reported them for the liver. The 
lack of finding :s.uc}'l changes supports the statement· in the .previous 
paragraph and in the report of M. Kuschner, M.D." 
•The historical data on the incidence of renal tubular adenomas
were reviewed. Bio/dynamics Inc. reported a percentage range 
. , from O to 3. 3 percent; International Research and Development 
./,:-\;.-"'\ Corporation found a percentage range from 1 to 2 percent, and 
.;·',.. Hazelton had a range from O to 3.6 percent. In the present chronic'·i. feeding study, the incidence in control male mice was 2 percent. 
As is stated in the Hazelton report, the eKpected percentage 
incidence �ould be as high as 7 percent. On the basis of these 
data, the occurrence of three renal tubular adenomas in the high 
dose grouR (6%) would still fall into the general percentage 
range of male control CD-1 mice." 
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"The data in. appendices 17 A and 17 B strongly indicate that 
the CD-1 mouse has a high incidental occurrence of neoplasms in 
many different organs ( report o_f Bio/dynamics Inc.). The incidence 
is: contror 20 out of SO mice, low dose 28 out of SO, medium 
dose 29 out of 50, and high dose 24 out of SO. In evaluating the 
potential tumorgenicity or carcinogenicity of the_�est ��mpoun� 
t , one should take this into ·consideration. I.t. might be that one 
• I .1 I . ; can find a slight statistical significance in the "dose related"
: � t ; � : ·data, if one ignores the historical. data ( previous paragraph) • 
. :J • · Whether this has any biological significance is doubtful. In the 
CD-1 mouse having a high occurrence ·,f neoplasms, the "dose 
related" inc.idence of renal tubula1 adenomas is in all probability 
biologically by chance ... 
·; .: . . 
•, ;.;. · • 5. Letter of October 10, 1985, from Pathology Working Group
·.}�� , •·-":(Pm)_ to Monsanto. 
·.:�1.!. •' J • 
:f. 
'.,:. ... �articipants in the PWG 
Dr. 
or:::. 
Dr. 
R. M. 
M. R.
J. D. 
J. M. 
D. G. 
Sa1Jer ( Chairperson) 
Anver 
Dr. 
Strandberg 
Ward 
Dr. Goodman 
Conduct of the PW:. Review 
"Prior to the PWG r eview, the Chairperson reviewed the pathology 
incidence tables, the original pathologist's (OP) narrative, 
pertinent individual animal records and all tissue sections of 
kidneys fran male m:ice. The letter included the original set of 
kidney sections which were read both by the OP and. Dr. Kuschner 
and a subsequently·, prepared set of 3 step sections from each 
kidney block which had been read by the OP. The kidney was the 
designated target organ for the PWG review." 
"The PWG blindly examined coded slides without respect.,.to 
treatment group of all cases or renal tubclar-cell tumors and all 
discrepancies in diagnoses among the OP, Dr. Kuschn�r and the 
Chairperson of renal tubular-cell turners and renal tubular-cell 
hyperplasias. The consensus viewpoint of the participants is 
recorded in Appendix. A." 
"The· ·pwc also reviewed all sections of kidneys from control 
and high dose males for incidence and severity of naturally 
occurring conditions and induced toxic lesions." 
7 
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Comments and R ecommendation of the P� 
•Microscopically, tubular cell adenoma.s are well circumscribed
and compress the adjacent ·parenchyrna. They are composed of 
variably sized cuboidal, columnar or P')lygonal cells which form 
solid lobules separated by delicate connectiv.e tissue septa. The 
cytoplasm may be basophilic but is • .. sually eosinophilic and 
granular or vaculated and reticular.� . The nuclei are round and 
open faced. Mitoses are infrequentv• 
"Tubular-cell carcinomas are usually larger and may invade 
the adjacent parenchyma. The. cells at"e more pleomorphic than in 
the adenomas and often contain large bi .tarre nuclei. Mitoses, 
while not common, are more frequent than in adennmas. Necrosis, 
hemorrhage and cholesterol clefts are often present.• 
"Renal tubular-eell hyperplasia consi<JtS of a small circumscribed 
. , lesion with or .without increased basophilia and an increased 
·, number of nuclei piling up and filling the lumen. There is 
· .usually some expansion of the tubule and loss of tubular architec­
' ture but without compression of adjacent parenchyrna. Typically 
the cells have poorly defined cytoplasmic borders, round open-faced 
nuclei and have a relatively high nuclear/cytoplasmic ratio.w 
"The :;:i.nc ldence of renal tubular-cell neoplasms as determined 
by the PWG is presentP.d in Table r. Because differentiation 
between tubular-.cell adenoma and tubular-cell carcinoma is not 
always clearly apparent and because both lesions are derived from 
the same cell type it is appropriate to .Jombine the incidences 
for purposes of evaluation and statistical analysis." 
TABLE I 
RENAL TUBULAR-CELL LESIONS 
Male Mice 
Tubular-cell adenoma 
'tubular-cell carcinoma 
Combined inc·idence 
1 
.Q. 
1 
Low 
Dose 
0 
.Q. 
0 
Medium High 
� Dose 
0 1 
l 2 
l 3 
concurs with the 
that the incidences
are not compound 
8 
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·The following points were taken into consideration in reaching
this decision:• 
•a) Renal tubular-cell twnors are spontaneous lesions for
which there is a paucity of historical control data for thjs __ 
mouse stock. However, clustering can occur and the incidence in 
this study is comparable to the available historical control 
range from several laboratories (Appendix B). Since there were 3 
treated grol'ps and only l control group, there is. a greater 
possibility of more variation from mean cdntrol incidences in the 
treated mice." 
"b) None of the treatment groups differed from the controls
by the Fisher exact test at the 0.05 level of significance. over 
all groups there was no evidence of a significant lil)ear. trend at 
the o. 05 level by a one-tailed Cochran-'Armi tage Test.• 
"c) Multiple renal tumors were not found · in any animal." 
! ..--;t' . •d) Compound related nephrotoxic lesions, including
' ! 
•,' 
--1 
preneoplastic changes, were not present in this study. In 
addition, renal toxicity was--"iiot noted in the 3-month subchronic 
toxicity study reported in December 1979." 
"Spontaneous chronic ·renal disease. is commonly seen in aged 
mice. It consists of a spectrum of lesions which may occur indi­
vidually or in various combinations in any particular kidney. 
Individual lesions reported by the OP in this study and listed in 
his updated report may be components of this complex. Chronic 
interstitial nephritis, a t�t'm.!lsed by the OP, is a swnmary and 
redundant diagnosis which encompasses several of the individual 
. components and should not be singled out for statistical analysis." 
"Many animals in this study had proliferative, cystic lesio11s 
of the parietal layer of Bowman's capsule and of the proximal 
convoluted tubules. These changes were apparently more severe in 
control than treated animals.• 
"Based on the review of all high dose and control male kidneys, 
the PWG did not observe an increase in incidence or severity of 
non-neoplastic lesions in the kidney of high dose animals. The 
pw:; concurs with the OP that there is no evidence that these-­
lesions were compound induced or related.� 
9 
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Appendix E: EPA Redacted example 
e.·
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 
NOV 2 5 !�:>, OFFICE OF 
PESTICIDES ANO TOXIC 
. SUBSTANCES 
MEMORANDUM 
SUBJECT: Glyphosate - Possible 6 (a) (2) Effect in 2-Generation 
Rat Reproduction Study Submitted by Monsanto in Letter
of November 15, 1989 
FROM: 
Tl:{RU: 
TO: 
Caswell No.: 
HED Project No.: 
Re.cord No. : 
661A 
0-0504
257892
William Dykstra, Ph. D. /�/,;/., 
� /7. � 
Review Section I VV  J/�/ 
/�
Toxicology Branch I 
Health Effects Division (H7509C) 
Roger Gardner, Section Head 
lu� __ J Review Section I 
�  Toxicology Branch I l(rtJ/U> /"1 J
-Health Effects Division (H7509C) � 
Robert J. Taylor, Product Manager 25
Registration Division (H7507C) 
I//Z.-P/91 
Requested Action 
Review possible adverse effects (6(a) (2) data) reported by
Monsanto from the 2-generation rat reproduction study. 
Recommendations and Conclusions 
The results reported by Monsanto in their letter of November
15, 1989, do not suggest an adverse reproductive effect under 
FIFRA 6(a) (2) (Reporting Code 9, 40 CFR, 158.34). 
Background 
In a letter dated November 15, 1989, the Registrant 
(Monsanto) described results from a multigeneration reproduction
study in rats as follows: 
..• Groups of 30 male and 30 female Sprague-Dawley rats were 
administered glyphosate through their diet at concentrations of 0, 
2000, 10,000, and 30,000 ppm. The F0 adults produced one litter 
of animals and the F 1 adults produced two successive litters ••. 
@ Printed on Recycled PElf':1r 
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There were statistically significant reductions (relative to 
controls) in body weights of high dose (30,000 ppm) group adults. 
Similar body weight reductions (statistically significant) were 
noted in pups of the high dose group on lactation days 14 and 21. 
Smaller decreases were noted in some mid dose (10,000 ppm) pups 
·but only on lactation day 21. There was a slight but
statistically significant decrease in the number of F 1 pups per
litter at birth in the high dose group. No statistically
significant decrease was noted in the F� or Flll litters but a
slight treatment-related effect cannot be ruled out at the high
dose. There were no treatment-related effects at the low dose
(2000 ppm) animals. These results are preliminary and have not
been fully evaluated.
Comments 
The reference dose (RfD) for glyphosate was based on a 
previous 3-generation reproduction study with a no-obser�ed­
effect level (NOEL) of 10 mg/kg/day, and the RfD is 0.1 mg/kg/day 
based on the NOEL and an un·certainty factor of "ioo. If the 
effects reported at the mid dose level of 10,000 ppm (500 
mg/kg/day) can be attributed to the administration of glyphosate, 
the· NOEL of 2000 ppm (100 mg/kg/day) is 1000 times the existing 
RfD (ADI). Therefore, the reported information did not suggest 
that glyphosate meets �he criterion for 6(a) (2) adverse 
reproductive effects data (40 CFR, 158.34, Reporting Code 9). 
According to· the PDMS, the study described in the November 
15 letter has been submitted to the Agency and has the following 
listing: 
MRID 41621501. Reyna, M. (1990i Two Generation Reproduction 
Feeding study with Glyphosate in Sprague Dawley Rats: Lab Project 
No. MSL-10387. Unpublished study prepared by Monsanto 
Agricultural Co. 1158 p. 
This study was received by the Agency on September 6, 1990, and 
has not been forwarded to Toxicology Branch I for review as of 
the date·of this memorandum. 
- 2 -
310
., . .-.. ·(' . 
. '.,I .. 
GLYPHOSATE 103601 
Page��- is not-included in this copy. 
Pages �-through� are not included •. 
The material not included contains _tjle following type Qf 
information: 
>( 
Identity of product inert ingredients. 
Identity- of product impurities. 
Description of the p�oduct m�n�facturing process . 
.. 
Des�ription of quality control procedures. 
Identity-of the source of proquct ingredients. 
Sales or other commercial/financial information. 
A draft product label. 
The product confid�ntial statement of formula. 
Information about a pending registration action. 
FIFRA registration data. 
The docwnent ·is a duplicate of page(s) 
The docwnent is not responsive to the request. 
CL-.k, ,._.5 
The information not included- is generally considered confidential 
by product registrants. If you have any questions, ·please contact 
the individual who prepared the response to your request. 
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DATE OUT:.------------
SUBJECT: PRODUCT CHEMISTRY REVIEW OF MP [] EP [X] 
DP BARCODE No.:D226250 REG./File Symbol No.: 524-UOG 
PRODUCT NAME: MON 58420 Herbicide 
DATE: Septemb er 12, 1996. 
TO:· Robert Taylor, PM 25 
Fungicide-Herbicide Branch 
Registration Division(7505C) 
rRoM: Shyam B. Mathur, Ph.D., Chemist 
Product Chemistry Reyiew Section 
THRO: 
Registration.Support Branch/RD (7505W) 
Harold Podall, Ph.D., Section Head­
.Product Chemistry Review Section 
Registration Support- Branch/R0(..7505W). ' . ·. . . . 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. The.basic formulation CSF(dated April 15, 1996) is filled·out
porrectly and completely_in compliance with PR Notice 91-� and
a_gree with t�e lab�l claim nominal conce�tration. [61-1 ·& 62-2).
2. The data-sul:>mitted corresponding to guideline reference·61-2 and
61-3 satisfy the data._requirements of 40CF�§158.·165·and -158 •. 167
respect.i,.vely. . ·. · . . 
3 .. The data submitted corresponding to guideline. reference 62-1 
and 62-3 satisfy the· data requirements of 40CFR§158.170 and 
158 .180· respectively. . . • · · . · . 
· 
4. The data submitted ·corresponding to guideline referenc·e 63-3, T,
12., 14-.1�, 18, ·& 21 satisfy the. data requirements. of 40CFR .
1· 
. · § 158. 190. The. registrant inf_o·rme"d thiit .the. stud�es on storage 
stability(63-17) and corrosion characteristics will be initiated 
this year(l996).. . . . . . · • 
5. The registrant carried. out analysis for follo�ing nitrosamin�s: IN-nitrosoglyphosat;.e(NN:G-)., N-nitrososarcosine.(�S�), N..,.nitroso-- .methylaminolll,ethyl phosphonic acid(.NNMAMPA), N-nitrosoiminodi-acet�c acfd(NNIDA)., and N�itt.oso�mi.no-.pi_s-::�e.thylene_-p,i.J:>-;-Phos-., f!i' I
phon1:c ·ac1d(NN'.CB). out of all-·the.se n11:rosam1nes, .on'.!-y.:N-nitr9so . .'ti. 
glyphosate(NNG)w.as detectad.iri' less·than ·1. ppm. ·
· 
� 
i 
a. 
�=
e
-
�lceto1�
1
�Fs, whe�ea
: the ;�gis��a��- 1n. �s�
a
f��r���:�;ri .. ii -,�. 
b .• N-P osp onomethylglycine, MON 0139 isopropylamine salt� 
. t t 
ha
t
s
h
been s�own
d
. t
t
o b
d
e j t
in REFS,· whereas e · 
reg1.s ran 1.n e CSF 1.n 1.c_a e l. to be ..
Note to.PM: 
fill 
1:Rmxxx:Reviewer:S.8.HATHUR:09/12/96:703·308·8378:Code No.(Reg. No 524·UOG ). <PCFORM> 
750511:RO:RSB:PCRS:CS· � 
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PRODUCT CHEMISTRY REVIEW OF MP [] 
DP BARCODE No. :D226250 . REG./File 
PRODUCT NAME: MON 58 4 20 Herbicide 
DATE: September 12, 1996 
. EP [X] 
Symbol No. =-=5=2�4_-�U�O�G'------
1. Reviewer: S.B.Mathur 2. Company: Monsanto Agriculture Co.
3. Type of Submi,ssion: Registration (XJ Reregistration [ J
New [X) Resubmission [ J Amendment· [. ) . "ME-TOO" ( J 
Alternate Formulation [] Experimental Use Permit ( ]
Other (Specify) ____ --=------------------
4. · If "Me-TOO" Registration, this product is ( ] is not ( ]
similar-_· or substantially similar to EPA's Reg.· No.: ____ _ 
. If not,· co�e�; in Confidential Appendix A· -on the differenc�s 
between the registered and th� new source where significant • . ; 
CONFIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF FORMULA 
s. Type of �ormuiation and the sources of ac�ive-ingredients:
. . . 
· • Non-,.integ:rated formulation system .• �.� •••.• ·; •••••••• , •••• (X] 
Are all technical grac;le active -ingredie·nts used registered?
yes ( )_ ·.•·.no [ ] , If no, specify------ --------
• ·Integrated formulation system ••• ; .••. � .••••. • •••• · ••••••.. ( ]
6. C-learance of . intentionally added ingredients in the
f,armulation tor. the intended use (indicate in the Confidential 
.Appendix. th,ose that· are not cleared; the PC Codes s�ould be 
provided by the chemist on the CSF for those that ar.e 
cleared):· 
6(a) Formulation intended for food use under 40CFR§l80.1001:
· . • yes. [X] • no [ ] : .• 1?.ome are -�leared, others are not . [ J ·
Cleared :under list: : ·.. ··.:·;c(Xl·=·; . , d[X1 • e (X) . 
�e there any limitai;:�ons __ for u,se �s �n inert .up4�r '40<;:l'.'R§l�O •... 
1001? 
. . . · . ··. . ·,- -. - :•--.·.-: -. -· __ -.- -
• yes ( ] • no ( ] , If ·yef;,· speci.fy ., ·:·•: ,:·;,r; :;:;·:--.: y,·:: 
6 (b) Formulation intended for 'non-food ·use:· : ., :·"., ,· ·'·· ·' � 
• yes ( ] • no (X] • Some are cleared, .others are not [ ] 
6(c) Clearance- by the FDA of certain formulati6ns under 21CFR§l70 
to 199. Examples: (a) indirect food additives, such as food 
contact surface sanitizers; adhesives, coatings, pape_r and 
p_aperboard products that may contact food ln packaging or­
holding; and (b) substances - generally recognized as safe 
(GRAS). 
• yes [ ) • no [ ] • Some are cleared, others are not (
If yes, the entire formulation is cleared under 21CFR§ __ _
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1. The density, pH, and flammability values given on the CSF are
identical with those of GRN 63-7, 63-12, and 6.3-15, 
respectively: • yes [X] • no [ ] 
a. The no�inal concentrations (NC) of the active ingredients and
the upper and· lower certified limits (UCL &. LCL) are as 
follows: · 
Active ingredient(s)
Acetochlor. 3 
·MoN 0139 Isopropyl amine salt- . . . 
. Atrazine· · 
%·by. weight
9. The calculated NCs, based ·on the pure active ingredients
(PAI), are identicai to those on the label: 
-yes · [Xl no [ ] . : 
10. The certified limits are. within .the· stailda:td limits as per .
40CFR§l58.175 ·or are ·adequately explained 1.f different: 
PRODUCT LABEL 
yes (X] · no .I· )
,. 
11. 
. , · .. · ... - _..... . !. -
The .che_inica;t..-names of the1ict;;v�. :i.�i��i�fferits· oh the jl!ibel are 1-- identical ·to those <?n -Uie<:esF,h.,:::s�·:..j'es (%) .. ·>; • no: C l 
. ! . . 
-
·1· , 
12. The appropriate pq.ysical and chei:nica1 hazards. jstatement. . 1regarding flammability_· or· explosive· bh�racteristics of ·the 
product are given on the labef
°
: -
• yes ( ) . · ·'• no ( ) ·· • not appl�cable. (X)
13. The storage ·and disposal instructi°ons ·for the pesticide ·and
container are in compliance with PR Notice 84-1 for household 
us� products or PR Notice 83-3 for all other uses: · 
• yes (X] • no ( ]
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PRODUCT CHEMISTRY DATA (SERIES 61, 62, 63) 
14. Chemical IDsLManufactureL
Analytical Informati.on
61-1 Chemical Identity(CSF) 
61-2 start.Mat.& Mfg.Process 
61..:.3 Discussion of Impurities 
. . 
62-1
62-2
62-3·
. .  
Preliminary Analysis 
Certified Limits(CSF)" . 
EnforceJl!.ent Analytical Method 
15. PhysicalLChemical Pro Data 
Data 
Reauired 
Fulfilled 
y 
y 
y 
.y 
y 
y 
.. Value or
per ·Reaui·red Qualitat. 
tie 
s 
63-3 Physical State 
63-7 Density/Bulk Density 
63-12 pH-of Product
63-14 oxid/Red·Action
. 
63-15a Flamma.-Flsh.Pt.
, 
63-15b Flame Extension
63-16 Explodability
63-"17 Storage Stability 
. . 
: -
63-18 Viscosity _.., ___
63-19 Miscibility
63-20 Corros.Char'act.
63-21 Dielec.Bkd.Vltg.
Fulfille
d
.. . 
. . . 
y 
Y· 
y 
·y
y 
NA 
y 
I 
.. .- . 
y
NA 
·r
NA 
- .. 
. .. 
- . 
.. 
Descrip. 
Liqui_d 
9.3 lbs 
per gal. 
5,4�. 
Ne>te 1 
>210°F
None 
. 
Note 
. -
682 
.. 
. 
2 
. . 
cPs 
' 
-
at 30 RPM
Note 2 
-
-
JIBID No. 
04-15-96
440004-01 
II ti 
II II 
04-15-96
440004-01 
MRID•No. 
·. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II . 
ti 
. ; 
,i 
.. -
· 11 
ti 
. . 
. .. 
II 
II 
·11 
II 
II 
II 
. .  
· II 
� 
II 
,· 
ti 
. . 
. . 
Explanations: Y = The R�1rements_llere Fulfilled; N = The Requirements I/ere N�t Fulfilled; NA= Not Applicable; G = Date Gap; U = Requ1 res Upgrachng; I = Jnc�lete or In Progress; II c 1/a,ved. 
Note 1. 63·14. Oxi./Red. Property: The reagents were added to the EP in a 11111ss ratio 5:1 of EP to the reagent. 
The rc;agents used were water, Zn, NH,H,PO,, and 1X l:MnO,. The product was oxidized by 1X t::Hr(),. 
Note 2. 63-17 end 63·20.: the registrant reported that these two studies will be initiated together in 1996 •. 
' 
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:i>a:g�-·-·-· _ is not included. in· this. copy • 
. . ·\,��es·� through· � are ,;iot included • 
• i • 
· · .. The·: 11rat�rj,a1 . not .included contains the following . type_ . of
i,nformation: 
�.Iqentity.of product inert inc;rredients. 
Ide'nti ty of product im�ur.ities. . 
Description of the product manufactufing process. 
Description of quality controi proce�ures. 
:rderiti ty of the source of product ingr�a.ients � 
__ _ · Sale� or other commercial/financial information. 
__ A draft product·label •. 
_ ... 
� .The product confidential statement of for:ttiula.
Information about a pending registration action. 
FIFRA registratiqn �ata .• ·... . . .  
Ttie a6cument 1s a dupl) .. ca�e o� '. page {_s)_ --------'---' 
• •. ;... . (': . .-.:.:-: - 7. -. ..-!: .. · ?.: 
The document is not·r�sp6ns'ive�t6ctn€-requesi. 
The information not included is generaily co�sidered ponfidentia1· �.
by product registr.ants. if_ yo� have any questions, please· contac::t 
the individual who prepared the _response. to _Y�ur request. · 
/' 
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organisms. in neighboring areas. Do not contaminate water when 
disposing of equipment washwater. 
This chemical demonstrates the· properties _and characteristics 
associated with chemicals detected in ground water. The use of 
this chemical· in areas· where soils are permeable, particularly 
where the ground water is shallow, may result in groun_d water 
contamination. 
·Acetochlor has properties that may result in surface water
contamination via dissolved runoff and erosion. Practices shoul�
be"followed to minimize the potential for --dissoived runoff and/or
runoff erosion.
Physical or Chemical Hazards 
1 Spray solution of this product should be mixed,. stored and 
app1ied only in !jtainless steel, alumin�, fiberglass, plastic 
and plastic�lined ·steel containers. 
DO NOT MIX, STORE OR APPLY THIS THIS PRODUCT ·oR SPRAY SOLUTIONS 
OF THIS PROD{J:CT IN GALVANIZED STEEL OR UNLINED STEEL (EXCEPT. 
STAI.NLESS S'l;'E!El,.) CONTAINERS OR SPRAY TANKS. This product or spray 
solutions of this product react with such containers and tanks to 
produce hydrogen gas which · may· fot'lll a . highly combusti"ble gas 
mixture. This gas mixture could flash or explode,. causing serious 
personal injury, if ignited by· open .flames, sparks, welder's 
torch, lighted cigarette or other ignition sources� 
' ·ACTIVE INGREDIENTS:* 
Ace:tochlor ,.[ 2.;.chloro-N-ethoxymethyl-N-
( 2-ethyl-6-methylphenyl) acetamide) •••••••••••••• �-· •••••. 2"1. St 
· Atrazine, [2-ch1oro-4�(ethylamino)-6-
' f · . ( isopropylamino) s-triazine.] and related triazines •••••• l�_. lt 
Glyphosate,[N-phosphonomethyl)glycine, 
in the fo_rm · of its isopropylamine .salt • .' ••.••.• � ••.•••••••• 8 •. lt 
INERT INGR11;DIENTS: ••••••••••• ·• .••••••.••••••••••• � •. � .• • �. '.• • 54. 31 
100.ot
*Contains 240 grams/liter or 2.0 pounds/gallon of acetochlor, 180
grams/liter or 1�5 pounds/gallon of atrazine and related
compounds and 90 grams/liter or 0.75 pound/gallon of
glyphosate, in the form of its isopropylamine salt which is
equivalent to 0.56 pounds/gallon of the acid, glyphosate.
This product is protected by U.S. Pat. No. 4,256,481 and U.S. 
Patent No. 4,405,531. Other pateqts pending. No license is 
granted under any non-u.s. patent(s) 
4 
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Appendix F: GAO Redacted Example 
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Appendix G: Toxicity Chart 
Toxicity Chart 
ACUTE ORAL TOXICITY: 
Category I 
 LD50 <   50 mg/kg 
DANGER  
Skull and Crossbones 
Fatal if swallowed  
Category II 
 LD50 > 50 mg/kg < 500 mg/kg 
WARNING  
No symbol  
May be fatal if swallowed 
Category III 
LD50 > 500 mg/kg < 5000 mg/kg 
CAUTION  
No symbol  
Harmful if swallowed 
Category IV 
 LD50 > 5000 mg/kg 
CAUTION or no signal word  
No symbol  
No hazard statement required; registrant 
may choose to use Category III statement 
ACUTE ORAL TOXICITY: 
Category 1 
LD50 < 5 mg/kg 
and  
Category 2 
 LD50 > 5 mg/kg < 50 mg/kg 
DANGER  
Skull and Crossbones in diamond 
Fatal if swallowed  
Category 3 
 LD50 > 50 mg/kg < 300 mg/kg 
DANGER  
Skull and Crossbones in diamond 
Toxic if swallowed  
Category 4 
LD50 > 300 mg/kg < 2000 mg/kg 
WARNING  
Exclamation point in  diamond 
Harmful if swallowed  
Category 5 
 LD50> 2000 mg/kg < 5000 mg/kg (See Note 
(e) to GHS Table 3.1.1.)
WARNING
No symbol  
May be harmful if swallowed 
[LD50 > 5000 mg/kg not classified; 
no specified label elements] 
320 
Appendix H: USDA-EPA Scientists Statement 
321 
Appendix I: NK603 European Regulations 
In 2004, EU approved NK603 for food/feed market (but not for cultivation). The final 
approval, by the European Commission takes into consideration:  
 The European Parliament and Council of 12 March 2001 Directive 2001/18/EC
(on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified
organisms)
 The EFSA’s authority, requirements and procedures regarding food law and
safety according to EC 178/2002
 EC suggests that EC 1830/2003 (regarding labeling) be used to help streamline
market transactions as well as secure necessary product information in case of
health hazard recall. Within this regulation, 1829/2003 (on genetically modified
food and feed) was referred to regarding keeping track of products registered as
GMO or containing GMOs. 1829/2003 was also directly mentioned in Article 1:
Consent.
 This regulation states that it grants authority to CA in Spain to place NK603 on
the market without prejudice to EC 258/97 (concerning novel food and novel
food ingredients, but this regulation was REPEALED and replaced with EC
2015/2283 (on novel foods)—which also replaces EC 1852/2001 (on laying
down detailed rules for making certain information available to the public and
for the protection of information pursuant to European Parliament and Council
Regulation EC 258/9) and amends EC 1169/2011 (on the provision of food
information to consumers) . Cited in EC 258/97 (which pertains to NK603) is:
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Directive 70/457 of 29 September 1970 on the common catalogue of 
varieties of agricultural plant species (REPEALED in 2002 and replaced with EC 
53/2002 on the common catalogue of varieties of agricultural plant 
species…which mainly covers seeds/cultivation crops, so it doesn’t apply to 
NK603);  
Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into the 
environment of genetically modified organisms (for establishing a Community 
system for environmental assessment. (REPEALED and replace with EC 
2001/18);  
EC 258/97 suggests that public health concerns be addressed to Scientific 
Committee for Food set up by Decision 74/234/EEC (this committee was 
absorbed into the EFSA in 2003);  
states that Directive 89/397/EEC of 14 June 1989 on the official control of 
foodstuffs (REPEALED and replace by EC 882/2004 on official controls 
performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, 
animal health and animal welfare rules) and Council Directive 93/99/EEC of 29 
October 1993 on the subject of additional measures concerning the official control 
of foodstuffs  apply to novel foods or food ingredients (REPEALED in 1993 and 
replaced with 93/10 EEC establishing implementing provisions for Council 
Decision 92/481/EEC on the adoption of an action plan for the exchange between 
Member State administrations of national officials who are engaged in the 
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implementation of Community legislation required to achieve the internal market 
(Karolus Programme), which was amended in 1994 by EC 94/818 (same title);  
69/414/EEC on setting up a Standing Committee for Foodstuffs 
(REPEALED in 2002 and replaced with EC 178/2002 on laying down the general 
principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety 
Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety);  
